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당첨되었다는 제목으로 메일이 왔네요.

아래 제목으로 메일이 왔네요. Claim your $500 + Spins before they expire

klip

・15 reads

Fake Binance VIP Signals Channel & Brand Impersonation Scam (@Team5522

This report is regarding a cryptocurrency scam network impersonating the Binance brand on Telegram. The channel "Binance Spot & FutuRes" (@next10xgem1) with over 322,000 subscribers is actively using Binance's copyrighted name and logo. The primary admin, @Team5522, uses a Telegram Premium yellow badge to falsely present himself as an officially verified Binance entity. Their modus operandi: They deceive users into paying between $100 to $300 in Bitcoin for fake "VIP Signals." They promise guaranteed profits, which is a financial fraud. They are utilizing Binance's trademark to build false trust and steal funds from innocent users. Attached are screenshots of their channel, the admin's profile (@Team5522), and their fraudulent VIP pricing menu. This is a blatant brand impersonation and financial scam. I request ChainBounty to flag this channel, the admin account, and report it to Binance's security team for takedown.

xxx

・28 reads

iCloud 보안 알림 피싱 메일

Apple 고객님, 귀하의 Apple 계정에 대한 보안 확인이 필요합니다. 날짜 및 시간: 2026년 10월 26일 오후 6:47 운영 체제: iOS 25 귀하의 계정에 변경이 감지되었습니다 귀하의 계정에서 변경이 감지되어 관련 작업이 일시적으로 동결되었습니다. 계정 보안을 위해 즉시 확인해 주세요. 사용 기기: iPhone 14 시스템: iOS 25 접속 IP: 211.234.252.203 위치: 인천 지금 확인하기 → 본인이 로그인한 것이 아니라면 즉시 Apple 지원에 문의해 주세요. iCloud 고객센터 Apple은 귀하의 개인정보를 소중히 여깁니다.

klip

・30 reads

[국제발신]

[Pi Net work]회원님의 지갑보호를위해 계정제한이되었습니다 본인확인바랍니다 https://pg.piminak.help

klip

・45 reads

이오영 면상까고 남들정보 팔아가며 찍은사진

[국제발신] 이오영 면#상#까고#남#들 정#보팔#아가며 #찍#은사진#궁#금한사#람 01079378010 #연#락하#면공#개

klip

・71 reads

[PI MINE]

회원님 자산 보호를위해 KYC검증을 완료해주시길 바랍니다.

klip

・114 reads

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November 21, 2026

Community Investigation
LUKSO recovery incident: What six Ethereum receipts show

After reports of a November 17–18, 2026, security incident involving LUKSO’s email-based account recovery system, SentinelTX examined a lead on Ethereum. It recorded six incoming transfers to one Ethereum address on November 18, totaling 52.4225 ETH. The same amount remained at that address at the recorded block, with no outgoing transaction observed. The receipts establish the direction and value of those transfers, not a link between the ETH and losses on LUKSO.What was reported on LUKSOSecondary coverage cited in the analysis reported about 300 affected Universal Profiles and about 1.4 million LYX in affected assets. SentinelTX did not review the original postmortem directly and could not query the LUKSO chain. These are reported figures, not on-chain findings of this analysis. The Ethereum records below cannot establish which profiles were affected or what happened to the LYX. (Source: SentinelTX analysis, p. 3.)What the Ethereum records showThe six verified value movements ran from the same unlabeled sender to the same unlabeled recipient. They occurred between 02:05:23 and 08:52:11 UTC on November 18. The analysis reviewed the recipient’s available ETH transaction history; only those six receipts were listed. (Source: SentinelTX analysis, pp. 6 and 15–17.)Figure 1. Six Ethereum transfers went to the same recipient on November 18, 2026, totaling 52.4225 ETH. Source: SentinelTX, structured value-movement evidence, p. 15.02:05:23 UTC: 2.277 ETH, block 26438836.06:51:47 UTC: 33.85 ETH, block 26440264.07:05:35 UTC: 11.739 ETH, block 26440333.07:12:47 UTC: 1.3735 ETH, block 26440368.07:21:35 UTC: 1.686 ETH, block 26440412.08:52:11 UTC: 1.497 ETH, block 26440864.At Ethereum block 26459795, with data refreshed on November 21 at 00:09:39 UTC, the recipient held 52.4225 ETH. The recorded count of transactions initiated by the recipient was zero, and the analysis observed no exchange deposit in the paths it followed. Neither observation extends beyond the records and snapshot examined. (Source: SentinelTX analysis, pp. 3 and 6.)Where the evidence stopsFigure 2. The recorded balance matched the amount received at Ethereum block 26459795; the analysis observed no outgoing transaction from the recipient. Source: SentinelTX, pp. 3 and 6, with the direction clarification on p. 22.The analysis began with an address presented as relevant to the incident. It did not independently establish who controlled it or why the transfers occurred. It also did not verify a path from LUKSO-side losses to these Ethereum receipts. The 52.4225 ETH is therefore a receipt total, not a measure of stolen, converted, or recovered LYX.Source limitation (SentinelTX analysis, p. 22): One flagged passage describes the recipient as sending funds. The structured transaction rows record the opposite direction: the address only received the six verified transfers. This article follows those structured rows and does not treat the disputed passage as evidence of any outgoing transfer, ownership, or theft.

LUKSO recovery incident: What six Ethereum receipts show
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Philippark
Philippark

November 21, 2026

Community Investigation
XMR1: 5.2 Million Tokens, 11 USDC Withdrawals and a Matched Bridge Payout

