Community Investigation

XMR1: 5.2 Million Tokens, 11 USDC Withdrawals and a Matched Bridge Payout

Philippark
Philippark

November 21, 2026

ChainBounty Investigation analysis: XMR1, following the sale proceeds, November 21, 2026; official Wagyu logo

XMR1: 5.2 million tokens, 11 USDC withdrawals, and a matched bridge payout

On 20 November, XMR1 moved from an account identified by Wagyu as its deployer to an account that Bitquery identifies as the seller behind the token’s collapse. XMR1 represents Monero within Hyperliquid’s trading system; it is not Monero’s native coin. This investigation asks what the public records establish about the transfers and later ETH movements, and where the explanation still depends on someone else’s account.

The extended route is XMR1 sales on HyperCore → USDC cross-chain withdrawals through HyperEVM → USDC received on Arbitrum. A selected Arbitrum swap and a separate Arbitrum-to-Ethereum bridge transaction show how parts of that account’s activity changed form. On Ethereum, four transfers reached one recipient. These segments are supported at different levels: the withdrawal messages can be joined by their request identifiers, while only one later bridge pair has had its message content reconciled here. Money passing through the same account is not a claim that each individual unit has been followed through every trade.

Scope

Basis

Incident date

20 November 2026; times below are UTC

Direct explorer checks

Three native XMR1 actions; 4,574 incident-window sell fills; 11 Core withdrawal / Arbitrum mint pairs; one CoW Trade event; one later bridge pair; six original Ethereum anchors

Calculation

100,000 + 100,000 + 5,000,000 = 5,200,000 XMR1

Sales scope and external tally

Bitquery reported about $13.51 million and 420 buyers. The fill API independently yields 13,507,983.519996 USDC gross sales in the stated incident window; buyer count remains unverified.

Evidence retrieval cutoff

2026-11-21T01:43:03Z; historical records, not live balances

Observation boundary

Defined fill and withdrawal windows; one swap and one later bridge pair sampled. Other bridge routes and refunds are not reconciled.

Three findings to carry through the report

Finding

Meaning

Sales are measurable from the seller’s own fill records

4,574 distinct incident-window sell fills total 369,622.92 XMR1. Gross proceeds and fees are accounted separately.

All 11 withdrawal messages carry the Core request identifiers

Recipient, amount and embedded Core nonce join each Core action to an Arbitrum USDC mint; the fee is 0.2 USDC per pair.

One later Arbitrum–Ethereum pair matches beyond amount and time

The immutable burn-message fields and hook data agree. This validates the selected pair without validating every bridge or the hosting explanation.

What moved on Hyperliquid?

The deployer role means the account associated with creating the token, rather than a separate Ethereum token contract. A spot balance is a balance used for trading the token. The native action records inspected here say sendAsset, with both sourceDex and destinationDex set to spot. Each identifies the same destination and the XMR1 token identifier. The field signatureChainId is not a reason to call these Ethereum transfers: the records are from the Hyperliquid explorer and say hyperliquidChain: Mainnet.

At 04:46:58, the first record specifies 100,000 XMR1. A second 100,000 follows at 05:14:30, then 5,000,000 at 05:16:10. The first-to-last interval is 29 minutes 12 seconds. That measures the span of these three records, not the duration of the intrusion or all subsequent selling. The transaction appendix preserves their hashes and blocks.

20 November UTC

Recorded XMR1 amount

04:46:58

100000

05:14:30

100000

05:16:10

5000000

Start Figure 1 with the deployer account at the top. Follow each solid arrow through its amount panel to the common recipient. The parallel panels make the three records visible without implying that they occurred at equal intervals.

Figure 1: three directly inspected Hyperliquid sendAsset records totaling 5,200,000 XMR1 to one recipient; UTC times; schematic

Figure 1. Solid arrows summarize the three native records. Position and line width are schematic. The explorer view exposes the action fields but no separate execution receipt; this report describes the recorded actions and does not invent a success flag. Sources: the three native transaction links in Appendix A.

