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Community Investigation
Bybit Hack Analysis: Another Major Attack by North Korean Hackers
Bybit Hack Analysis: North Korean Hackers Strike Again in One of the Largest Crypto HeistsIn February 2025, Bybit, one of the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchanges, suffered a major security breach, resulting in the loss of approximately $70 million worth of digital assets. According to cybersecurity firms and blockchain analytics companies, the attack was carried out by a North Korean state-sponsored hacking group, likely Lazarus Group, which has been responsible for several high-profile cryptocurrency heists in recent years.This incident underscores the growing sophistication of cybercriminals targeting the cryptocurrency industry and highlights the urgent need for stronger security measures across exchanges. In this report, we will break down the attack, analyze the techniques used by the hackers, and discuss how exchanges can enhance their security to prevent similar breaches in the future.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Overview of the Bybit Hack and Its ImpactThe Bybit hack occurred in early February 2025, with the attackers managing to steal a substantial amount of digital assets from the platform’s hot wallets.Estimated Loss: Approximately $70 million in various cryptocurrencies.Attack Attribution: Security experts at TRM Labs and Chainalysis have linked the attack to North Korean hacking groups.Response from Bybit: The exchange suspended withdrawals, launched an internal investigation, and implemented emergency security measures.Market Reaction: The incident raised concerns among investors, leading to a temporary decline in crypto market confidence.This breach follows a pattern of state-sponsored cyberattacks targeting cryptocurrency platforms, with stolen funds often used to fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. How Did the Attack Happen? Analysis of Hacker TechniquesAccording to cybersecurity reports, the Bybit hack was executed using a combination of social engineering, smart contract vulnerabilities, and blockchain laundering techniques.(1) Spear Phishing & Insider ManipulationHackers likely used sophisticated phishing campaigns to trick Bybit employees or third-party service providers into revealing sensitive credentials.Fake job offers, malicious email attachments, and compromised cloud storage links may have been used to plant malware on Bybit’s internal systems.Targeting insiders is a common strategy of North Korean hackers, allowing them to bypass multi-layered security systems.(2) Exploiting Hot Wallet VulnerabilitiesMany cryptocurrency exchanges store a portion of user funds in hot wallets to facilitate instant withdrawals. However, these wallets are more vulnerable to cyberattacks.The hackers likely exploited a weakness in Bybit’s wallet security system, gaining unauthorized access to move funds out of the exchange.Smart contract exploits or API vulnerabilities may have also been leveraged to manipulate transactions.(3) Using Blockchain Mixing Services to Launder Stolen FundsOnce the funds were stolen, the attackers immediately split them into thousands of smaller transactions, making them harder to trace.Cryptocurrency mixing services such as Tornado Cash were used to obfuscate the origin of the stolen funds.Security firm Chainalysis reported that portions of the stolen assets were converted into privacy coins like Monero, further complicating law enforcement efforts.This method mirrors previous attacks executed by Lazarus Group, which has stolen over $2 billion worth of cryptocurrency since 2017.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. The Growing Threat of North Korean Crypto HacksThe Bybit attack is not an isolated incident. North Korean hackers have been systematically targeting crypto exchanges, DeFi platforms, and bridge networks to fund the country’s economy.Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge Hack (2022): $620 million stolen.Horizon Bridge Attack (2022): $100 million stolen.Atomic Wallet Breach (2023): $35 million stolen.Mixin Network Hack (2023): $200 million stolen.According to the United Nations, North Korea has ramped up its cyber operations due to increased international sanctions, using stolen crypto to finance weapons programs, military operations, and illicit trade.The Bybit hack follows the same trend, reinforcing concerns that cryptocurrency platforms remain a prime target for state-sponsored cybercrime.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. How Exchanges Can Strengthen Their SecurityIn the wake of the Bybit hack, cybersecurity experts have emphasized the need for more robust security protocols to protect user funds. Here are the key measures exchanges should implement:✅ Multi-Signature Wallets for Secure TransactionsLarge transactions should require multiple approvals from different authorized personnel.This prevents a single compromised account from draining funds.✅ AI-Powered Security MonitoringAI-based anomaly detection systems can flag suspicious withdrawal patterns in real time.Blockchain analytics tools should track fund movements across different addresses to identify potential hacks early.✅ Zero-Trust Security ModelExchanges should limit employee access to sensitive systems and enforce strict authentication policies.Internal audits and penetration testing should be conducted regularly to identify vulnerabilities.✅ Decentralized Cold Wallet StorageA larger percentage of user funds should be kept in cold wallets, disconnected from the internet.Multi-layer authentication should be required for any transfer of funds from cold to hot wallets.✅ Stronger Compliance & Law Enforcement CooperationExchanges should work closely with blockchain security firms and law enforcement to recover stolen assets.Regulatory bodies must introduce stricter KYC and AML (Anti-Money Laundering) measures to prevent illicit transactions.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. Conclusion: A Critical Moment for Crypto SecurityThe Bybit hack serves as a harsh reminder of the vulnerabilities present in cryptocurrency exchanges. With state-sponsored cyberattacks becoming more frequent and sophisticated, the industry must prioritize proactive security measures rather than reactive damage control.Bybit is expected to enhance its security infrastructure in response to the breach, but the entire crypto ecosystem must take this attack as a warning. Without stronger defense mechanisms, AI-driven threat detection, and regulatory cooperation, similar incidents will continue to plague the industry.As the crypto space evolves, so too must its security protocols. The Bybit hack is a wake-up call—one that should not be ignored.