XMR1: 5.2 million tokens, 11 USDC withdrawals, and a matched bridge payoutOn 20 November, XMR1 moved from an account identified by Wagyu as its deployer to an account that Bitquery identifies as the seller behind the token’s collapse. XMR1 represents Monero within Hyperliquid’s trading system; it is not Monero’s native coin. This investigation asks what the public records establish about the transfers and later ETH movements, and where the explanation still depends on someone else’s account.The extended route is XMR1 sales on HyperCore → USDC cross-chain withdrawals through HyperEVM → USDC received on Arbitrum. A selected Arbitrum swap and a separate Arbitrum-to-Ethereum bridge transaction show how parts of that account’s activity changed form. On Ethereum, four transfers reached one recipient. These segments are supported at different levels: the withdrawal messages can be joined by their request identifiers, while only one later bridge pair has had its message content reconciled here. Money passing through the same account is not a claim that each individual unit has been followed through every trade.ScopeBasisIncident date20 November 2026; times below are UTCDirect explorer checksThree native XMR1 actions; 4,574 incident-window sell fills; 11 Core withdrawal / Arbitrum mint pairs; one CoW Trade event; one later bridge pair; six original Ethereum anchorsCalculation100,000 + 100,000 + 5,000,000 = 5,200,000 XMR1Sales scope and external tallyBitquery reported about $13.51 million and 420 buyers. The fill API independently yields 13,507,983.519996 USDC gross sales in the stated incident window; buyer count remains unverified.Evidence retrieval cutoff2026-11-21T01:43:03Z; historical records, not live balancesObservation boundaryDefined fill and withdrawal windows; one swap and one later bridge pair sampled. Other bridge routes and refunds are not reconciled.Three findings to carry through the reportFindingMeaningSales are measurable from the seller’s own fill records4,574 distinct incident-window sell fills total 369,622.92 XMR1. Gross proceeds and fees are accounted separately.All 11 withdrawal messages carry the Core request identifiersRecipient, amount and embedded Core nonce join each Core action to an Arbitrum USDC mint; the fee is 0.2 USDC per pair.One later Arbitrum–Ethereum pair matches beyond amount and timeThe immutable burn-message fields and hook data agree. This validates the selected pair without validating every bridge or the hosting explanation.What moved on Hyperliquid?The deployer role means the account associated with creating the token, rather than a separate Ethereum token contract. A spot balance is a balance used for trading the token. The native action records inspected here say sendAsset, with both sourceDex and destinationDex set to spot. Each identifies the same destination and the XMR1 token identifier. The field signatureChainId is not a reason to call these Ethereum transfers: the records are from the Hyperliquid explorer and say hyperliquidChain: Mainnet.At 04:46:58, the first record specifies 100,000 XMR1. A second 100,000 follows at 05:14:30, then 5,000,000 at 05:16:10. The first-to-last interval is 29 minutes 12 seconds. That measures the span of these three records, not the duration of the intrusion or all subsequent selling. The transaction appendix preserves their hashes and blocks.20 November UTCRecorded XMR1 amount04:46:5810000005:14:3010000005:16:105000000Start Figure 1 with the deployer account at the top. Follow each solid arrow through its amount panel to the common recipient. The parallel panels make the three records visible without implying that they occurred at equal intervals.Figure 1. Solid arrows summarize the three native records. Position and line width are schematic. The explorer view exposes the action fields but no separate execution receipt; this report describes the recorded actions and does not invent a success flag. Sources: the three native transaction links in Appendix A.The key observation is concentration: the same recipient is specified in every record. This is not proof of the person operating that account. Nor does the transfer quantity measure how much real Monero backed the tokens, or the amount buyers later paid for them. Those questions require different records.How much XMR1 did the recipient sell?A fill is one executed piece of an order. One order can match many resting orders, so a fill count is not a buyer count. The official API identifies the XMR1/USDC market as @260, linked to token index 404 and the same XMR1 identifier used in the native actions. We queried the seller through 13:00 UTC on 20 November and kept XMR1 sells after the first deployer transfer at 04:46:58.926 UTC. Hyperliquid’s official fill API documentation.The retrieved records contain 4,574 distinct sell fills in that interval. Their first timestamp is 04:49:32.170 and their last is 10:28:02.058 UTC. Multiplying each fill’s XMR1 quantity by its USDC price gives gross proceeds of 13,507,983.519996 USDC. Fees in those records total 8,110.80642437 USDC; subtracting them gives 13,499,872.71357163 USDC. These are trade-accounting quantities, not fiat withdrawals, a live balance, or a separate loss to add to the later transfers.Incident-window fill measureResultSold XMR1369,622.92Distinct sell fills4,574Gross USDC / reported USDC fees13,507,983.519996 / 8,110.80642437Gross less those fees13,499,872.71357163 USDCExclusionTwo small buys and two small sells before the first deployer transfer; other markets excludedThree overlapping API pages were deduplicated by market, trade ID, order ID, action hash and side. The final page held 702 records, below the 2,000-record response cap. The API exposes only the latest 10,000 fills, which remains a retrieval limit. It does not supply counterparties here, so we have not independently counted Bitquery’s reported 420 buyers. Appendix C gives the precise query and first/last fill anchors.Can the USDC exits be linked to Arbitrum receipts?Yes, for the 11 requests examined here. Hyperliquid’s native explorer calls each action sendToEvmWithData. Its destinationRecipient is the seller’s address, and destinationChainId is 3. This number is a CCTP domain identifier for Arbitrum, not Ethereum chain ID 3. The Arbitrum receiving transactions identify source domain 19, which Circle assigns to HyperEVM. Circle’s domain identifiers.The decisive link is inside the receiving message. Its hook data—a small payload that accompanies the transfer—preserves the full Core sender address and the 64-bit Core request nonce. A nonce is an identifier for the request; it is not the block timestamp. In every pair, that value matches the native action’s nonce, while the recipient and the USDC amount agree. Circle publishes the byte positions used for this check in its hook library. Circle’s published withdrawal-hook layout.Withdrawal reconciliationObserved resultCore requests / Arbitrum receiving transactions11 / 11; each request joined by its embedded sender and nonceCore-side amount, normalized to six USDC decimals13,281,001.725471 USDCArbitrum amount minted to the seller13,280,999.525471 USDCForwarding fees in the receiving events11 × 0.2 = 2.2 USDCSeparate Core ledger fees0.023419 USDC; not added to the destination mint amountThe first pair makes the difference concrete. The Core request at 04:54:40.128 carries nonce 1795150467235 and 7,474,206.546009 USDC. At 04:54:48, Arbitrum records a successful mint of 7,474,206.346009 USDC and a 0.2 USDC fee; the received hook contains the same sender and nonce. These are linked request and receipt records, rather than a match inferred merely from eight seconds of elapsed time. First Core request · First Arbitrum receipt.All 11 native actions and destination events are preserved in Appendix C. This establishes the cross-chain withdrawal linkage, but the intermediate HyperEVM transaction hashes were not individually fetched.Nor does a match establish that every USDC unit came only from XMR1 sales: the account also has activity outside that market. The API’s tiny decimal tail on one large ledger amount is retained in the research evidence; public USDC comparisons use six decimal places, as do the receiving token’s raw units. official non-funding ledger API documentation.What does a selected conversion show?At 04:57:53 UTC, an Arbitrum CoW settlement records the seller as the owner of a Trade event. The event sells 1,000,000 USDC and records 578.374894447965203136 ETH as the buy amount. CoW is a decentralized trade-settlement service here, not evidence of a custodial exchange deposit or a sale for bank money. Selected settlement and logs.Selected Trade eventExact recordBlock / event index525826782 / 2Sell amount / buy amount1,000,000 USDC / 578.374894447965203136 ETHEvent feeAmount0; this field does not account for every service cost or gas feeVerification boundaryTrade event inspected; independent internal ETH