The key observation is concentration: the same recipient is specified in every record. This is not proof of the person operating that account. Nor does the transfer quantity measure how much real Monero backed the tokens, or the amount buyers later paid for them. Those questions require different records.

How much XMR1 did the recipient sell?

A fill is one executed piece of an order. One order can match many resting orders, so a fill count is not a buyer count. The official API identifies the XMR1/USDC market as @260, linked to token index 404 and the same XMR1 identifier used in the native actions. We queried the seller through 13:00 UTC on 20 November and kept XMR1 sells after the first deployer transfer at 04:46:58.926 UTC. Hyperliquid’s official fill API documentation.

The retrieved records contain 4,574 distinct sell fills in that interval. Their first timestamp is 04:49:32.170 and their last is 10:28:02.058 UTC. Multiplying each fill’s XMR1 quantity by its USDC price gives gross proceeds of 13,507,983.519996 USDC. Fees in those records total 8,110.80642437 USDC; subtracting them gives 13,499,872.71357163 USDC. These are trade-accounting quantities, not fiat withdrawals, a live balance, or a separate loss to add to the later transfers.

Incident-window fill measure

Result

Sold XMR1

369,622.92

Distinct sell fills

4,574

Gross USDC / reported USDC fees

13,507,983.519996 / 8,110.80642437

Gross less those fees

13,499,872.71357163 USDC

Exclusion

Two small buys and two small sells before the first deployer transfer; other markets excluded

Three overlapping API pages were deduplicated by market, trade ID, order ID, action hash and side. The final page held 702 records, below the 2,000-record response cap. The API exposes only the latest 10,000 fills, which remains a retrieval limit. It does not supply counterparties here, so we have not independently counted Bitquery’s reported 420 buyers. Appendix C gives the precise query and first/last fill anchors.

Can the USDC exits be linked to Arbitrum receipts?

Yes, for the 11 requests examined here. Hyperliquid’s native explorer calls each action sendToEvmWithData. Its destinationRecipient is the seller’s address, and destinationChainId is 3. This number is a CCTP domain identifier for Arbitrum, not Ethereum chain ID 3. The Arbitrum receiving transactions identify source domain 19, which Circle assigns to HyperEVM. Circle’s domain identifiers.

The decisive link is inside the receiving message. Its hook data—a small payload that accompanies the transfer—preserves the full Core sender address and the 64-bit Core request nonce. A nonce is an identifier for the request; it is not the block timestamp. In every pair, that value matches the native action’s nonce, while the recipient and the USDC amount agree. Circle publishes the byte positions used for this check in its hook library. Circle’s published withdrawal-hook layout.

Withdrawal reconciliation

Observed result

Core requests / Arbitrum receiving transactions

11 / 11; each request joined by its embedded sender and nonce

Core-side amount, normalized to six USDC decimals

13,281,001.725471 USDC

Arbitrum amount minted to the seller

13,280,999.525471 USDC

Forwarding fees in the receiving events

11 × 0.2 = 2.2 USDC

Separate Core ledger fees

0.023419 USDC; not added to the destination mint amount

The first pair makes the difference concrete. The Core request at 04:54:40.128 carries nonce 1795150467235 and 7,474,206.546009 USDC. At 04:54:48, Arbitrum records a successful mint of 7,474,206.346009 USDC and a 0.2 USDC fee; the received hook contains the same sender and nonce. These are linked request and receipt records, rather than a match inferred merely from eight seconds of elapsed time. First Core request · First Arbitrum receipt.

All 11 native actions and destination events are preserved in Appendix C. This establishes the cross-chain withdrawal linkage, but the intermediate HyperEVM transaction hashes were not individually fetched.

Nor does a match establish that every USDC unit came only from XMR1 sales: the account also has activity outside that market. The API’s tiny decimal tail on one large ledger amount is retained in the research evidence; public USDC comparisons use six decimal places, as do the receiving token’s raw units. official non-funding ledger API documentation.