Community Investigation
Bounty King: Bybit Security Breach – $1.4B Stolen Asset Analysis (Ongoing Investigation 2)
Bounty King: Investigation Series follows a team of skilled investigators as they navigate the dark world of cybercrime, uncovering hidden digital trails and solving complex mysteries with the power of AI and blockchain technology. Each case takes them deeper into the realm of online fraud, crypto hacks, and digital heists, where bounties fuel the relentless pursuit of truth. With every investigation, they piece together the puzzle—tracing lost assets and exposing the individuals behind the screens. It’s a journey of persistence, intelligence, and teamwork, where every clue brings them one step closer to justice in an ever-evolving digital landscape.In Ongoing Investigation 1, we identified a money laundering network on the BNB Chain by analyzing a shared wallet (0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65) linked to both Bybit and Phemex. We also tracked the centralized exchanges where some of the laundered funds started off.In Ongoing Investigation 2, we’ll look deeper into how these connected laundering networks move funds multiple times before making large deposits into CEXs.For on-chain analysis, the key to proving connections is accurate transaction data. The best way to do this is by tracking transactions (tx), as they clearly show how funds move between wallets.Our next step is to expand the investigation based on a key fund aggregator address found in Investigation 1: 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572.Bounty King: Bybit Security Breach – $1.4B Stolen Asset Analysis (Ongoing Investigation 1) https://community.chainbounty.io/posts/0195352f-55de-7791-aae3-9e6008c8bcb9On the BNB Chain, this address collects small amounts of BNB from different wallets and then sends them to specific target addresses. The same pattern appears on the Ethereum mainnet, so we’ll check for any unusual withdrawals from this wallet.We usually start by analyzing withdrawal addresses because the person controlling the wallet actively decides where to send the funds, which gives us clues about their intentions. In contrast, deposit addresses are more passive, making it harder to determine the owner's motives.This address has also been seen sending 0.03 ETH to multiple wallets (Figure 1) on the Ethereum network.Figure 1: Outgoing transaction patterns of the fund aggregator wallet on EthereumIf we look at the types of tokens held by the connected wallets, most of them commonly have stablecoins like DAI and USDT, along with the native coin ETH. Since stablecoins are pegged to a fixed value, they are less volatile.However, two wallets stand out because they hold different types of tokens:0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203ded –This wallet has a history of holding tokens named Arb.0x27d680edfd1094efa01ba003113e5a6c4e202d59 – This wallet has a history of holding tokens named Polygon ecosystem.In on-chain analysis, looking at different pieces of information helps us understand the intent behind transactions. In cases like this, the presence of specific tokens in certain wallets can be an important clue. Automated wallets typically do not hold unique tokens unless they are manually operated, making these cases worth further investigation.For example, 0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203ded received ARB through OKX and later transferred it to Gate.io.(Figure 2)Figure 2: Suspicious token transfers from CEX to CEXTransaction Details:First TransactionFrom: OKX Withdraw Wallet (0x6cc5f688a315f3dc28a7781717a9a798a59fda7b)To: 0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203dedDate & Time: August 6, 2024, 04:19 AM (UTC)Transaction Hash: 0xe8431526a81a2b9549acbd7ce3f377feb72467052f19ddf36968802eda76c1a3Amount: 9.168 ARBSecond TransactionFrom: 0x0ba9161b32a541bf30ac8db6842b9a6904e2d924To: Gate.io User Wallet (0x0ba9161b32a541bf30ac8db6842b9a6904e2d924)Date & Time: December 28, 2024, 12:57 PM (UTC)Transaction Hash: 0x6603d59dad51ade1feb121df40bfd8026ebc67d7147ff1490e94f33fff93650eAmount 9.168 ARBIn the previous ongoing investigation, only the withdrawal transaction from the exchange was confirmed. However, the deposit transaction has now also been identified. Therefore, it is important to work with law enforcement to verify the user details associated with these transactions.It is also confirmed that 0x27d680edfd1094efa01ba003113e5a6c4e202d59 received Polygon from Gate.io.(Figure 3)From: Gate.io Withdrawal Wallet (0x0d0707963952f2fba59dd06f2b425ace40b492fe)To: 0x27d680edfd1094efa01ba003113e5a6c4e202d59Date & Time: November 17, 2024, 07:48 AM (UTC)Transaction Hash: 0x99e537e4839c5a4285334828507ba4cdba987d2cd02a95d11094765ee31b2946Amount: 107.170 PolFigure 3: Suspicious token transfers from CEX In this case, after passing through four steps, funds from 0x27d680edfd1094efa01ba003113e5a6c4e202d59 eventually flow into 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65, which is an overlapping address(Figure 4) used by both Phemex and Bybit for ETH transactions.Within the cluster, multiple addresses are interconnected, forming links both forward and backward. Therefore, identifying relationships between wallets that follow this pattern is crucial for understanding the overall flow of funds and verifying transactions.Figure 4: Connection to 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65By following this cluster flow, we can identify addresses with significant transfer in/out activity.For example, the address 0x24c367c656c9960655936bac8cf8b738a70433dc exhibits such behavior.Looking at the flow of the wallet 0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203ded, which has a history of transferring ARB from OKX to Gate.io, we can see that after four steps, 140 ETH(Figure 5) was transferred in and out of 0x24c367c656c9960655936bac8cf8b738a70433dc.Figure 5: Large Distribution Wallet ObservationThe overlapping addresses above are also used for fund distribution in money laundering schemes. Based on this, we can infer that relay wallets exist within approximately four steps between the aggregator and the distribution phase.Now, let's analyze 0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203ded further to identify additional patterns.Looking at the in/out transaction history of 0x264e3ca158787b40798d1f006c0fd6558a203ded, we can see that the address 0x9ff1b430a699ee6215b315ea8f7892520e14b9cd transferred 140 ETH.(Figure 6) This address shows significant incoming transactions from multiple wallets.A key observation here is that the 140 ETH was bridged via Debridge, which utilizes OKX’s cross-chain DEX. (Figure 6)Figure 6: Distribution Wallet AnalysisBy examining 0x9ff1b430a699ee6215b315ea8f7892520e14b9cd as the source of these funds, we can clearly (Figure 7) see a connection.From 0x9ff1b430a699ee6215b315ea8f7892520e14b9cd, a total of 1,141 ETH was split and distributed across eight different addresses. These funds were then swapped cross-chain through Debridge.In fact, using Debridge for money laundering is a well-known pattern commonly used by groups like Lazarus and other laundering operations.The following visualization illustrates how large-scale fund distributions are processed.Figure 7: Large Distribution Wallet operationLet’s highlight an important point here.Looking at the source of wallet 0x9ff1b430a699ee6215b315ea8f7892520e14b9cd, which distributes funds through eight wallets via Debridge, we can see multiple records of deposits from CEXs (Figure 8). This is crucial to understand because money laundering networks do not rely solely on DEXs; they often move funds through multiple CEXs as well.Therefore, the process involves a combination of swaps, cross-chain transfers, and CEX transactions to obscure the fund trail.By following this report, we can observe how CEXs ultimately serve as the final gateway for money laundering.Figure 8: Illicit Sources from CEXsFor example, laundered funds from Huobi (HTX) are further distributed across multiple wallets before ultimately reaching the pre-Debridge distribution wallets. This process illustrates how funds are layered and moved to obscure their origins.