payment trace unavailable in the explorer responseThis closes one conversion at the event level. It is not a reconciliation of all ten settlements in the earlier external analysis, and the seller’s shared balance prevents assigning this one swap’s exact ETH to the later 1,013 ETH bridge input. Keeping that distinction avoids presenting a continuous line where only selected transactions have been checked.How does the selected bridge reach Ethereum?At 05:03:54, the selected Arbitrum transaction takes 1,013.043520159326998830 ETH and executes swaps before a CCTP burn of 1,733,501.731759 USDC. CCTP transfers native USDC by destroying it on the source chain and authorizing issuance on the destination chain. The Ethereum transaction at 05:04:11 records the corresponding received message, mints 1,733,259.041517 USDC for the payout contract and ultimately pays the seller 1,000.344443544774143612 ETH. The two ETH amounts differ because this route includes conversions and charges; it is not a transfer of an unchanged ETH quantity.Selected bridge stageQuantity / evidenceArbitrum input1,013.043520159326998830 ETH · source transaction, block 525,828,140USDC burned / minted1,733,501.731759 / 1,733,259.041517 USDCCCTP executed fee242.690242 USDC; burned amount − minted amountEthereum payout1,000.344443544774143612 ETH · internal transfer, block 26,454,094The connection can now be tested against message content. The source MessageSent and destination MessageReceived agree on domain 3 → 0, the source messenger, burn token, mint recipient, amount, original message sender, maximum fee and complete hook data. The hook also contains the seller as the intended recipient of the final payout. This is a substantially stronger association than the old explorer link or an amount-and-time guess. Source: Arbitrum logs · Ethereum logs.In Figure 2, begin at the Arbitrum ETH input and follow the stages downward. Solid lines describe stages within a transaction; the dashed connector marks the cross-chain association established by matching the immutable message fields and hook. The figure omits intermediate swap pools and secondary service payments, so it is a schematic for this one pair, not the whole incident.Figure 2. ETH quantities are rounded to six decimals in the image; the table keeps full precision. The USDC difference of 242.690242 is the CCTP executed fee, not a second loss. Other route fees and conversions are not bundled into that number. The association applies to the two transaction hashes in Appendix D.Two protocol details limit what “matching” means. In CCTP V2, the source emits an empty nonce before attestation; the destination carries an assigned 32-byte nonce. Their equality is therefore not a valid test. The received fee and expiration fields are also populated later. We compared the fields that should remain unchanged, rather than declaring the entire byte string identical. This does not independently revalidate Circle’s off-chain signatures or the other six bridge pairs. Circle’s published burn-message layout.What is independently visible on Ethereum?Before the first XMR1 action, an Ethereum transaction at 03:30:23 includes an internal transfer of 0.0978829303948 ETH to the examined address. An internal transfer is a value movement made during contract execution; it differs from the transaction’s outer sender. Etherscan labels its source as a Tornado Cash pool. The transaction was successful, but the label does not identify the person who funded it. Funding transaction.At 05:04:11, another successful transaction paid 1,000.344443544774143612 ETH internally to the examined address through a contract labeled Mayan: Fast MCTP by Etherscan. The explorer’s overview links this Ethereum transaction to the selected Arbitrum source hash. The preceding section reconciles this receipt against the selected Arbitrum source’s message fields and hook data; it is no longer based only on the explorer’s cross-chain annotation. Ethereum payout record.Four successful direct transfers then sent ETH from the examined address to the same Ethereum recipient. The first was 10 ETH at 05:05:35, followed by the largest, 2,325.669594723330818716 ETH at 05:06:11; then 1,500 ETH at 05:10:23 and 1,000 ETH at 05:18:59. Together they total 4,835.669594723330818716 ETH, excluding transaction fees. These are four distinct transaction hashes, counted once each. The total is a redistribution amount, not an additional loss or verified cash-out.20 November UTCDirect transfer to the common recipient05:05:3510 ETH · transaction05:06:112325.669594723330818716 ETH · transaction05:10:231500 ETH · transaction05:18:591000 ETH · transactionRead Figure 3 from the two upper receipt panels to the shared Ethereum account, then to the recipient below. Solid arrows summarize independently inspected Ethereum value movements. The two incoming observations do not account for the whole outgoing amount; this is deliberately not a complete balance reconciliation.Figure 3. Diagram quantities are rounded where marked. Exact values and full transaction hashes are in the tables and Appendix B. The upper-right receipt is independently visible on Ethereum; its selected Arbitrum source is reconciled in Figure 2 and Appendix D. Figure 3 stays within Ethereum, so it does not draw the intermediate cross-chain stages again.The order matters. Ethereum redistribution began after the first XMR1 action and before the second and third. The final ETH transfer followed the last native action. A narrative that first finishes the entire token outflow and only then begins the money trail would conceal this overlap. Ordering the events still does not fill every sales, swap and bridge link.Bitquery’s original investigation remains the incident lead and source for its broader sales, buyer and route tallies. The new calculations above replace reliance on its rounded sales total for this defined window; they do not independently validate every broader tally or any actor attribution.Does the hosting breach explain the key exposure?Wagyu representative’s post-mortem says the deployer key was in files retained from an old server that had been deleted. He also promised personal refunds and a later relaunch. These are project statements. They do not establish which files were taken, the exact access path, the intruder’s identity, or that compensation has been completed.DV’s reproduction of a joint 1984 ehf. and CERT-IS notice separately describes a serious attack on the host and a temporary suspension of services. It supports the existence of a hosting incident. The notice does not itself identify Wagyu’s deployer key or prove that this key was extracted through that incident.There are several explanations the chain records alone cannot distinguish: exposure through retained server data, compromise through a different copy of the key, or another form of authorized-key misuse. No ranking of those alternatives is claimed here. Server access logs, retention records and evidence connecting a particular key copy to the unauthorized signing activity would narrow the cause.Response points tied to the evidenceQuestionRecord needed nextWhat could the old key still control?An incident-time inventory of token balances, account authority and any replaced signing permissions.Which buyers were compensated?Authenticated refund transactions matched to eligible recipients and amounts; a promise alone is insufficient.Which bridge movements belong to this route?Replicate the other six bridge pairings with source events, immutable message fields, destination receipts and fee reconciliation; one matched pair is not enough for the whole route.Retiring infrastructure and retiring signing authority are different operations. If the key remains able to authorize value movement, removing the server does not make surviving copies harmless. That is a general security interpretation of the project’s explanation, not proof of how the incident occurred. For investigators, the practical next step is a dated authority inventory alongside the transfer record, rather than an expanding graph of loosely related wallets.Evidence appendixFull wallet strings below link to address pages on the relevant chain. Roles describe the records used here and do not identify their controllers. The deployer role is attributed to Wagyu and Bitquery; the explorer independently confirms the account’s user field in the three actions.Role and chainFull addressReported deployer · Hyperliquid0x207700bd207df757825f9193ef9c648c1c65e06aXMR1 recipient · Hyperliquid0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bfExamined account · Ethereum0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bfLarge-transfer recipient · Ethereum0xf32d7842611a5d63b875075dadd19c55f3f1dc59Funding pool · Ethereum (explorer label)0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8FcPayout contract · Ethereum (explorer label)0xC1062b7C5Dc8E4b1Df9F200fe360cDc0eD6e7741Examined