What does a selected conversion show?

At 04:57:53 UTC, an Arbitrum CoW settlement records the seller as the owner of a Trade event. The event sells 1,000,000 USDC and records 578.374894447965203136 ETH as the buy amount. CoW is a decentralized trade-settlement service here, not evidence of a custodial exchange deposit or a sale for bank money. Selected settlement and logs.

Selected Trade event

Exact record

Block / event index

525826782 / 2

Sell amount / buy amount

1,000,000 USDC / 578.374894447965203136 ETH

Event feeAmount

0; this field does not account for every service cost or gas fee

Verification boundary

Trade event inspected; independent internal ETH payment trace unavailable in the explorer response

This closes one conversion at the event level. It is not a reconciliation of all ten settlements in the earlier external analysis, and the seller’s shared balance prevents assigning this one swap’s exact ETH to the later 1,013 ETH bridge input. Keeping that distinction avoids presenting a continuous line where only selected transactions have been checked.

How does the selected bridge reach Ethereum?

At 05:03:54, the selected Arbitrum transaction takes 1,013.043520159326998830 ETH and executes swaps before a CCTP burn of 1,733,501.731759 USDC. CCTP transfers native USDC by destroying it on the source chain and authorizing issuance on the destination chain. The Ethereum transaction at 05:04:11 records the corresponding received message, mints 1,733,259.041517 USDC for the payout contract and ultimately pays the seller 1,000.344443544774143612 ETH. The two ETH amounts differ because this route includes conversions and charges; it is not a transfer of an unchanged ETH quantity.

Selected bridge stage

Quantity / evidence

Arbitrum input

1,013.043520159326998830 ETH · source transaction, block 525,828,140

USDC burned / minted

1,733,501.731759 / 1,733,259.041517 USDC

CCTP executed fee

242.690242 USDC; burned amount − minted amount

Ethereum payout

1,000.344443544774143612 ETH · internal transfer, block 26,454,094

The connection can now be tested against message content. The source MessageSent and destination MessageReceived agree on domain 3 → 0, the source messenger, burn token, mint recipient, amount, original message sender, maximum fee and complete hook data. The hook also contains the seller as the intended recipient of the final payout. This is a substantially stronger association than the old explorer link or an amount-and-time guess. Source: Arbitrum logs · Ethereum logs.

In Figure 2, begin at the Arbitrum ETH input and follow the stages downward. Solid lines describe stages within a transaction; the dashed connector marks the cross-chain association established by matching the immutable message fields and hook. The figure omits intermediate swap pools and secondary service payments, so it is a schematic for this one pair, not the whole incident.

Figure 2: selected Arbitrum input, USDC burn, matching Ethereum mint and ETH payout; exact message and fee evidence in Appendix D; intermediate swap pools omitted

Figure 2. ETH quantities are rounded to six decimals in the image; the table keeps full precision. The USDC difference of 242.690242 is the CCTP executed fee, not a second loss. Other route fees and conversions are not bundled into that number. The association applies to the two transaction hashes in Appendix D.

Two protocol details limit what “matching” means. In CCTP V2, the source emits an empty nonce before attestation; the destination carries an assigned 32-byte nonce. Their equality is therefore not a valid test. The received fee and expiration fields are also populated later. We compared the fields that should remain unchanged, rather than declaring the entire byte string identical. This does not independently revalidate Circle’s off-chain signatures or the other six bridge pairs. Circle’s published burn-message layout.

What is independently visible on Ethereum?

Before the first XMR1 action, an Ethereum transaction at 03:30:23 includes an internal transfer of 0.0978829303948 ETH to the examined address. An internal transfer is a value movement made during contract execution; it differs from the transaction’s outer sender. Etherscan labels its source as a Tornado Cash pool. The transaction was successful, but the label does not identify the person who funded it. Funding transaction.