(Figure 9)Figure 9: Complex Source from CEXsBelow is the detailed information on 1,140 ETH being sent to Debridge through nine transactions across eight addresses.This data can be analyzed further using the Debridge Explorer to track how the assets are converted into different cryptocurrencies.Transaction Summary (Debridge Identified) 1) Transaction Hash: 0x85ae303e13c17c16336cfe7f23f812f074414566d522652a4bb91d8a820077acFrom: 0xd9274cda8346d25a7e344079594d8e1a1a4d3a02To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 21:27:47Token: ETHAmount: 159.984891 2) Transaction Hash: 0x5cf2b00098898c1af5ce7ce240908102edde611906d2eae967e4ddeed75402a9From: 0x24c367c656c9960655936bac8cf8b738a70433dcTo (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 18:54:35Token: ETHAmount: 139.981718 3) Transaction Hash: 0x7930109426d980a9de4a29309103d4cde3ddc3ab28a3f259ff69a574b8524976From: 0xa7fce5ed6006626bb07749245a9854296a60e2d1To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 17:36:35Token: ETHAmount: 137.969672 4) Transaction Hash: 0x6b9434bf9faaf0b7552e002ac687a0e2e596960188a4c1d8c06d1fb980205ec1From: 0xcbc18f2c0371a03b25b1ec596b497d1f5a7b54e8To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 22:22:23Token: ETHAmount: 76.985214 5) Transaction Hash: 0x8f98c88f6b4b72c257fbc947250921fd82b94739fa422be24bee497378b03d53From: 0xbe7a5460d177ca8c89839ba3f900e3b61e4d4d89To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-10 12:23:59Token: ETHAmount: 5.902455 6) Transaction Hash: 0xe225eed10a1dc3b2b06b510c06d7bacd2f69b1043a3b9c8e98d704dc1bf5df06From: 0xbe7a5460d177ca8c89839ba3f900e3b61e4d4d89To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-10 12:23:11Token: ETHAmount: 159.905085 7) Transaction Hash: 0xf2a9fa7022e97b6178f36f0ba1d978e2aabd53154d99feef560c3113596c17d9From: 0x74851cba5b37cb085b75a16c778a1f74c6b27d3fTo (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 19:23:59Token: ETHAmount: 139.985168 8) Transaction Hash: 0x52d77d0d4a9ec43e6abf23628cd0eadb7c67687530d5030e0da91a43c06f4553From: 0x81ceaa93e6c7021276f92da90a62f1cbed802d44To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 20:48:11Token: ETHAmount: 160 9) Transaction Hash: 0x634af7279d816d98b6c57311ea7e695cea129f46bb1e92db05357087a3c0dacdFrom: 0x0bd2d8e6f19fe540cb69a6c72ee3e942218c1f86To (Debridge): 0x663dc15d3c1ac63ff12e45ab68fea3f0a883c251Transaction Time (UTC): 2025-02-06 19:56:59Token: ETHAmount: 159.985086For example, a transaction sending 159.984891 ETH in TX 0x85ae303e13c17c16336cfe7f23f812f074414566d522652a4bb91d8a820077ac goes through two conversions:159.98 ETH → 429,120 USDC (Solana) → 429,120 USDC (BSC). (Figure 10)Figure 10: Cross-chain swap from ETH to Solana and BSCSource: https://app.debridge.finance/orders?s=52ptwAmkmMsg7PaQiCexjbJmkEYtA3VZXebTjtrgBoAUAfter that, 428,772 USDC is sent from BSC back to deBridge. (Figure 11)Figure 11: Cross-chain swap from BSC by DebridgeSource: https://bscscan.com/address/0x55788125568c5b22d14c020914b86d9acf753272#tokentxnsAfter that, 428,772 USDC is sent from BSC to Solana, where it arrives at 428,520 USDC. Figure 12: Cross-chain swap from BSC to SolanaSource: https://app.debridge.finance/orders?s=0x55788125568c5B22D14C020914b86d9acf753272This transaction undergoes a total of three cross-chain swaps:ETH → Solana → BSC → SolanaThe final destination wallet is as follows:The 428K USDC was ultimately deposited into a private wallet:8rduN4bx1UuYZk1UAhQ31Wt5sKDPTKcPQQc3PJApDNwgThis wallet presents two interesting points:There is a history of deposits and withdrawals involving approximately 428K USDC from a wallet that the community refers to as Wintermute. (Figure 13)However, we cannot definitively confirm that this wallet belongs to Wintermute, a globally recognized market maker and OTC trading firm.Figure 13: Final Wallet on SolanaSource: https://intel.arkm.com/explorer/address/8rduN4bx1UuYZk1UAhQ31Wt5sKDPTKcPQQc3PJApDNwgIf multiple sources, including the community and Arkham Intelligence, label the wallet as Wintermute, this becomes particularly noteworthy.If the owner of this wallet was involved in money laundering, they likely completed KYC verification at some point.Wintermute, if indeed associated with the wallet, would have access to relevant KYC information.Next Steps for Law EnforcementTo establish the facts, law enforcement should consider reaching out to Wintermute for verification. If the wallet is indeed tied to them, they may hold crucial KYC data that could assist in further investigation. By tracing the nine initial ETH transactions sent to deBridge, we can observe that all funds eventually consolidate into a single exchange wallet.Destination Exchange WalletOKX Deposit Wallet: HK7RDBzzBfhSr8DWxgLtwKA62zAzf3iUtsVsw54tAv5fThis wallet started receiving funds on February 4, approximately three weeks ago.It has a total deposit history of 3.37M USDC.This indicates that the source funds were aggregated and transferred to OKX(Figure 14), making it a key point of interest for further investigation.Figure 14: OKX User WalletSource: https://explorer.bitquery.io/solana/address/HK7RDBzzBfhSr8DWxgLtwKA62zAzf3iUtsVsw54tAv5f?from=2024-02-01&till=2025-02-25This OKX deposit wallet has been actively receiving funds since February 4, 2025, accumulating a total deposit of 3.37M USDC. This wallet serves as the final destination for the traced transactions, consolidating funds from multiple cross-chain transfers.Based on multiple findings, we analyzed Large Distribution Wallets using fund aggregator addresses linked to money laundering clusters previously identified on Phemex and Bybit.Conclusion & Next Steps for Law Enforcement and Exchanges1. Large-Scale Money Laundering Activity ConfirmedThe investigation has identified a clear pattern of cross-chain money laundering, where stolen funds were transferred through three separate cross-chain swaps before being deposited into a specific OKX wallet. This structured movement of funds suggests the involvement of an organized laundering network designed to obscure the origins of stolen assets.2. Suspicious Transactions Involving a Wallet Labeled as "Wintermute"One of the laundering wallets has transaction records linking it to a wallet that Arkham Intelligence and the community have labeled as "Wintermute." However, we cannot confirm with certainty that this wallet actually belongs to Wintermute, which is a global market maker and OTC firm. If this wallet is indeed linked to Wintermute, this could be a key point of investigation, as companies like Wintermute are required to follow strict KYC and compliance regulations. Unlike anonymous or fake KYC accounts on exchanges, firms like Wintermute typically collect verified identity data on their clients. If law enforcement confirms this connection, Wintermute could possess important identity records related to the individuals involved in these transactions. There is a high chance this wallet has been mislabelled as open-source information identifying the wallet with Wintermute has never once cited any evidence.3. 3.37M USDC Deposited into an OKX Wallet from a Laundering NetworkA wallet on OKX has received 3.37 million USDC since February 4, 2025, with transactions that strongly match known laundering methods. Given the timing and pattern of transfers, this wallet is highly likely connected to the Phemex hack.Analyzing other wallets with similar transaction behaviors on OKX and other exchanges could reveal additional laundering accounts and transactions.We will continue to work on the investigation and will share further information.
Community Investigation
Bounty King: Bybit Security Breach – $1.4B Stolen Asset Analysis (Ongoing Investigation 1)
Bounty King: Investigation Series follows a team of skilled investigators as they navigate the dark world of cybercrime, uncovering hidden digital trails and solving complex mysteries with the power of AI and blockchain technology. Each case takes them deeper into the realm of online fraud, crypto hacks, and digital heists, where bounties fuel the relentless pursuit of truth. With every investigation, they piece together the puzzle—tracing lost assets and exposing the individuals behind the screens. It’s a journey of persistence, intelligence, and teamwork, where every clue brings them one step closer to justice in an ever-evolving digital landscape.The Bybit hacker is currently laundering funds through platforms like Exch exchange, Chainflip, and Thorchain, converting assets into BTC, ETH, and TRON USDT.Since many teams worldwide are already tracking the money laundering process and sharing similar information, we will focus on profiling rather than laundering activities.According to on-chain investigator ZachXBT, one address, 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65, has been linked to transactions from a previous hacking incident involving Phemex, which was connected to the Lazarus Group.We will dig deeper into this connection.Source:https://x.com/zachxbt/status/1893211577836302365We have verified this information and found it to be credible.The reason is that while many new addresses are being used for money laundering, this particular address is not new. Its first transaction dates back to November 2024.Looking at its deposit and withdrawal patterns, it appears to be an automated address within a money laundering cluster. This suggests that some of the laundered funds have overlapped with addresses previously used for laundering.Based on this, we assume that this wallet is part of an automated money laundering cluster. We are now analyzing patterns of other wallets linked to this address.During this analysis, we discovered something unusual.We found that 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65 exists on the BSC (Binance Smart Chain) and decided to trace the movement of BNB backward.By doing so, we were able to track the reverse flow(Figure 1) as follows:0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f65 → 0x9d636e330abef7a34fbb079580e6c3d20b4dd3cc → 0x543568d6c7b41537eb0bb9ed455e77949f0892aeFigure 1: Reverse TrackingWe observed the following transactions:0x543568d6c7b41537eb0bb9ed455e77949f0892ae → 0x9d636e330abef7a34fbb079580e6c3d20b4dd3cc0.72 BNB sent on 2025-02-19 at 04:50 AM (UTC)TX: 0x60701fdd9a31edde197316df50068b002472e430d7b412e495a71f94c14016610x9d636e330abef7a34fbb079580e6c3d20b4dd3cc → 0x33d057af74779925c4b2e720a820387cb89f8f650.72 BNB sent on 2025-02-19 at 08:55 AM (UTC)TX: 0xaf1fd305f297b1b723835c1800d5cff351ee0210a0ddd16236f6ef0d0f0bc4a2Both wallets show patterns commonly associated with relay wallets used in money laundering.For example, each