account · Arbitrum0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bfCross-chain withdrawal contract · HyperEVM (message field)0x6b9e773128f453f5c2c60935ee2de2cbc5390a24USDC token contract · Arbitrum0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831USDC burn-token contract · HyperEVM0xb88339cb7199b77e23db6e890353e22632ba630fAppendix A · Native action anchorsRecord 1Native HyperliquidTime / block2026-11-20T04:46:58Z / 1227836280Asset / quantityXMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 100000Full hash0x328fc4efdff6c881340904492f4b780201d700d57af9e753d65870429efaa26bRecord 2Native HyperliquidTime / block2026-11-20T05:14:30Z / 1227859502Asset / quantityXMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 100000Full hash0xfe18b36928ccc7ecff9204492fa62e0208de004ec3cfe6bfa1e15ebbe7c0a1d7Record 3Native HyperliquidTime / block2026-11-20T05:16:10Z / 1227860884Asset / quantityXMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 5000000Full hash0x8453d81d6945e81885cd04492fab940204a80003044906ea281c83702849c203Appendix B · Ethereum anchorsFieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T03:30:23Z / 26453625Asset / quantity0.0978829303948 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0x33513047a342ea41bbcc6503aa8c889a8b5d05a4ef332354fba682fdc60b53eeFieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T05:06:11Z / 26454104Asset / quantity2325.669594723330818716 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0x74a704c0b00bd9cb6c671e339f361718c7d885d5776d13074ecb0ed17edf4752FieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T05:05:35Z / 26454101Asset / quantity10 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0x43e61634dd6a8c01e8fc9fad0d04b56ec602f42f4a37e3080d32d6f69e1d892aFieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T05:10:23Z / 26454125Asset / quantity1500 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0xf5820bca522aeff14766a66ad939a25d447837f544371e6fff2597804c401b62FieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T05:18:59Z / 26454168Asset / quantity1000 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0x9380c8291ae4e4dfad92a704a6bb8f97d6f70d5b97edff6b887b318ffd05cd66FieldEthereum transactionTime / block2026-11-20T05:04:11Z / 26454094Asset / quantity1000.344443544774143612 ETHStatusSuccessFull hash0x3a93c0cb9085ed6d73d6f0e2a8bcfafc942d8d4af7b42b9d34abc10576b07240Appendix C · Sales and cross-chain withdrawal anchorsAll times in this appendix are UTC on 20 November 2026. The full fill dataset was retrieved and deduplicated; the two fill records below are selected anchors, not a list of every counterparty fill. The withdrawal tables include every one of the 11 matched requests and receipts.Reproduce the public API queryValueEndpoint / methodhttps://api.hyperliquid.xyz/info · POST (read-only query)Fill requesttype=userFillsByTime; user=examined address; startTime=1795132800000; endTime=1795179600000; aggregateByTime=false. Subsequent pages restart at the preceding page’s last timestamp.Incident filtercoin=@260; side=A; time ≥1795150018926; feeToken=USDC. @260 maps to XMR1 token index404 in spotMeta.Ledger requesttype=userNonFundingLedgerUpdates; same user and time window.Selected fillRecordRole / UTCFirst incident-window sell fill / 2026-11-20T04:49:32.170000+00:00Quantity × price4.06 XMR1 × 492.31 USDCTrade ID / order ID19548947811789 / 611017042039Full action hash0xa796e1e81e2ce7b1a91004492f53fe02039400cdb92006834b5f8d3add20c19cSelected fillRecordRole / UTCLast retrieved incident-window sell fill / 2026-11-20T10:28:02.058000+00:00Quantity × price19.94 XMR1 × 1.0 USDCTrade ID / order ID818168203372803 / 611038769808Full action hash0x5eb0cd98e63bd136602a044933a73b0203cc007e813ef008027978eba53fab21Core request / UTC / nonceFull native action hash#1 · 04:54:40.128 · 1795150467235 · block 12278427880x09c132ddd91dbcd10b3a04492f64e402011d00c37410dba3ad89de30981196bb#2 · 04:58:28.158 · 1795150701921 · block 12278460020x9adc3d0f742d38159c5504492f71720201b000f50f2056e73ea4e86233211200#3 · 05:00:20.477 · 1795150813676 · block 12278475850xfc91d6f7ef08cbf9fe0b04492f77a102066300dd8a0beacca05a824aae0ca5e4#4 · 05:02:57.963 · 1795150971545 · block 12278497710xb9a50dce599f70a3bb1e04492f802b0201c200b3f4928f755d6db92118934a8e#5 · 05:04:40.554 · 1795151074715 · block 12278512170x2181764eda26916822fb04492f85d10202f500347529b03ac54a21a1992a6b52#6 · 05:06:49.227 · 1795151203043 · block 12278530110x203d6f7e44b1af5b21b704492f8cd30203fc0063dfb4ce2dc4061ad103b58945#7 · 05:09:12.026 · 1795151345338 · block 12278550110xc2ea9bd43b431038c46404492f94a3020f3d00b9d6462f0a66b34726fa46ea23#8 · 05:11:54.918 · 1795151508869 · block 12278573240xf2c5dbfe4aea5c91f43f04492f9dac02035a00e3e5ed7b64968e875109ee367c#9 · 05:13:44.217 · 1795151618162 · block 12278588370xac851e7a49bed781adfe04492fa395020382005fe4b1f653504dc9cd08b2b16c#10 · 05:17:20.669 · 1795151834464 · block 12278618670x414d5f5f10cfc98d42c704492faf6b020a6d0044abc2e85fe5160ab1cfc3a377#11 · 05:20:25.736 · 1795152018245 · block 12278644150x3cedf29f071faea53e6704492fb95f0201560084a212cd77e0b69df1c613888fPaired Arbitrum receiptNet USDC and full transaction hash#1 · block 525826159 · 04:54:48 UTC7474206.346009 USDC · 0xa093ff4d80333eac0c94dee7d1995c9ba5df7e11362fa91c0ce1f1ae1e2a2828#2 · block 525826915 · 04:58:35 UTC2186171.005507 USDC · 0xdab445e7bba90bb1f34b323b145b9f6645fc9074101a74efa221d234c05131e2#3 · block 525827318 · 05:00:29 UTC640637.524008 USDC · 0xa9452eae1e4c78ea0ae0c2aeb88bdc77be4b23a33482dfd27985ea5f695c8328#4 · block 525827944 · 05:03:05 UTC380747.0356 USDC · 0x9c76efbdc2076de5d0576d0bb5a4449c55da1250d167d796d9445e1d3aa247bd#5 · block 525828360 · 05:04:48 UTC234024.180596 USDC · 0x72d875800fd7619aca7e4ab6958fb85552aabb4b0bce98257db2316d290c6e4f#6 · block 525828873 · 05:06:57 UTC787588.097878 USDC · 0x43f78f61ade094681d7ebd0bf24d0c7dc23195e194027380d7a4fd1eea40f8bc#7 · block 525829444 · 05:09:19 UTC591201.19169 USDC · 0xc5b26e510db06ce9cdefc14bf11b6a3b4e0c7d5f9ea66efa165c6f8afd396bf9#8 · block 525830116 · 05:12:02 UTC368961.31029 USDC · 0x3804984d90f6ec0ef8eec8da81deb626b83cfc1973a2c99c3fdc16fabf33628e#9 · block 525830554 · 05:13:52 UTC355987.266055 USDC · 0x1b06050d225149a17d3aa51b1561145811bc2dd3c7779eddb6815acee52923f7#10 · block 525831440 · 05:17:30 UTC204313.15134 USDC · 0x84bd76983cb3b0efe9dc40f9e43f323f8e9429955d66bf3135df06547a0f5d81#11 · block 525832175 · 05:20:34 UTC57162.416498 USDC · 0xf028b5a2e5488c862e92f279cdd5940fc92440c66e0697628b4ca542319a7168Pair numberReceived CCTP nonce (32 bytes)#10x7d1659ef4b401372a15fd949296187348ab26d6c1900dcaa2abf1e79856a10dc#20xeac90c639eb279ebecf76350dc7ecd5bc10bf79c1e9fc9b43478c2ce4fc0d1da#30x0589ce7b37ceff47268451844b5f67a6557b071124f0712dd88c857f70269068#40x416a64b349951f18fd8547a7139145456217e4515b2518b314bb7d3013805640#50x23f7707db8fa7ce305e5ab57486e615265becd0474d5bf9fe89f5a963ba47097#60x51183006f3aa1ac7934a451a9827b5181f6832f3b47273ab70efc120eea01d5f#70x57e963e09b86be85fb22937e64464f5a5c4b567c3e15d5aed784514d5b93c934#80x86d7974c271a8fc70c1433da04a4d8b636d057ae581eaa5410f12d2aae4b0595#90xb6b6f63b9d5b7b3a0176750d2fe5fafce3744f8bd1600da3c6d55f178319bcb9#100x58c958bb78dd57acdbf1926d3c2859f169615d928ded2f1f69b3c138bcac88f1#110x088b7b62d38f575dd5559c45dd6ecb858e4ca2c7bf8151b37366e447259a9ad9Appendix D · Selected conversion and bridge anchorsRecordFull hash / identifierArbitrum CoW settlement0x50d4490db13e0f7fdc3214b61ed4fb28dd172f437c794fe4265346e5fabb6b73CoW order UID0x2e1dd545358ba4fc398eacf39583dab775b83804b78052ce1b975aa56f3e867a1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf6affda41Arbitrum bridge source0x1b6f68247603d6c3d1754680d9f73aee87d1791a8e51ec92bea1dfa58a47733eEthereum bridge destination0x3a93c0cb9085ed6d73d6f0e2a8bcfafc942d8d4af7b42b9d34abc10576b07240Source MessageSent index / destination MessageReceived index225 / 251Destination CCTP nonce0xf458e998e40533c8519a95bf1ac3ba3a243513db0444c92a82206490b6dca56bRaw-message comparisonSource nonce zero before attestation. Immutable body prefix and hook match; populated destination fee/expiry fields excluded from the equality test.Method: direct native explorer inspection, official Hyperliquid read-only fill and ledger API queries, public Arbitrum Blockscout transaction/log data and independent Ethereum RPC receipt comparison. Decimal arithmetic was used for quantities and fees. The selected bridge’s source MessageSent bytes and destination MessageReceived bytes were decoded against Circle’s published layouts. The withdrawal hook sender and Core nonce were compared across all 11 pairs. Source-code layouts describe how to read the observed bytes; current code is not treated as a complete historical deployment audit. Broader SentinelTX results were not substituted for the missing primary records. This update does not establish all swap/bridge matches, all intermediate HyperEVM transaction hashes, complete balances, native Monero reserves, completed refunds or actor identity.