At 05:04:11, another successful transaction paid 1,000.344443544774143612 ETH internally to the examined address through a contract labeled Mayan: Fast MCTP by Etherscan. The explorer’s overview links this Ethereum transaction to the selected Arbitrum source hash. The preceding section reconciles this receipt against the selected Arbitrum source’s message fields and hook data; it is no longer based only on the explorer’s cross-chain annotation. Ethereum payout record.

Four successful direct transfers then sent ETH from the examined address to the same Ethereum recipient. The first was 10 ETH at 05:05:35, followed by the largest, 2,325.669594723330818716 ETH at 05:06:11; then 1,500 ETH at 05:10:23 and 1,000 ETH at 05:18:59. Together they total 4,835.669594723330818716 ETH, excluding transaction fees. These are four distinct transaction hashes, counted once each. The total is a redistribution amount, not an additional loss or verified cash-out.

20 November UTC

Direct transfer to the common recipient

05:05:35

10 ETH · transaction

05:06:11

2325.669594723330818716 ETH · transaction

05:10:23

1500 ETH · transaction

05:18:59

1000 ETH · transaction

Read Figure 3 from the two upper receipt panels to the shared Ethereum account, then to the recipient below. Solid arrows summarize independently inspected Ethereum value movements. The two incoming observations do not account for the whole outgoing amount; this is deliberately not a complete balance reconciliation.

Figure 3: two independently inspected Ethereum receipts and four direct transfers totaling 4,835.669595 ETH rounded; incomplete balance reconciliation

Figure 3. Diagram quantities are rounded where marked. Exact values and full transaction hashes are in the tables and Appendix B. The upper-right receipt is independently visible on Ethereum; its selected Arbitrum source is reconciled in Figure 2 and Appendix D. Figure 3 stays within Ethereum, so it does not draw the intermediate cross-chain stages again.

The order matters. Ethereum redistribution began after the first XMR1 action and before the second and third. The final ETH transfer followed the last native action. A narrative that first finishes the entire token outflow and only then begins the money trail would conceal this overlap. Ordering the events still does not fill every sales, swap and bridge link.

Bitquery’s original investigation remains the incident lead and source for its broader sales, buyer and route tallies. The new calculations above replace reliance on its rounded sales total for this defined window; they do not independently validate every broader tally or any actor attribution.

Does the hosting breach explain the key exposure?

Wagyu representative’s post-mortem says the deployer key was in files retained from an old server that had been deleted. He also promised personal refunds and a later relaunch. These are project statements. They do not establish which files were taken, the exact access path, the intruder’s identity, or that compensation has been completed.

DV’s reproduction of a joint 1984 ehf. and CERT-IS notice separately describes a serious attack on the host and a temporary suspension of services. It supports the existence of a hosting incident. The notice does not itself identify Wagyu’s deployer key or prove that this key was extracted through that incident.

There are several explanations the chain records alone cannot distinguish: exposure through retained server data, compromise through a different copy of the key, or another form of authorized-key misuse. No ranking of those alternatives is claimed here. Server access logs, retention records and evidence connecting a particular key copy to the unauthorized signing activity would narrow the cause.

Response points tied to the evidence

Question

Record needed next

What could the old key still control?

An incident-time inventory of token balances, account authority and any replaced signing permissions.

Which buyers were compensated?

Authenticated refund transactions matched to eligible recipients and amounts; a promise alone is insufficient.

Which bridge movements belong to this route?

Replicate the other six bridge pairings with source events, immutable message fields, destination receipts and fee reconciliation; one matched pair is not enough for the whole route.

Retiring infrastructure and retiring signing authority are different operations. If the key remains able to authorize value movement, removing the server does not make surviving copies harmless. That is a general security interpretation of the project’s explanation, not proof of how the incident occurred. For investigators, the practical next step is a dated authority inventory alongside the transfer record, rather than an expanding graph of loosely related wallets.

Evidence appendix

Full wallet strings below link to address pages on the relevant chain. Roles describe the records used here and do not identify their controllers. The deployer role is attributed to Wagyu and Bitquery; the explorer independently confirms the account’s user field in the three actions.