wallet has only five transactions in total, with small amounts being transferred, which is a typical characteristic of temporary relay wallets used for one-time fund transfers.Figure 2: Relay Wallet PatternSource: BSC Scanhttps://bscscan.com/address/0x9d636e330abef7a34fbb079580e6c3d20b4dd3ccContinuing our investigation from 0x543568d6c7b41537eb0bb9ed455e77949f0892ae, we found that some funds within this money laundering cluster were received from two centralized exchanges (Figure 3) CoinEx and Gate.io.Figure 3: CEX Connection for Fund Deposits to the ClusterThe complete transaction trail is as follows:Wallet 0x17eef0f69e0cf668ab51b75aab5b944ca09fb3e0 received a total of 1.2738 BNB from Gate.io and CoinEx.Gate.io → 0x17eef0f69e0cf668ab51b75aab5b944ca09fb3e00.46 BNB sent on 2025-02-12 at 11:39 PM (UTC)TX: 0xf1c6f53328e13ab82ec754e3292e718ae8d783c4f6c00c0c1dd396979300a178CoinEx → 0x17eef0f69e0cf668ab51b75aab5b944ca09fb3e00.81 BNB sent on 2025-02-10 at 19:26 PM (UTC)TX: 0xbf063a7f3bafeacbfc190b2739e58f822c98018b5bf732a3aef9e1004f5e1d24To gather more details, cooperation from CEXs is required to obtain IP logs, KYC data, and further transaction records. This should be coordinated with law enforcement for verification and further investigation.Here is the continued transaction trail(Figure 4) from 0x17eef0f69e0cf668ab51b75aab5b944ca09fb3e0:Figure 4: Full Trail for Reverse TrackingHere's a structured breakdown of the transaction history: 1) 0x17eef0f69e0cf668ab51b75aab5b944ca09fb3e0 → 0x8fa78148eabcda855f84e98d6568ce9f93c5c8ceAmount: 0.10 BNBDate: 2025-02-11 at 06:02 AM (UTC)TX: 0xaba91fc1a940dc1cfe3ef3a88f0a0b11aaf0451dc914680c13d10a2eb3f0ec6c 2) 0x8fa78148eabcda855f84e98d6568ce9f93c5c8ce → 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572Amount: 0.09 BNBDate: 2025-02-13 04:40 AM (UTC)TX: 0xc37c888605d24a16ca083e0ed13e47eba3946ca1840f80c5e5ca2f37d1346db5 3) 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572 → 0xd9cbf4290651ef7f8b4571a55167a414619bd15bAmount: 0.05 BNBDate: 2025-02-13 at 05:24 AM (UTC)TX: 0x29cb21f7bc3bd4686bd6d055a216663eb893c7bccfc362506d9be7c2d9e0f437 4) 0xd9cbf4290651ef7f8b4571a55167a414619bd15b → 0x543568d6c7b41537eb0bb9ed455e77949f0892aeAmount: 0.05 BNBDate: 2025-02-17 at 02:15 AM (UTC) TX: 0xbf380e69478f585694cd80ed257e11a7be692511a0da03cf90abbb7e7fcafb7e 5) 0x543568d6c7b41537eb0bb9ed455e77949f0892ae → 0x9d636e330abef7a34fbb079580e6c3d20b4dd3ccAmount: 0.05 BNBDate: 2025-02-19 at 04:50 AM (UTC)TX: 0x60701fdd9a31edde197316df50068b002472e430d7b412e495a71f94c1401661SummaryThe original transaction of 0.10 BNB was sent from 0x17eef0f6 to 0x8fa78148.The same amount was immediately transferred to 0x672ee9a8.Then, 0.05 BNB was split off and sent to 0xd9cbf429 on Feb 13.That 0.05 BNB was further transferred to 0x543568d6 on Feb 17.Finally, it was moved to 0x9d636e33 on Feb 19.This means the initial 0.10 BNB transaction was divided into two 0.05 BNB transfers, and one of those portions moved through multiple addresses.This pattern indicates layering in the money laundering process, where small amounts are moved between multiple addresses to obscure the original source of funds.The wallets linked to 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572 show some distinct characteristics compared to typical relay wallets.As seen in the transaction patterns, many small incoming transactions of 0.016 BNB are received from various addresses. These funds are then consolidated into larger amounts such as 0.3 BNB, 0.6 BNB, and 2.354 BNB before being sent out.This pattern suggests that the wallet might be used for fund aggregation, (Figure 5) where small amounts from multiple sources are collected and then distributed in larger transactions. Such behavior is often observed in cases related to money laundering, transaction obfuscation, or automated fund processing. However, further analysis would be needed to determine the exact intent behind these transactions.Figure 5: Fund Aggregation PatternExpanding on this pattern, the transaction flow can be visualized as follows:On the left side, numerous addresses send small amounts of BNB (e.g., 0.016 BNB) into the wallet. These small transactions are then collected and consolidated before being sent out in larger amounts on the right side (e.g., 0.3 BNB, 0.6 BNB, 2.354 BNB).This structure suggests a fund aggregation mechanism, where multiple small inputs are gathered and then processed into larger outgoing transactions. This pattern is commonly seen in:Mixing services attempting to obscure the origin of fundsMoney laundering activities using structured deposits and withdrawalsAutomated fund distribution for services or payoutsFurther investigation into the sources of these small deposits and the destinations of the larger transactions would be necessary to understand the true purpose of this activity.(Figure 6)Figure 6: Full Visual of Fund Aggregation PatternWhen dealing with such a high volume of transactions, it becomes difficult to manually analyze and track all the movement patterns. This is where an AI investigator can be extremely useful.Figure 7: AI Investigator SupportThe AI Investigator's full analysis of wallet 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572 suggests potential money laundering activity based on the following transaction patterns:AI Investigator responseUpon analyzing the transaction data for the origin address 0x672ee9a8db4ce9787752f7ca34b85a1d30f69572, several patterns emerge that could be considered suspicious or indicative of potentially fraudulent or unusual activity:High Frequency of Small Incoming Transactions: There is a noticeable pattern of numerous small incoming transactions (negative depths) from various addresses. These could be indicative of a dusting attack, where small amounts of cryptocurrency are sent to a wallet by an attacker in an attempt to deanonymize the wallet by linking it to other accounts or to engage in a phishing attack.Repeated Transactions Between the Same Addresses: There are several instances where the same addresses appear multiple times in the transaction list, both sending to and receiving from the origin address. For example, address 0x1d3146598721f9380fd3860e960602b782288b7a appears multiple times in both incoming and outgoing transactions with similar amounts. This could suggest a pattern of cycling funds, which might be an attempt to obfuscate the movement of funds (a technique often used in money laundering).Timing of Transactions: If the transactions are occurring at regular intervals or at specific times that coincide with certain events, this could indicate automated behavior or timing the transactions to avoid detection during low-traffic periods.Similar Transaction Amounts: Transactions that are consistently for similar amounts, especially if they are just below reporting thresholds, could be indicative of structuring, a technique used to avoid triggering legal reporting requirements and scrutiny.Rounded Transaction Amounts: Many transactions are for rounded amounts of BNB (e.g., 0.1 BNB, 0.5 BNB), which is unusual for regular transactions but common in artificial transaction patterns.Direct Reversal of Transactions: Some transactions appear to be directly reversed shortly after they occur. For instance, address 0x1d3146598721f9380fd3860e960602b782288b7a sends 0.1 BNB to the origin and then receives a similar amount back. This could be indicative of wash trading, where an entity trades with itself to create misleading market activity.Use of Multiple Addresses: The use of a large number of receiving and sending addresses in relation to the origin address could indicate an attempt to disguise the true source or destination of the funds through address hopping.It is important to note that while these patterns can be indicative of suspicious activity, they do not provide conclusive evidence of wrongdoing. Each pattern would need to be investigated more thoroughly in the context of additional information outside of this dataset. Identifying suspicious patterns is the first step, and each observation would require further analysis and context to determine if there is indeed fraudulent or illegal activity occurring.ConclusionTo summarize, automated mixing clusters consist of multiple types of wallets, each serving different roles. Some of the identified funds have been deposited from Gate.io and CoinEx, indicating potential exchange interaction.With this information, Bybit should collaborate with law enforcement agencies for further investigation.Within these clusters, different wallets serve specific functions:Relay Wallets: Used to transfer funds without holding them for long.Storage Wallets: Hold a portion of the funds temporarily.Distribution Wallets: Collect and redistribute funds.If overlapping patterns emerge among these wallets, there is a high probability that they are linked to the same group, similar to what ZachXBT described in the Phemex hacking case.However, based on our extensive investigations, while on-chain data may suggest these wallets belong to the same group, hacking groups and money laundering networks often operate separately. Multiple organizations frequently collaborate to facilitate illicit transactions, making it essential to conduct deeper profiling to determine which individuals or entities are involved.We will continue to investigate this case and update the community as we gather more insights.