XMR1: 5.2 Million Tokens, 11 USDC Withdrawals and a Matched Bridge Payout
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i4283probe
i4283probe

November 16, 2026

Community Investigation
i4488 quota probe 3

i4488 bounded probe 3

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Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…

Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…

Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated Laundering OperationThe laundering infrastructure behind the recent Gravity Bridge exploit has now been largely uncovered.After tracing 87 confirmed attacker transactions and an additional 26 downstream movements, the overall flow of stolen funds is becoming clear. What initially appeared to be a straightforward bridge exploit has evolved into a highly structured laundering operation involving decentralized exchanges, relay wallets, non-custodial swap services, and centralized exchanges.This report summarizes the complete fund flow observed so far and highlights the remaining recovery opportunities.Executive SummaryTotal tracked transactions: 113Initial stolen assets converted into ETH almost immediatelyApproximately $4.7M converted through KyberSwap and 1inch2,600 ETH consolidated into a secondary aggregation walletFunds dispersed through dozens of one-time relay walletsConfirmed deposits identified at ChangeNOW and KuCoinMultiple staging wallets still hold potentially recoverable fundsSeveral laundering paths remain active and require real-time monitoringPhase 1 — Asset ConversionThe attacker-controlled wallet:0x7B582033061b96cC3F9421e73a749ED7C62da1F9immediately began converting stolen stablecoins into ETH.The swaps were executed primarily through KyberSwap and 1inch, suggesting the attacker wanted to reduce exposure to token freezes while maximizing liquidity.Observed transactions include:$100K USDC → ETH$200K USDC → ETH$500K USDC → ETH$400K USDT → ETHMultiple additional swapsIn total:Approximately $4.3M USDCApproximately $434K USDTwere converted into ETH within a short time window.The rapid conversion indicates pre-planning and suggests the operator anticipated potential blacklisting or asset recovery attempts.Phase 2 — ETH ConsolidationAfter conversion, the attacker consolidated funds into a second wallet:0x4d3ca32e687e871a58b78AcAc73bE59AC37C7A47A total of 2,600 ETH was transferred through multiple transactions:600 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETHThis wallet appears to have functioned as the primary distribution hub for the laundering operation.Rather than cashing out directly, the operator implemented a layered relay strategy designed to fragment attribution and complicate tracing efforts.Phase 3 — Distributed Relay LaunderingThe most notable discovery is the laundering architecture itself.Instead of sending large transfers directly to exchanges, the attacker repeatedly split funds into dozens of temporary wallets.The observed pattern resembles:Primary Wallets → One-Time Relay Wallets → Swap Service / Exchange → Cross-Chain ExitIndividual transfers were commonly observed in the 6–10 ETH range.This methodology significantly reduces the visibility of exchange deposits and makes automated clustering more difficult.The pattern appears intentional and operationally mature.Confirmed ChangeNOW ActivityThe largest identified laundering route currently leads to ChangeNOW.Observed destination:0xeba88149813bec1cccccfdb0dacefaaa5de94cb1Estimated deposits:Approximately 114 ETHRoughly $230,000 equivalentBecause ChangeNOW is non-custodial, recovery options are more limited.However, transaction records still exist.The highest priority investigative question is determining what assets these ETH deposits were converted into.Particular attention should be given to:Monero (XMR)Privacy-focused assetsCross-chain bridge destinationsIf conversion into privacy-preserving assets occurred, tracing may become significantly more difficult.Confirmed KuCoin DepositsA second laundering path has been identified through KuCoin.Known deposit address:0x45300136662dd4e58fc0df61e6290dffd992b785Estimated deposits:Approximately 6 ETHAdditional suspected deposit address:0x58edf78281334335effa23101bbe3371b6a36a51Status:Further confirmation requiredUnlike ChangeNOW, KuCoin operates as a custodial exchange and maintains KYC records.This creates a potential recovery and attribution opportunity if law enforcement or affected parties act quickly.Remaining On-Chain FundsSeveral wallets remain active and continue to warrant monitoring.Primary Staging Wallet0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562Current observations:Received 59 ETHOnly 15 ETH moved onwardApproximately 44 ETH potentially remains under attacker controlThis wallet may represent an operational staging point rather than a final cash-out destination.Additional Unresolved Destinations0xf1ed839d08309e2a52e58d69b06d286d35fc18bc — 15 ETH0xe1e471614305656114c39294637b65adccf665a3 — ~13 ETH0x58432e011aa493c404f80409d997b1eabdfd8e24 — 9 ETH0x79f376453537878eeb79fb7d2cdb2c10bc58f454 — 9 ETH0x98d9022fa2789c0d8e9cd49707599c6848619ed8 — 10 ETHThese wallets currently represent unresolved portions of the laundering network.Immediate Investigative Priorities1. KuCoin Cooperation RequestThis remains the strongest recovery opportunity.Required actions:Identify account owner(s)Preserve account recordsFreeze assets if still presentObtain associated KYC informationTiming is critical.2. ChangeNOW Exit TracingInvestigators should determine:Destination chainDestination assetConversion timingPotential privacy-coin exposureThis path likely contains the most important unanswered questions in the investigation.3. Real-Time Monitoring of Staging WalletsThe wallet:0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562should be monitored continuously.A significant portion of attacker-controlled funds may still be sitting on-chain.Any future movement could reveal:Additional exchange depositsAdditional swap servicesNew laundering infrastructureFinal cash-out attemptsConclusionThe Gravity Bridge attacker did not rely on a simple exchange cash-out strategy.Instead, the operator employed a structured relay-wallet laundering network designed to fragment attribution, obscure exchange deposits, and delay investigation.While a meaningful portion of the funds has already entered laundering channels, several opportunities remain.The most actionable leads currently include:KuCoin deposit attributionChangeNOW conversion tracingMonitoring of the 59 ETH staging walletThe next movements from these wallets will likely determine whether investigators can continue following the money — or whether the trail disappears into privacy infrastructure permanently.