Role and chain

Full address

Reported deployer · Hyperliquid

0x207700bd207df757825f9193ef9c648c1c65e06a

XMR1 recipient · Hyperliquid

0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf

Examined account · Ethereum

0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf

Large-transfer recipient · Ethereum

0xf32d7842611a5d63b875075dadd19c55f3f1dc59

Funding pool · Ethereum (explorer label)

0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8Fc

Payout contract · Ethereum (explorer label)

0xC1062b7C5Dc8E4b1Df9F200fe360cDc0eD6e7741

Examined account · Arbitrum

0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf

Cross-chain withdrawal contract · HyperEVM (message field)

0x6b9e773128f453f5c2c60935ee2de2cbc5390a24

USDC token contract · Arbitrum

0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831

USDC burn-token contract · HyperEVM

0xb88339cb7199b77e23db6e890353e22632ba630f

Appendix A · Native action anchors

Record 1

Native Hyperliquid

Time / block

2026-11-20T04:46:58Z / 1227836280

Asset / quantity

XMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 100000

Full hash

0x328fc4efdff6c881340904492f4b780201d700d57af9e753d65870429efaa26b

Record 2

Native Hyperliquid

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:14:30Z / 1227859502

Asset / quantity

XMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 100000

Full hash

0xfe18b36928ccc7ecff9204492fa62e0208de004ec3cfe6bfa1e15ebbe7c0a1d7

Record 3

Native Hyperliquid

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:16:10Z / 1227860884

Asset / quantity

XMR1:0xbb2057659bd378d17e2e151bb04bdcaa / 5000000

Full hash

0x8453d81d6945e81885cd04492fab940204a80003044906ea281c83702849c203

Appendix B · Ethereum anchors

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T03:30:23Z / 26453625

Asset / quantity

0.0978829303948 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0x33513047a342ea41bbcc6503aa8c889a8b5d05a4ef332354fba682fdc60b53ee

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:06:11Z / 26454104

Asset / quantity

2325.669594723330818716 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0x74a704c0b00bd9cb6c671e339f361718c7d885d5776d13074ecb0ed17edf4752

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:05:35Z / 26454101

Asset / quantity

10 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0x43e61634dd6a8c01e8fc9fad0d04b56ec602f42f4a37e3080d32d6f69e1d892a

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:10:23Z / 26454125

Asset / quantity

1500 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0xf5820bca522aeff14766a66ad939a25d447837f544371e6fff2597804c401b62

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:18:59Z / 26454168

Asset / quantity

1000 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0x9380c8291ae4e4dfad92a704a6bb8f97d6f70d5b97edff6b887b318ffd05cd66

Field

Ethereum transaction

Time / block

2026-11-20T05:04:11Z / 26454094

Asset / quantity

1000.344443544774143612 ETH

Status

Success

Full hash

0x3a93c0cb9085ed6d73d6f0e2a8bcfafc942d8d4af7b42b9d34abc10576b07240

Appendix C · Sales and cross-chain withdrawal anchors

All times in this appendix are UTC on 20 November 2026. The full fill dataset was retrieved and deduplicated; the two fill records below are selected anchors, not a list of every counterparty fill. The withdrawal tables include every one of the 11 matched requests and receipts.

Reproduce the public API query

Value

Endpoint / method

https://api.hyperliquid.xyz/info · POST (read-only query)

Fill request

type=userFillsByTime; user=examined address; startTime=1795132800000; endTime=1795179600000; aggregateByTime=false. Subsequent pages restart at the preceding page’s last timestamp.

Incident filter

coin=@260; side=A; time ≥1795150018926; feeToken=USDC. @260 maps to XMR1 token index404 in spotMeta.

Ledger request

type=userNonFundingLedgerUpdates; same user and time window.