Community Investigation
The Bybit Hack: A Wake-Up Call for Crypto Security
The Bybit Hack: A Wake-Up Call for Crypto SecurityThe crypto world was shaken in February 2025 when Bybit, a major centralized exchange (CEX), suffered the largest hack in history. Attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Bybit’s security system, stealing approximately $1.4 billion worth of Ethereum (ETH) from its cold wallet. This incident surpasses previous record-breaking hacks, including the Ronin Network breach in 2022 and the WazirX attack in 2024.Inside the Attack: How Hackers Stole $1.4 BillionThe Bybit hack was executed using an advanced social engineering attack. Hackers tricked the exchange’s team into approving a fraudulent transaction that granted them control over the cold wallet. Here’s how it unfolded:Malicious Transaction Masking – The hackers embedded a hidden smart contract modification inside a seemingly harmless transaction. This transaction appeared to transfer assets from the cold wallet to a legitimate hot wallet.Signer Deception – The project’s team members, responsible for approving transactions, unknowingly authorized the malicious transaction, believing it to be a routine fund transfer.Cold Wallet Takeover – Once the transaction was signed and approved, control of the cold wallet was transferred to the attacker, who then moved the stolen assets into their own wallets.Immediate Fallout – Panic spread across the market as news of the breach emerged, leading to a decline in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Traders quickly adjusted their positions amid the uncertainty.Bybit’s CEO, Ben Zhou, swiftly addressed the situation, reassuring users that the compromised cold wallet was an isolated case and that customer funds would be restored through Bybit’s reserves.Breaking Down the Tech: Cold Wallets, Hot Wallets, and Multi-Signature SecurityTo understand how this attack was possible, it’s crucial to differentiate between key crypto storage methods:Cold Wallets: Offline storage solutions offering higher security by keeping assets disconnected from the internet.Hot Wallets: Online wallets providing convenient access but exposing funds to hacking risks.Multi-Signature (Multi-Sig) Wallets: Require multiple approvals to execute a transaction, adding an extra layer of security.Despite Bybit’s use of a multi-signature cold wallet, the attackers manipulated the approval process, effectively bypassing its security measures.Lessons from the Bybit Hack: How to Stay SafeThe Bybit breach highlights the growing sophistication of crypto hacks and reinforces the need for enhanced security practices. Here’s what we can learn:Beware of Social Engineering Attacks – Hackers often manipulate trusted individuals into granting unauthorized access. Always verify transaction details carefully.Strengthen Security Protocols – Even multi-signature wallets are vulnerable if signers can be tricked. Additional verification steps, like hardware authentication, should be implemented.Routine Security Audits – Continuous monitoring of smart contracts and transaction approvals can help identify vulnerabilities before they are exploited.Use Hardware Wallets for Maximum Security – Users concerned about exchange security should consider moving funds to hardware wallets for enhanced protection.Community Vigilance Matters – Crypto investigators, like ZachXBT, play a key role in tracking stolen funds and raising awareness of security risks.The Future of Crypto Security: What’s Next?This attack serves as a wake-up call for the entire crypto industry. Moving forward, exchanges must adopt:Multi-Party Computation (MPC) Technology – A more advanced security mechanism that reduces the risks associated with multi-signature wallets.Stronger Authentication Measures – Two-factor authentication, biometric verification, and AI-powered fraud detection should become standard.Regulatory Compliance – Defined security guidelines can help exchanges maintain higher protection standards for users.Education & Awareness – Users must remain informed about security threats and best practices to safeguard their assets.Final Thoughts: Strengthening Crypto’s Security FutureThe Bybit hack is a stark reminder of the risks associated with digital currencies. As crypto adoption grows, so do the threats. The industry must prioritize security enhancements, and users should stay vigilant to protect their investments. By working together—exchanges, developers, and the community—we can build a safer and more resilient crypto ecosystem.
Recent Threats
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Lucky Star Rug Pull
The strategy employed by the malicious actor(s) appears rather straightforward yet carefully executed. LSC tokens were illicitly withdrawn, converted to BUSD, and ultimately consolidated into a single address (0x23f8c805306Bf27AB8bf3cEbEce4B778acfFd896). Funds were finally moved to MEXC Global Exchange Link : https://medium.com/sentinel-protocol/a-closer-look-at-the-lucky-star-rug-pull-a-1m-cryptocurrency-heist-79112df2f4f5 Link : https://twitter.com/CertiKAlert/status/1711440972796604521 Address that launder BUSD : 0x23f8c805306Bf27AB8bf3cEbEce4B778acfFd896
Email Scam
Hello pervert, I've sent this message from your Microsoft account. I want to inform you about a very bad situation for you. However, you can benefit from it, if you will act wisеly. Have you heard of Pegasus? This is a spyware program that installs on computers and smartphones and allows hackers to monitor the activity of device owners. It provides access to your webcam, messengers, emails, call records, etc. It works well on Android, iOS, macOS and Windows. I guess, you already figured out where I’m getting at. It’s been a few months since I installed it on all your dеviсеs because you were not quite choosy about what links to click on the intеrnеt. During this period, I’ve learned about all aspects of your private life, but оnе is of special significance to me. I’ve recorded many videos of you jerking off to highly controversial роrn videos. Given that the “questionable” genre is almost always the same, I can conclude that you have sick реrvеrsiоn. I doubt you’d want your friends, family and co-workers to know about it. However, I can do it in a few clicks. Every number in your contact Iist will suddenly receive these vidеоs – on WhatsApp, on Telegram, on Instagram, on Facebook, on email – everywhere. It is going to be a tsunami that will sweep away everything in its path, and first of all, your fоrmеr life. Don’t think of yourself as an innocent victim. No one knows where your реrvеrsiоn might lead in the future, so consider this a kind of deserved рunishmеnt to stop you. I’m some kind of God who sees everything. However, don’t panic. As we know, God is merciful and forgiving, and so do I. But my mеrсy is not free. Transfer 1400$ to my Litecoin (LTC) wallet: ltc1qsv3zptrkyzvve4cn02w827pjjzqjlaw0r4400d Once I receive confirmation of the transaction, I will реrmanently delete all videos compromising you, uninstаll Pegasus from all of your devices, and disappear from your life. You can be sure – my benefit is only money. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be writing to you, but destroy your life without a word in a second. I’ll be notified when you open my email, and from that moment you have exactly 48 hours to send the money. If cryptocurrencies are unchartered waters for you, don’t worry, it’s very simple. Just google “crypto exchange” or "buy Litecoin" and then it will be no harder than buying some useless stuff on Amazon. I strongly warn you against the following: * Do not reply to this email. I've sent it from your Microsoft account. * Do not contact the police. I have access to all your dеviсеs, and as soon as I find out you ran to the cops, videos will be published. * Don’t try to reset or destroy your dеviсеs. As I mentioned above: I’m monitoring all your activity, so you either agree to my terms or the vidеоs are рublished. Also, don’t forget that cryptocurrencies are anonymous, so it’s impossible to identify me using the provided аddrеss. Good luck, my perverted friend. I hope this is the last time we hear from each other. And some friendly advice: from now on, don’t be so careless about your online security.