ChainBounty

ChainBounty

6 months ago
Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation

Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation

How automated bots and shared infrastructure revealed a 10-month-old organized crime syndicate.The blockchain never forgets, but it can be incredibly complex to navigate. Recently, ChainBounty conducted a deep-dive forensic investigation into a significant asset theft involving $SUBY and other Solana-based tokens. What began as a single incident report evolved into the discovery of a professional, long-standing scam infrastructure that has now led to an active criminal investigation by the Cyber Crime Investigation Division in Seoul, South Korea.1. The Incident: Precision and AutomationOn May 30, 2025, a victim’s wallet was drained of approximately 8.2 million $SUBY tokens, along with $SSE and $DAW. The speed of the transfer was alarming.Our forensic analysis revealed that this wasn’t a manual operation. The assets were moved to an intermediary wallet (46S5bgHq...) and immediately processed through automated scripts. These bots executed swaps into stablecoins and distributed funds across multiple "hop" wallets with 0-second latency, ensuring the trail became as fragmented as possible within minutes.2. Identifying the “Cash Out” InfrastructureBy tracing the flow of stolen assets, we identified two primary exit points: Bitget Exchange and FixedFloat (a mixing service). While some deposits to these platforms occurred shortly before or after the specific $SUBY theft, our “Infrastructure Analysis” proved a definitive link. We discovered a massive, interconnected network:27 Common Fee Payers: A cluster of wallets consistently funded the gas fees for the attack wallets.63 Shared Addresses: These wallets acted as a central hub for multiple thefts over a 10-month period.The Forensic Anomaly: Why tracking the criminal organization is more effective than tracking the tokens aloneThis confirms that the attackers are not “lone wolves” but an organized syndicate operating a “Scam-as-a-Service” model on the Solana network.3. The Evidence: The Smoking GunThe most compelling evidence of organized crime was the Machine-like Transfer Patterns. Our timeline analysis showed batch processing intervals of exactly 15 to 28 seconds. This level of synchronization is only possible through a dedicated command-and-control (C2) botnet designed for money laundering.Through our investigation, we identified over $142,430 USDT funneled through the Bitget deposit addresses associated with this specific group.Inhuman execution: Batch processing and mechanical intervals confirm the use of laundering bots.4. Active Investigation and Next StepsChainBounty has officially submitted this forensic package to the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. The investigation is currently focused on:KYC De-anonymization: Working with Bitget to identify the account holders behind the identified deposit addresses.Cross-Chain Tracking: Tracing funds that exited via FixedFloat into Ethereum and Bitcoin.Asset Freezing: Coordinating with exchanges to blacklist and freeze the identified criminal infrastructure.Conclusion: Vigilance in the Web3 EraThis case is a stark reminder that in the world of DeFi, your digital footprint — and that of the hackers — is permanent. At ChainBounty, we are committed to turning the tide against these scam networks.We urge the community to stay vigilant. Do not click on suspicious partnership links or authorize “blind signings” in your wallet. The scammers are professional, but so is our pursuit of justice.Join the Fight. Follow our investigation and report suspicious activities at our community: 🔗 https://community.chainbounty.io 📧 For inquiries: [email protected]#ChainBounty #Solana #Forensics #CyberCrime #Web3Security #OSINT #CryptoInvestigation