Selected fill

Record

Role / UTC

First incident-window sell fill / 2026-11-20T04:49:32.170000+00:00

Quantity × price

4.06 XMR1 × 492.31 USDC

Trade ID / order ID

19548947811789 / 611017042039

Full action hash

0xa796e1e81e2ce7b1a91004492f53fe02039400cdb92006834b5f8d3add20c19c

Selected fill

Record

Role / UTC

Last retrieved incident-window sell fill / 2026-11-20T10:28:02.058000+00:00

Quantity × price

19.94 XMR1 × 1.0 USDC

Trade ID / order ID

818168203372803 / 611038769808

Full action hash

0x5eb0cd98e63bd136602a044933a73b0203cc007e813ef008027978eba53fab21

Core request / UTC / nonce

Full native action hash

#1 · 04:54:40.128 · 1795150467235 · block 1227842788

0x09c132ddd91dbcd10b3a04492f64e402011d00c37410dba3ad89de30981196bb

#2 · 04:58:28.158 · 1795150701921 · block 1227846002

0x9adc3d0f742d38159c5504492f71720201b000f50f2056e73ea4e86233211200

#3 · 05:00:20.477 · 1795150813676 · block 1227847585

0xfc91d6f7ef08cbf9fe0b04492f77a102066300dd8a0beacca05a824aae0ca5e4

#4 · 05:02:57.963 · 1795150971545 · block 1227849771

0xb9a50dce599f70a3bb1e04492f802b0201c200b3f4928f755d6db92118934a8e

#5 · 05:04:40.554 · 1795151074715 · block 1227851217

0x2181764eda26916822fb04492f85d10202f500347529b03ac54a21a1992a6b52

#6 · 05:06:49.227 · 1795151203043 · block 1227853011

0x203d6f7e44b1af5b21b704492f8cd30203fc0063dfb4ce2dc4061ad103b58945

#7 · 05:09:12.026 · 1795151345338 · block 1227855011

0xc2ea9bd43b431038c46404492f94a3020f3d00b9d6462f0a66b34726fa46ea23

#8 · 05:11:54.918 · 1795151508869 · block 1227857324

0xf2c5dbfe4aea5c91f43f04492f9dac02035a00e3e5ed7b64968e875109ee367c

#9 · 05:13:44.217 · 1795151618162 · block 1227858837

0xac851e7a49bed781adfe04492fa395020382005fe4b1f653504dc9cd08b2b16c

#10 · 05:17:20.669 · 1795151834464 · block 1227861867

0x414d5f5f10cfc98d42c704492faf6b020a6d0044abc2e85fe5160ab1cfc3a377

#11 · 05:20:25.736 · 1795152018245 · block 1227864415

0x3cedf29f071faea53e6704492fb95f0201560084a212cd77e0b69df1c613888f

Paired Arbitrum receipt

Net USDC and full transaction hash

#1 · block 525826159 · 04:54:48 UTC

7474206.346009 USDC · 0xa093ff4d80333eac0c94dee7d1995c9ba5df7e11362fa91c0ce1f1ae1e2a2828

#2 · block 525826915 · 04:58:35 UTC

2186171.005507 USDC · 0xdab445e7bba90bb1f34b323b145b9f6645fc9074101a74efa221d234c05131e2

#3 · block 525827318 · 05:00:29 UTC

640637.524008 USDC · 0xa9452eae1e4c78ea0ae0c2aeb88bdc77be4b23a33482dfd27985ea5f695c8328

#4 · block 525827944 · 05:03:05 UTC

380747.0356 USDC · 0x9c76efbdc2076de5d0576d0bb5a4449c55da1250d167d796d9445e1d3aa247bd

#5 · block 525828360 · 05:04:48 UTC

234024.180596 USDC · 0x72d875800fd7619aca7e4ab6958fb85552aabb4b0bce98257db2316d290c6e4f

#6 · block 525828873 · 05:06:57 UTC

787588.097878 USDC · 0x43f78f61ade094681d7ebd0bf24d0c7dc23195e194027380d7a4fd1eea40f8bc

#7 · block 525829444 · 05:09:19 UTC

591201.19169 USDC · 0xc5b26e510db06ce9cdefc14bf11b6a3b4e0c7d5f9ea66efa165c6f8afd396bf9

#8 · block 525830116 · 05:12:02 UTC

368961.31029 USDC · 0x3804984d90f6ec0ef8eec8da81deb626b83cfc1973a2c99c3fdc16fabf33628e