Email Scam
Hello pervert, I've sent this message from your Microsoft account. I want to inform you about a very bad situation for you. However, you can benefit from it, if you will act wisely. Have you heard of Pegasus? This is a spyware program that installs on computers and smartphones and allows hackers to monitor the activity of device owners. It provides access to your webcam, messengers, emails, call records, etc. It works well on Android, iOS, macOS and Windows. I guess, you already figured out where I'm getting at. It's been a few months since I installed it on all your devices because you were not quite choosy about what links to click on the internet. During this period, l've learned about all aspects of your private life, but one is of special significance to me.
Address is used in Phishing scam
There are reports that this address was used in a Phishing scam. Please exercise caution when interacting with it. Reported by GoPlusSecurity.
Multiple USDT Fake Phishing
Fake Phishing Scam impersonating USDT token
Scam Warning
View all커머스피싱
글로벌온라인쇼핑몰에서 쉽게 판매하고 큰돈을 벌 수 있다고 접근합니다. 첫 접근은 텔레그램으로 일본 여성이 자신이 전화번호를 잘못추가했다면서 인사를 하면서 말을 걸어 옵니다. 본인의 어머니가 한국사람이라면서 친근한 대화를 몇마디 나누다가 다음달에 한국 여행이 있는데 한국에서 만나자고 유도를 하면서 편하게 카카오톡으로 대화를 하자고 메신저를 변경 합니다. 어머니가 한국 휴대폰을 등록해줬다면서 전화번호(01023301251)를 알려주고 카카오톡 친구 추가를 요청합니다. 본인은 피부관리샵을 운영하면서 동시에 온라인 상점에서 손쉽게 판매를하면서 고액의 수익을 올린다고 저에게도 해볼것을 권유합니다. 알려준 사이트는 (https://www.kikuu-mall.vip/) 이며, 회원가입시 어설픈 KYC를 진행하게 되고, 가짜 신분등을 업로드해도 승인이 이루어 집니다. 그 후 카카오톡을 통해서 상품을 등록하는 방법을 하나하나 알려주고, 다음날 주문이 들어오게 됩니다. 먼제 제가 제 돈을 충전하고 오더를 신청하면 쇼핑몰에서 고객에게 상품을 전달하고, 추후 고객이 주문한 상품이 고객에게 전달되면 고객의 구매금액이 저에게 돌아 온다고 합니다. 사이트를 뒤져보면 트론지갑주소도 있고, EVM 지갑 주소도 보입니다. 트론 : TUtF8Zs5jibEqEfu8U8sKaMUgwV5LLLLLL EVM: 0xCd9c7aE5fEes095db880BA9dC2740778f9563854 EVM 주소는 invalid 라고 나오지만, 트론 주소는 계속해서 USDT가 입, 출금이 되는거 보니 많은 사람들이 사기를 당하고 있는거 같습니다. 커머스피싱이라고 제법 잘 알려져 있지만 혹시 모르시는 분들이 당하시지 않게 내용 공유 합니다.
How I almost fell for a sophisticated scam from a fake Chinese VC
A few days ago, someone claiming to work for a well-known VC in China reached out to discuss a potential collaboration. After some conversation, we scheduled an online meeting. Everything seemed normal at first. But when the meeting time arrived, the person told me that their region was blocked from using the platform we had agreed on. Instead, they sent me a WeChat link and asked me to download the app so we could continue the meeting there. It felt a bit inconvenient, but I didn’t think much of it. I clicked the link and installed the app. Then, the person asked me to send a record screen video to confirm that I had downloaded the app, so they could "guide me through the process." That was when I started to feel uneasy. Something wasn’t right. Why would they need a record video just to help me join a meeting? I hesitated for a moment, then decided not to send anything. Instead, I tried messaging them again, suggesting we switch to another platform - but to my shock, all of our previous messages had disappeared. The WeChat link was also gone. It was as if the conversation had never happened. At that point, I knew I had narrowly avoided something serious. I wasn’t sure what kind of scam this was, but I wasn’t going to take any risks. I immediately reset my device to be safe. Looking back, I realized how easily this could have gone wrong. If I had sent that video, what kind of access could they have gained? Again, lucky for me, this device didn’t store any important data like wallets or passkey. This scammer was in several shared groups and had even contacted one of my friends before. No matter how careful you are, these situations can still happen. Stay alert, trust your instincts, and always double-check before downloading anything from an unknown source.
Blog
Smart contracts are the backbone of decentralized applications (dApps), powering everything from DeFi platforms to NFTs and DAOs. These self-executing programs bring automation and trustlessness to blockchain transactions. However, the more popular they become, the more attractive they are to hackers. Smart contract security must be top of mind when developing, deploying, or interacting with smart contracts.What is smart contract security?Smart contract security refers to the security principles and practices used by developers, users, and exchanges when creating or interacting with smart contracts. Unlike traditional software, once a smart contract is deployed, it is often immutable — meaning that any bug or vulnerability remains permanently unless upgrade mechanisms are in place.Key reasons why smart contracts require strong security:Transparency: Since most contracts are open-source, anyone can analyze their code.Irreversibility: Unlike traditional financial systems, transactions on the blockchain cannot be reversed, making exploits final.High-Value Targets: Billions of dollars are locked in smart contracts, attracting cybercriminals.Common smart contract attack vectors and Why they happen?Reentrancy AttacksOne of the most infamous attack vectors in smart contract security is reentrancy. This exploit occurs when a malicious contract repeatedly calls a vulnerable function before the original execution completes, allowing the attacker to drain funds before the contract updates its balance.A notable recent case is the December 2024 attack on GemPad, a platform enabling no-code smart contract deployments. The attacker exploited a reentrancy flaw in the withdrawal function, executing multiple withdrawals before the contract could update balances.As a result, approximately $1.9 million was stolen across multiple networks, including Ethereum, BNB Chain, and Base. This incident underscores the importance of implementing reentrancy guards, such as the checks-effects-interactions pattern or using Reentrancy Guard from OpenZeppelin.Private Key CompromiseEven the most secure smart contracts can be rendered useless if an attacker gains access to private keys. Once a hacker obtains these keys, they can execute unauthorized transactions, drain funds, and take full control of associated contracts.In July 2024, WazirX, one of India’s largest crypto exchanges, suffered a devastating attack that resulted in $234.9 million in losses. Reports linked the attack to the North Korean hacking group Lazarus, which allegedly compromised the exchange’s private key management system. This breach highlights the critical need for multi-signature wallets, hardware security modules (HSMs), and stringent access controls to minimize the risk of private key theft.Supply Chain AttacksInstead of targeting contracts directly, attackers often infiltrate the development process by injecting malicious code into dependencies or third-party tools used in smart contract development. This method is particularly dangerous because compromised libraries can go undetected for extended periods.In October 2024, a large-scale supply chain attack hit blockchain developers when 287 malicious packages were uploaded to the Node Package Manager (NPM) repository. These packages, disguised as legitimate libraries, introduced malicious scripts that exfiltrated sensitive data and compromised smart contract functionality. Developers unknowingly integrated these dependencies, leading to security breaches in multiple Ethereum-based projects. This incident emphasizes the importance of package verification, dependency audits, and reproducible builds to ensure the integrity of smart contract development environments.Flash Loan ExploitsFlash loans allow users to borrow large sums of cryptocurrency without collateral, provided the loan is repaid within the same transaction. While designed as a financial innovation, flash loans have become a favorite tool for attackers who manipulate smart contract logic, exploit price oracles, or drain liquidity pools.A recent example occurred in January 2025, when Bybit was exploited in a flash loan attack that resulted in $1.5 billion in losses. The attacker manipulated an internal transfer function within Bybit’s wallet system, exploiting the contract’s logic mid-transaction. The FBI later attributed the attack to Lazarus Group, highlighting the growing sophistication of these exploits. This attack reinforces the need for secure price oracles, transaction delays for critical operations, and enhanced smart contract audits to detect vulnerabilities before deployment.How to Strengthen Smart Contract SecurityConduct Comprehensive AuditsOne of the most critical steps in securing smart contracts is performing rigorous audits before deployment. Security audits help identify potential weaknesses and provide recommendations to mitigate risks.Regular audits should not be a one-time effort. As protocols evolve and new features are added, continuous audits and security assessments must be conducted. Additionally, employing formal verification techniques can mathematically prove that a contract behaves as intended, reducing the likelihood