ChainBounty

ChainBounty

10 months ago
MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report

MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report

IntroductionThis report details a real-world case submitted by an applicant to ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program. The victim approached us after suffering a significant loss due to a targeted social engineering attack. ChainBounty is actively assisting the victim by providing comprehensive on-chain forensics and intelligence analysis to trace the stolen assets and identify the perpetrators for law enforcement purposes.1. Executive SummaryThis report synthesizes the results of on-chain forensic analysis and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) investigation regarding the digital asset theft incident that occurred between December 7 and 8, 2025.The incident appears to have originated from a social engineering attack targeting an active user of Memex, a major dApp in the MemeCore (M) ecosystem. The attacker impersonated community administrators and creators to lure the victim into a fake Telegram group, then induced them to connect their wallet to a fraudulent bot service using “high-yield staking rewards” as bait.The victim created a new wallet and transferred assets as instructed, but the flow was designed to funnel funds into the attacker’s scam network.On-chain analysis reveals that the stolen funds did not end with a simple transfer. A multi-stage laundering flow was observed, involving MRC-20 token swaps within the MemeCore network, repetitive transactions based on the WM contract, cross-chain bridging via Meson Finance, inflows into Centralized Exchanges (CEX), and dispersed withdrawals across multiple exchanges.Notably, a “direct-to-exchange” flow is clearly visible in the early stages. M tokens were directly transferred from the victim’s wallet to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and this fund was collected into the exchange’s hot wallet (0x1ab4…) within a short period. This suggests the attacker operated a direct route to the exchange alongside other methods to accelerate cash-out early on.The damage is calculated based on two criteria:Total M Token Outflow (Direct): 2,151.11 M, approx. $2,881.39 (Combined sum of direct transfers to exchange + EOA/Gathering Wallet).Total M Token Outflow (Including Bridge): 8,280.11 M, approx. $11,150.17 (Direct outflow + Meson bridge outflow included).Furthermore, clues suggesting a connection to specific social accounts and developer community profiles were identified in Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), which was confirmed as a key hub for money laundering. Based on this, grounds to narrow down suspect candidates have been partially secured. However, this is a circumstantial judgment based on the correlation between public information (OSINT) and on-chain data, and is not a legally confirmed conclusion.1.1 Summary StatisticsThe key flows are summarized as follows:1.2 Summary of Key Flows (4 Core Paths)Path 1: Victim → Direct Outflow to Bitget (Attempt at Immediate Cash-out)A total of 2,140.72 M (approx. $2,867) was directly transferred from the Victim Wallet (0xdc54…) to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…).The deposit was collected into the Bitget exchange hot wallet (Bitget 6, 0x1ab4…) within minutes (approx. 3–5 mins).This flow represents the attacker sending “M tokens that are easy to cash out immediately” straight to the exchange.Path 2: Victim → Gathering Wallet 1 → Meson Bridge → Gathering Wallet 2 (Mainstream of Indirect Laundering)After WM contract processing, 5 types of MRC-20 tokens were received by the Victim Wallet and then drained to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…e6).In Gathering Wallet 1, MRC-20s were swapped back to M, and 6,129 M was bridged via Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3).6,122.87 M arrived at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) on the BNB Chain.Path 3: Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Reconsolidation at Bitget Deposit 2 (Possible Mixing with Other Victims’ Funds)900.65 M from Gathering Wallet 1 and 5,007.02 M from Gathering Wallet 2 flowed into Suspect Bitget Deposit 2 (0xb408…).The combined total is 5,907.67 M. As there is a “possibility of other victims’ funds being mixed,” this needs to be interpreted separately from the victim’s sole damage amount.Subsequent collection into Bitget 6 (0x1ab4…) was confirmed.Path 4: Multi-chain Dispersed Withdrawal from Gathering Wallet 2 (Evasion/Smurfing)From Gathering Wallet 2, after swapping M → BNB, there is a record of 37.51 BNB being dispersed and withdrawn in 48 transactions to 5 exchanges: Bybit, Bitget, MEXC, Binance, and Remitano.Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base as well as BNB, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern.2. Incident Mechanism and Psychological AnalysisThis incident appears to have started from a social engineering scenario targeting human trust rather than technical flaws such as system vulnerabilities. It seems to be a variation of the typical “Pig Butchering (Sha Zhu Pan)” tactic adapted to the MemeCore ecosystem context. There are indications that the attacker analyzed the community atmosphere and the victim’s activity patterns beforehand to approach with a tailored script.2.1 Manipulating the Environment to Build Trust: “The Illusion of the Fake Room” The attack seems to have begun with an approach from an account mimicking an acquaintance active on Memex. In anonymous messenger environments like Telegram, profile pictures and Display Names can be configured similarly, and Usernames (Handles) are hard to distinguish with just a one-character difference. The attacker judged to have secured trust by exploiting these characteristics. The Telegram room the victim was invited to contained multiple accounts impersonating Admins and Creators. They staged the room to look like an “Official Community” by continuing conversations or sharing profit verification screenshots even before the victim joined. In such an environment, it was easy to mistake the room for an extension of the official Memex community, which became the basis for the fraud.2.2 Technical Deception: Fake Bot and Inducing Wallet Connection Once a certain level of trust was established, the attacker guided the victim saying, “You can receive staking rewards if you connect your wallet via the Telegram bot”. The method is close to a typical Phishing or Drainer type. The wallet (0xDC54…69b) the victim newly created and connected was a “clean wallet” with almost no transaction history. The moment the victim trusted the instructions and moved assets, it is likely the attacker secured control through one (or a combination) of the following methods:Possibility that the transaction signed via the bot was actually an Unlimited Token Approval, not staking.Possibility that it was designed to execute an asset Transfer transaction during the signing or connection process.Possibility that keys or permissions were exposed to the attacker during the wallet creation/connection process. The key point is that “Wallet Connection” may have turned into an act of handing over actual asset authority, rather than simple login or authentication.3. Technical Characteristics of MemeCore Ecosystem and Asset StructureTo interpret the fund flow, it is necessary to first understand the background of the MemeCore chain where the victim’s assets existed and the asset structure. This explains why the attacker performed repetitive swaps and why the laundering path developed into a specific pattern.3.1 MemeCore and Proof of Meme (PoM) MemeCore is a Layer 1 chain aimed at connecting the cultural value of Memes with an economic reward structure. It promotes Proof of Meme (PoM) as its consensus structure, which includes elements like community contribution and viral activities in the reward system alongside simple staking. The base asset of this chain is the M token. M is used for core functions such as gas fees, governance, and validator staking, and has relatively high liquidity, which is why the attacker ultimately pooled funds into M for laundering.3.2 MRC-20 Token Standard and Cash-out Constraints Tokens such as NinjaMEX, walxop, LIFT, Bubger, and Abudium identified in the swap path of this incident follow the MemeCore-specific token standard (MRC-20). These appear to be “transit tokens” temporarily passed through during the process of the attacker exchanging stolen assets on the internal DEX, rather than assets originally held by the victim. Technically similar to ERC-20, they are structured for the creation and circulation of meme tokens within MemeCore. The issue is external compatibility. Since it is rare for external chains, centralized exchanges, or bridges to directly support MRC-20, it is difficult for the attacker to move them out externally and cash them out in the MRC-20 state. Eventually, to proceed to the actual cash-out stage, they must go through the flow of: converting back to M on the internal DEX -> moving to an external chain (BNB Chain, etc.) via a bridge -> attempting cash-out via swap/dispersed withdrawal on the external chain. The massive internal swap transactions observed in the report are interpreted as reflecting the constraint of having to convert back to M for external export, along with the possibility of transit swaps intended to confuse tracking in some sections.4. Incident Timeline and Detailed Forensic ReconstructionThis incident is clearly divided into Reconnaissance & Testing on December 7 and the Main Exploit on December 8. The attacker checked the validity of the path the day before, and then stole all available assets and proceeded with rapid laundering the next day.4.1 Phase 1: Reconnaissance and Initial Infiltration (Dec 7) — Traces Left by Destination Choice Immediately after securing access rights, the attacker showed a pattern of verifying two things with small (or relatively small) transfers first, rather than moving