#9 · block 525830554 · 05:13:52 UTC

355987.266055 USDC · 0x1b06050d225149a17d3aa51b1561145811bc2dd3c7779eddb6815acee52923f7

#10 · block 525831440 · 05:17:30 UTC

204313.15134 USDC · 0x84bd76983cb3b0efe9dc40f9e43f323f8e9429955d66bf3135df06547a0f5d81

#11 · block 525832175 · 05:20:34 UTC

57162.416498 USDC · 0xf028b5a2e5488c862e92f279cdd5940fc92440c66e0697628b4ca542319a7168

Pair number

Received CCTP nonce (32 bytes)

#1

0x7d1659ef4b401372a15fd949296187348ab26d6c1900dcaa2abf1e79856a10dc

#2

0xeac90c639eb279ebecf76350dc7ecd5bc10bf79c1e9fc9b43478c2ce4fc0d1da

#3

0x0589ce7b37ceff47268451844b5f67a6557b071124f0712dd88c857f70269068

#4

0x416a64b349951f18fd8547a7139145456217e4515b2518b314bb7d3013805640

#5

0x23f7707db8fa7ce305e5ab57486e615265becd0474d5bf9fe89f5a963ba47097

#6

0x51183006f3aa1ac7934a451a9827b5181f6832f3b47273ab70efc120eea01d5f

#7

0x57e963e09b86be85fb22937e64464f5a5c4b567c3e15d5aed784514d5b93c934

#8

0x86d7974c271a8fc70c1433da04a4d8b636d057ae581eaa5410f12d2aae4b0595

#9

0xb6b6f63b9d5b7b3a0176750d2fe5fafce3744f8bd1600da3c6d55f178319bcb9

#10

0x58c958bb78dd57acdbf1926d3c2859f169615d928ded2f1f69b3c138bcac88f1

#11

0x088b7b62d38f575dd5559c45dd6ecb858e4ca2c7bf8151b37366e447259a9ad9

Appendix D · Selected conversion and bridge anchors

Record

Full hash / identifier

Arbitrum CoW settlement

0x50d4490db13e0f7fdc3214b61ed4fb28dd172f437c794fe4265346e5fabb6b73

CoW order UID

0x2e1dd545358ba4fc398eacf39583dab775b83804b78052ce1b975aa56f3e867a1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf6affda41

Arbitrum bridge source

0x1b6f68247603d6c3d1754680d9f73aee87d1791a8e51ec92bea1dfa58a47733e

Ethereum bridge destination

0x3a93c0cb9085ed6d73d6f0e2a8bcfafc942d8d4af7b42b9d34abc10576b07240

Source MessageSent index / destination MessageReceived index

225 / 251

Destination CCTP nonce

0xf458e998e40533c8519a95bf1ac3ba3a243513db0444c92a82206490b6dca56b

Raw-message comparison

Source nonce zero before attestation. Immutable body prefix and hook match; populated destination fee/expiry fields excluded from the equality test.

Method: direct native explorer inspection, official Hyperliquid read-only fill and ledger API queries, public Arbitrum Blockscout transaction/log data and independent Ethereum RPC receipt comparison. Decimal arithmetic was used for quantities and fees. The selected bridge’s source MessageSent bytes and destination MessageReceived bytes were decoded against Circle’s published layouts. The withdrawal hook sender and Core nonce were compared across all 11 pairs. Source-code layouts describe how to read the observed bytes; current code is not treated as a complete historical deployment audit. Broader SentinelTX results were not substituted for the missing primary records. This update does not establish all swap/bridge matches, all intermediate HyperEVM transaction hashes, complete balances, native Monero reserves, completed refunds or actor identity.

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