of unforeseen bugs.Implement Bug Bounty ProgramsEven the most thorough audits may not catch every vulnerability, which is why bug bounty programs have become a vital layer of defense. By incentivizing ethical hackers and security researchers to test smart contracts for weaknesses, projects can proactively uncover and fix security flaws before malicious actors exploit them.Platforms like ChainBounty make it easier for Web3 projects to launch effective bug bounty programs. ChainBounty connects security experts with blockchain developers, offering rewards for identifying vulnerabilities. Unlike traditional security audits, which are limited to a few experts, bug bounty programs leverage the collective intelligence of a diverse security community. This decentralized approach strengthens security by allowing multiple perspectives to analyze potential attack vectors.With cyber threats becoming more sophisticated, utilizing platforms like ChainBounty ensures that vulnerabilities are addressed promptly, reducing the risk of costly breaches.Adopt Secure Coding PracticesMany smart contract vulnerabilities arise due to poor coding practices. Developers must follow well-established security guidelines and use libraries designed to prevent common attack vectors.For example, implementing reentrancy guards ensures that contracts execute functions in a controlled manner, preventing attackers from exploiting recursive calls. Additionally, using overflow- and underflow-safe arithmetic operations, eliminates risks related to numerical manipulation.Other secure coding best practices include:Using checks-effects-interactions to minimize reentrancy risks.Ensuring proper input validation to prevent unintended operations.Writing modular and upgradeable smart contracts to fix vulnerabilities efficiently.Enhance Access ControlsAccess control failures have led to some of the largest crypto exploits in history. Developers must ensure that only authorized entities can execute sensitive functions within smart contracts.One of the most effective security measures is role-based access control (RBAC), which grants permissions based on predefined roles rather than individual accounts. Additionally, multi-signature wallets can prevent unauthorized access by requiring multiple approvals before executing high-risk transactions.Another critical consideration is key management. Private keys must be stored securely using hardware security modules (HSMs) or threshold signature schemes (TSS) to prevent unauthorized access. Projects should also adopt timelocks and emergency pause mechanisms, allowing developers to respond to potential threats before major losses occur.Monitor and RespondContinuous monitoring is essential for detecting and mitigating attacks in real time. Blockchain analytics tools can track unusual activities, such as large token transfers, sudden price manipulations, or unexpected contract interactions.Projects should establish a real-time alert system that notifies developers of suspicious behavior. Additionally, having an incident response plan ensures that in the event of an attack, damage can be minimized, and user funds can be protected.ConclusionSmart contract security is an ongoing challenge that requires a proactive approach. By conducting comprehensive audits, engaging in bug bounty programs like ChainBounty, adopting secure coding practices, enforcing strong access controls, and implementing real-time monitoring, blockchain projects can significantly reduce their risk exposure.About ChainBountyChainBounty is a decentralized platform that addresses security challenges in the crypto space. With collective intelligence and fair rewards, anyone can join the fight against cybercrime.Follow us to stay up-to-date with the latest information:X: https://x.com/ChainBountyXWebsite: https://chainbounty.io/Medium: https://medium.com/@ChainBountyX#Web3 #Cyberthreats #Cybersecurity #CryptoSafety #BlockchainInnovation #ChainBounty
ChainBounty
8 days agoYou’ve launched a Web3 project with a thoroughly audited smart contract, only to wake up weeks later to a devastating exploit. This isn’t just a hypothetical scenario — it has happened to multiple projects, even those backed by top-tier security audits. The problem? This article will dissect why conventional audits fall short and propose a more resilient approach to Web3 security.The Limitations of Traditional Security AuditsOne-Time Assessments Are InsufficientTraditional security audits are typically conducted as a one-time event before a project launch. While they help identify vulnerabilities at a specific moment in time, they fail to address the ongoing nature of security risks in Web3. Smart contracts are immutable once deployed, but their interactions with external protocols and dependencies can change over time, introducing new threats that an initial audit may not cover. Without continuous security evaluations, a project remains exposed to evolving attack strategies.Code-Focused Audits Ignore Ecosystem RisksMost traditional audits primarily focus on smart contract code, ensuring that it follows best practices and avoids known vulnerabilities. However, Web3 security extends far beyond code correctness. Many high-profile hacks exploit weaknesses in broader ecosystem components, such as oracle price manipulation, governance attacks, or vulnerabilities in cross-chain bridges. A secure smart contract does not guarantee a secure protocol if the surrounding infrastructure remains vulnerable.Lack of Real-World Attack SimulationsTraditional audits often rely on static analysis, manual code reviews, and automated scanning tools. While these methods are essential, they do not accurately simulate real-world attack scenarios. Hackers employ creative and sophisticated strategies that go beyond predictable vulnerabilities. Web3 projects need stress testing, adversarial simulations, and penetration testing that mimic actual attacks in live environments. Without this, teams may have a false sense of security based on theoretical assessments rather than practical defenses.No Ongoing Accountability from AuditorsOnce an audit is completed, the responsibility for security shifts entirely to the project team. If a vulnerability is later exploited, auditors typically bear no accountability. This limitation creates a gap where projects may over-rely on audit reports without implementing additional security measures. Web3 requires a model where security is treated as an ongoing responsibility rather than a checkbox completed before launch.A More Effective Security Approach for Web3Continuous Monitoring & Real-Time Threat DetectionInstead of relying solely on periodic audits, projects should implement:On-Chain Monitoring — Detect unusual patterns like flash loan attacks or suspicious withdrawals.Automated Alert Systems — AI-driven tools flag potential security breaches in real time.Smart Contract Watchdogs — Platforms that continuously validate contract interactions and behavior.Community-Driven Security: Bug Bounty ProgramsBug bounty programs engage ethical hackers to uncover vulnerabilities before malicious actors do. Unlike audits, which involve a small team of experts, bounty programs harness a global network of security researchers, ensuring continuous security testing.Layered Security Audits: No Single Point of FailureRather than depending on a single audit firm, projects should:Commission multiple independent security firms.Use automated security scans alongside manual reviews.Leverage decentralized audit communities for peer verification.Incident Response & Recovery PlanningSecurity isn’t just about prevention; it’s also about response. Web3 projects should implement:Emergency Multi-Signature Controls — Prevent unauthorized transactions.Timelocks & Circuit Breakers — Delay suspicious transactions for verification.Insurance & Recovery Funds — Minimize financial damage from successful attacks.How ChainBounty Reinforces Web3 SecurityChainBounty takes security beyond static audits by creating a dynamic, community-driven protection layer for Web3 projects. Through:Decentralized Bug Bounty Programs — Ethical hackers help projects identify threats before bad actors exploit them.Real-Time Security Intelligence — Live monitoring tools detect anomalies and potential breaches.Evolving Threat Defense — Bug bounties create a dynamic security layer that adapts to emerging Web3 risks, such as flash loan attacks and governance exploits.ConclusionRelying on traditional security audits alone is a dangerous gamble in Web3. The landscape is evolving too fast for static defenses. To stay ahead, projects need continuous monitoring, adversarial testing, bug bounty programs, and decentralized security validation.Security isn’t just a final step before launch — it must be an integral, continuous part of a project’s lifecycle. Web3 doesn’t wait for audits to catch up, and neither should you.