the full amount immediately:Whether the wallet is actually usable by the attacker.Whether the exchange deposit is processed normally (no risk of detection/blocking). At 10:18 UTC, 388.717 M was transferred to Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and at 14:08 UTC, an additional 752 M was transferred via the same path. This flow aligns with the typical pattern of a small test followed by additional transfers. The notable point is that the receiving address 0x7a5d…337 is estimated to be a User-Assigned Deposit Address of a Centralized Exchange (Bitget), not a personal wallet. Funds flowing into this address were observed being collected into the Bitget hot wallet (0x1ab4…f23) within minutes. If cooperation with the exchange is established, there is a possibility that tracking can continue on an account basis (KYC-based).4.2 Phase 2: Full-Scale Asset Theft and Laundering (Dec 8) — Forced Conversion to M and Exfiltration The full-scale theft proceeded rapidly on December 8. In this phase, it is observed that repetitive processing of the WM contract and mass liquidation (swap) of MRC-20 tokens were carried out in parallel with simple transfers.4.2.1 WM Repetitive Processing Pattern: Between 06:45 and 06:49 UTC, 8 repetitive transactions occurred against the WM contract, confirming processing (Deposit/Withdraw) of approximately 8,000 M. This repetitive wrapping/unwrapping can be interpreted as (1) a staging to confuse tracking, or (2) a preparatory step to match the asset form required for subsequent swaps/bridging.4.2.2 Organized Outflow of 5 MRC-20 Tokens and Immediate Cash-out: Around 1:24 PM, continuous M→MRC-20 swap transactions via the internal DEX occurred in the victim’s wallet, which appear to have been performed by the attacker. Subsequently, these 5 MRC-20 tokens were transferred to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…eae6), where a process of converting them back to M via the Swap Router was observed. This choice is pragmatic from the attacker’s perspective. The longer low-liquidity meme tokens are held, the greater the price fluctuation and tracking traces may become. It seems the attacker chose to quickly convert MRC-20 to M to increase mobility and cash-out potential.4.3 Phase 3: Cross-Chain Bridging and Final Concealment — Attempt to Evade Tracking via Chain Hopping The secured M tokens did not stay in the MemeCore chain for long and were observed moving to the BNB Chain via the Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3) cross-chain bridge.Meson Bridge: 6,129 M Deposited.BNB Chain Arrival: 6,122.87 M received at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) (Approx. 3 mins to arrive). Gathering Wallet 2 subsequently acts as a hub to send funds to exchanges or disperse them to other chains (Base, Arbitrum). It has a strong character of a “Operational Wallet” used repeatedly rather than a simple transit point.5. Fund Flow Structure AnalysisFunds drained from the victim’s wallet moved largely in two directions:Direct Outflow straight to the exchange (Priority: Speed).Indirect Laundering via gathering wallets and bridges (Priority: Evasion).5.1 Key Deposit (Receiving) AddressesSuspect Bitget Deposit 1: 0x7a5d...337 / Received: 2,140.72 M (~$2,867.47) / Note: Exchange Transfer.Gathering Wallet 1 (MemeCore): 0x8325...eae6 / Received: 5 MRC-20s + 10.39 M / Note: MRC-20 → M Swap.Gathering Wallet 2 (Multi-chain Same Address): 0x1c00...285f / Received: 6,122.87 M & Multi-chain activity (BNB/Arbitrum/Base).Suspect Bitget Deposit 2: 0xb408...dd5c / Received: 5,907.67 M (~$7,969) / Note: From Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Exchange. Caution: Possibility of mixing with other victims' funds..5.2 Characteristics and Implications in Fund Flow First, the laundering strategy is split into two. Part of it prioritized speed by sending it quickly to the exchange (Path 1), while the rest tried to make tracking difficult through bridging and multi-chain dispersion (Paths 2, 4). Second, Bitget appears repeatedly. Both the direct outflow path (0x7a5d…) and the path from the gathering wallet (0xb408…) converge to Bitget deposit addresses. In particular, 0xb408… is a common point receiving funds from both Gathering Wallet 1 and Gathering Wallet 2, making it a candidate for a key cash-out window. However, as other victims’ funds may be mixed in this section, definitive conclusions should be avoided. Third, Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) functions as a central node that receives bridged funds and then performs exchange transfers or dispersion to other chains.5.3 Multi-Exchange Dispersed Withdrawal (Smurfing) Statistics (BNB Only) From Gathering Wallet 2 (BNB Chain) → Exchange Withdrawal Statistics:Bybit: 23.44 BNB / 16 txsBitget: 7.15 BNB / 2 txsMEXC Global: 5.06 BNB / 22 txsRemitano: 1.30 BNB / 4 txsBinance: 0.56 BNB / 4 txsTotal Exchange Withdrawals: 37.51 BNB / 48 txs / 5 Exchanges Note: After swapping M → BNB at Gathering Wallet 2, dispersed withdrawals were made to multiple exchanges. Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern. Reference: Remitano is known as a platform widely used for P2P trading in Southeast Asia, which can serve as a reference clue for geographic profiling (Note: Do not conclude).6. Relevant Actor Intelligence AnalysisIn this investigation, by cross-examining on-chain flows and off-chain public activity traces, we secured clues to narrow down the relevant Actor (Actor A) and associated account/profile candidates. The central address of the analysis is Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), and OSINT information was organized around this address.6.1 Circumstances Connecting On-Chain Activity and Digital Identity In this case, some clues were observed where 0x1c00…5f, identified as a key gathering address, could be connected to external public activities. If the same address is repeatedly mentioned or exposed in specific social accounts or community profiles, it can serve as important evidence connecting on-chain addresses with off-chain activities. There are circumstances where a specific social account marked as (Redacted) posted the 0x1c00…5f address multiple times in posts related to past airdrops, whitelist registrations, faucet participation, etc. This raises the possibility that the address is associated with the account’s activity to a certain level.6.2 Detailed Identity Profile (Circumstantial) In the OSINT investigation, circumstances were confirmed where the social account/handle marked as (Redacted) is connected to a specific bounty/task platform (e.g., Superteam Earn) account/profile. The following additional information is derived from this:Real Name/Legal Identity: (Redacted)Country/Region of Residence: (Redacted; Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns, etc.)Professional Identity: (Redacted; Based on self-introduction)Tech Stack Claims: (Redacted)Activity Character: (Redacted)Additional Explanation: Meaning of “Partially Consistent with Remitano Usage Patterns” Here, “Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns” does not mean concluding residence in a specific country/region (e.g., Vietnam) solely because Remitano appeared. It is intended to be referred to as a supplementary clue that increases probability from the perspective of Geo-profiling. specifically:Regional Character of Remitano: Remitano is known to be relatively widely used for P2P On/Off-ramp (cash-out/settlement) purposes in Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) rather than being used equally worldwide like global major exchanges. Therefore, if Remitano is naturally included and repeatedly observed in the multi-exchange withdrawal flow, the possibility that the actor’s living sphere/settlement environment touches the Southeast Asian region (including Vietnam) relatively increases.Hints form “Exchange Combination”: In this case, regional P2P channels like Remitano appear alongside general-purpose exchanges like Bybit, Binance, and MEXC. This combination can be interpreted as a form often observed in dispersed withdrawals considering the final cash-out route, rather than simple investor propensity.Therefore, Remitano traces are worth referencing as a “Geographic Clue Candidate”. However, it is a “Supplementary Clue,” not definitive evidence. Final confirmation must be made through cooperation/investigation data such as exchange KYC, login/access logs (IP/Device), and withdrawal methods (Bank/Payment info).7. Conclusion & Our CommitmentComprehensive Conclusion This incident, occurring on December 7–8, 2025, was a social engineering-based asset theft. Funds were laundered through two parallel paths:A direct path flowing straight into the Bitget exchange (Speed).An indirect path exfiltrated to external chains via the Meson bridge after internal swaps on MemeCore (Stealth).Additionally, circumstantial evidence links “Gathering Wallet 2” (0x1c00...5f) to specific social accounts and developer profiles, providing strong identification clues for law enforcement.Response Strategy ChainBounty has advised a phased response:Phase 1: Immediate reporting to law enforcement with key TxIDs and requesting asset freezing at Bitget.Phase 2: International cooperation review for cross-border tracking.Phase 3: Continuous monitoring of suspect addresses and community education on risk factors.Need help tracking stolen funds? Recovering stolen assets starts with professional tracking. If you have been targeted by a similar exploit, do not hesitate to reach out. ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program provides the forensic evidence needed for law enforcement reporting and exchange cooperation.👉 Apply for Victim Relief Program: https://chainbounty.io/en/event/campaign-victim-support/(Disclaimer: This report is based on on-chain data and public OSINT. Identity-related content is circumstantial estimation. Final legal judgments must be confirmed through lawful procedures by law enforcement agencies.)

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