ChainBounty
11 days ago
The Problem with Traditional Bug Bounty PlatformsBug bounty platforms are an essential part of the Web3 ecosystem, helping secure smart contracts, protocols, and DApps by identifying potential vulnerabilities. However, many existing platforms still suffer from critical issues:Complicated and time-consuming review processes — Some platforms require excessive verification steps, discouraging hackers from participating.Lack of transparency and delayed payouts — Many platforms do not have automated payment mechanisms, causing long wait times for rewards.Barriers for non-traditional hackers — Ethical hackers from Web2 often struggle to enter the Web3 bounty space due to unfamiliar processes and restrictive requirements.In some cases, even skilled ethical hackers struggle to claim the rewards they rightfully deserve. This discourages talented security researchers from participating and leaves Web3 projects exposed to threats.So, what’s the ideal solution for Web3 hackers?What Makes a Great Bug Bounty Platform?For ethical hackers, choosing the right platform to hunt for vulnerabilities is crucial. The best bug bounty platforms should offer:Fair compensation — Transparent and competitive payouts for discovered vulnerabilities.Strong project partnerships — Access to high-profile Web3 projects that prioritize security.A hacker-centric approach — Clear guidelines, efficient reporting processes, and an overall rewarding experience.Trust and transparency — Open communication between hackers and projects, ensuring timely payments and dispute resolution.Why ChainBounty Stands OutChainBounty is built on a decentralized security philosophy, leveraging the power of the community to create a safer, more transparent, and more efficient platform. Here’s what makes ChainBounty different from traditional bug bounty platforms:Decentralized Threat Intelligence & Bounty SystemUnlike traditional bug bounty platforms that focus solely on identifying smart contract vulnerabilities, ChainBounty allows the community to report a wide range of Web3 threats, including scams, phishing attempts, and other malicious activities. Contributions from hackers, security experts, and everyday users are recognized and fairly rewarded.Real-Time On-Chain RewardsChainBounty utilizes Layer 2 technology to ensure that transactions and rewards are processed swiftly and transparently. This eliminates delays and unnecessary disputes that users commonly experience on traditional bug bounty platforms.Community-Driven SecurityChainBounty is more than just a bug bounty platform — we features a Community Insights section where hackers, security experts, and even casual users can share knowledge about blockchain security. Contributors help build a comprehensive database of Web3 threats, making the entire ecosystem safer.Additionally, ChainBounty introduces the CBP (ChainBounty Points) system, allowing users to earn points that can be converted into $BOUNTY tokens or redeemed for premium features such as risk assessment tools and advanced security analysis.Fair & Transparent Dispute ResolutionUnlike centralized platforms that rely on a single entity for dispute resolution, ChainBounty adopts a decentralized model. This ensures that bounty disputes and vulnerability evaluations are handled transparently, with the community playing an active role in decision-making.More Than Just Bug BountiesChainBounty expands beyond traditional bug bounty programs by incorporating scam and threat intelligence reporting. Users can report phishing sites, suspicious wallet addresses, scam phone numbers, and other security threats — and get rewarded for their contributions.With a more comprehensive approach to Web3 security, ChainBounty isn’t just a bug bounty platform — it’s a decentralized security ecosystem where hackers, security experts, and users collaborate to create a safer Web3.The Future of Web3 Security Lies in CollaborationWeb3 security depends on ethical hackers being empowered, recognized, and fairly rewarded for their contributions. ChainBounty isn’t just another bug bounty platform — it’s a movement toward a more secure, transparent, and hacker-friendly blockchain ecosystem.If you’re a Web3 hacker looking for a platform that values your skills and time, ChainBounty is the place to be.
ChainBounty
20 days ago
Web3 is a battlefield: smart contract exploits, phishing scams, and million-dollar hacks. No single team can secure this space alone.This is where the bounty hunter community plays a crucial role. But what if bounty hunters weren’t just reactive responders? What if they became security leaders, making a proactive security culture across Web3?Beyond Bounties: Why Web3 Needs Security LeadershipThe traditional cybersecurity landscape has long been dominated by centralized entities — government agencies, corporate security teams, and compliance regulators. Web3, however, thrives on decentralization, meaning that security can no longer be the responsibility of a select few. Instead, it must become a shared culture, where developers, users, and ethical hackers collaborate to prevent, detect, and respond to threats.This shift requires bounty hunters to evolve — from skilled exploit finders to educators, strategists, and community defenders.The Current State of Crypto SecurityIf 2024 has taught us anything, it’s that Web3 security is still playing catch-up in an increasingly hostile digital landscape. Despite advancements in blockchain technology, high-profile breaches continue to expose the vulnerabilities of even the most established platforms.Take the case of WazirX, one of India’s largest crypto exchanges. In July 2024, a sophisticated attack exploited weaknesses in its multi-signature wallet system, allowing hackers to siphon away nearly $235 million. Then came the breach at Radiant Capital, where hackers gained access to three private keys, enabling them to drain assets from multiple blockchains. This multi-chain heist, worth over $50 million, highlighted a troubling trend: even projects designed with decentralization in mind can have single points of failure.One of the biggest losses of the year hit DMM Bitcoin. In a matter of minutes, $320 million worth of Bitcoin vanished due to a compromised private key. The scale of the loss wasn’t just a financial setback, it was a stark reminder that inadequate key management remains one of the biggest security threats in crypto.These incidents are proof that the Web3 industry still lacks a strong, unified security culture. Many projects prioritize rapid development and user growth, only to address security vulnerabilities after a crisis occurs. The result? A landscape where attackers are always one step ahead, and defenses are built in hindsight rather than foresight.The question is: Will we wait for the next billion-dollar hack before taking action?From Hunter to Leader: How Bounty Hunters Can Shape Web3 SecurityEducating the CommunityOne of the biggest challenges in Web3 security is awareness. Many users fall victim to scams simply because they don’t understand on-chain risks or wallet security best practices.Security leaders don’t just find exploits — they educate the ecosystem. Whether through detailed reports, social media threads, or live security workshops, bounty hunters can help projects and users stay ahead of threats.Proactively Identifying RisksInstead of waiting for exploits to be discovered by attackers, security leaders should be one step ahead. This means:Running continuous smart contract auditsDeveloping on-chain tracking tools to detect suspicious movementsCollaborating with projects to strengthen security posturesBounty platforms like ChainBounty provide a structured way for researchers to get involved in these efforts- ensuring security is not just reactive but proactive.Strengthening Decentralized Threat IntelligenceThe traditional cybersecurity world relies on threat intelligence sharing — where security experts share attack patterns and vulnerabilities. Web3 needs the same approach.ChainBounty’s Threats/Scams Report feature enables bounty hunters to report risks in real-time, creating a decentralized intelligence network that helps the entire ecosystem stay one step ahead of attackers.Rewarding Security ContributionsFor security culture to thrive in Web3, incentives matter. ChainBounty is pioneering a “Report-to-Earn model”, where users can earn ChainBounty Points (CBP) for reporting scams, sharing security insights, and helping protect the community.Building the Future of Web3 SecurityBy shifting from bounty hunting to security leadership, ethical hackers can transform Web3 into a more resilient, secure, and trustworthy ecosystem.Want to be part of the movement? Join ChainBounty, contribute to blockchain security, and turn your expertise into impact.
ChainBounty
23 days ago
