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A collector contract, one transaction-submitting account and three recurring recipients form the clearest BNB Smart Chain pattern in SentinelTX’s November 2 report on a reported DNS-hijack campaign. Three observed splits followed incoming transfers by five seconds at the recorded block timestamps. Each used the same recipients and approximately the same 55/30/15 proportions.That pattern is narrower than the whole incident. It does not identify the people behind the addresses, establish how the DNS change happened, or prove that all reported losses passed through this collector. Some incoming amounts also carry explicit verification warnings in the source report. This article keeps those qualifications alongside the findings rather than treating a detailed transaction diagram as a complete account of the attack.What this report coversThe source of this article is SentinelTX’s platform-generated report CASE-7766DAE6, dated November 2, 2026. Its analytic focus is BNB Smart Chain, chain ID 56, from October 31 at 00:00 to November 2 at 00:00 UTC. The executed query was broader: October 1, 2026, 00:24:30.552075 UTC through November 2, 2026, 00:24:30.552075 UTC. Those are different boundaries, not interchangeable descriptions of a single 48-hour search.The report’s discovery source, a Bitquery investigation dated October 31, describes 12 DeFi websites registered through Name.com resolving to attacker-run copies containing a wallet drainer. It attributes a Step Drainer connection to Blockaid and reports $202,386 across 32 wallets on six chains, including $2,386 across seven BNB Chain wallets. These are attributed incident-wide claims reproduced in the PDF, not totals independently reconstructed by this BSC investigation. SentinelTX states that only the first 12,000 characters of that discovery page were reviewed.The cause of the DNS change and the registrar’s role are not established by the chain evidence. The report makes no finding of registrar culpability. Likewise, the claimed drainer-family attribution is not an identity finding from the transactions below.Source note: SentinelTX PDF, pages 4, 11–15 and 21. All transaction times in this article are UTC. The BSC subset must not be extrapolated into a six-chain loss estimate.Follow the roles, not presumed identitiesC1 is the Safe-type collector contract. X1 is the externally owned account that submitted every observed split. P1, P2 and P3 are recurring recipient addresses. S1 identifies the sender of the incoming transfer immediately preceding the example split.The report records Safe-style execution calls and an ExecutionSuccess event for the seed transaction. That supports the execution relationship. It does not establish that X1 is a Safe owner: the owner set, signing threshold and modules were not read. All attribution lookups returned no label, which means no label was returned—not that attribution is impossible or that the addresses belong to one operator.Figure 1. The observed BSC roles: S1 sends to C1; C1 distributes to P1, P2 and P3; X1 submits the execution call. The call relationship is distinct from a value-transfer relationship. Source: SentinelTX PDF, pages 7–10. Address ownership and Safe control remain unknown.The five-second splitThe example begins at 01:40:21 on October 31. The PDF records an incoming transfer from S1 to C1 of 0.483268458106 BNB, but explicitly flags that incoming amount as unverified in its narrative and conclusion. At 01:40:26, seed transaction T1 records three outgoing legs:Recipient: P1 — approximately 55% — Recorded outgoing amount: 0.2657976519583 BNBRecipient: P2 — approximately 30% — Recorded outgoing amount: 0.1449805374318 BNBRecipient: P3 — approximately 15% — Recorded outgoing amount: 0.0724902687159 BNBThe three outgoing amounts total 0.483268458106 BNB. Presenting those recorded legs does not remove the source’s separate warning about the incoming transfer. Nor is this one transaction’s total a whole-incident loss figure.Figure 2. Three recorded outgoing legs in seed transaction T1, shown in BNB from a zero baseline. Total: 0.483268458106 BNB; proportions approximately 55/30/15. Source: SentinelTX PDF, pages 5–6, 9–10 and 17. These are transaction amounts, not recipient balances; the preceding incoming amount retains its verification warning.Two other inflow-to-split pairs show the same five-second spacing: 01:00:55 to 01:01:00, and 01:42:38 to 01:42:43. The same X1 account submitted all three splits to the same three recipients. This repeated execution pattern is the basis for the report’s revenue-sharing interpretation. The allocation of specific business roles—such as kit operator, affiliate or infrastructure provider—is an assessment, not an observed identification of three people.The largest reported inflow did not splitThe collector summary lists four incoming transfers totaling 3.09671583071052685 BNB and nine outgoing legs across three split transactions totaling 0.828208994212836824 BNB. Their reported difference is 2.268506836497690026 BNB. These are the PDF’s reconciliation figures; its warnings on underlying incoming amounts still apply.That difference matches the collector balance recorded at block 131144415, on November 2 at 00:24:09 UTC. This balance observation is later than the stated analytic cutoff. It must not be presented as a continuously monitored or current balance.The corresponding 2.268506836497690026 BNB inflow, associated with block 130768877 at 01:26:51 on October 31, is explicitly classified as needing corroboration. It is also the largest reported collector inflow and the one not forwarded in the observed splits. The PDF therefore qualifies the discovery source’s broad claim that almost every drain followed the same split: that description does not capture this largest BSC transfer.The source offers possible explanations, including execution failure, a deliberate hold or an attempted transaction that reverted. It does not choose between them. An earlier zero-value executor call at 01:16:29 was not decoded. The missing explanation remains a lead, not a finding that can be filled in from the later balance match.Receipts are not balancesThe payout-wallet figures cover gross receipts in the 32-day lookback. They include more than the three collector payments and should not be used as a current asset inventory.Recipient: P1 — Gross receipts reported in the lookback: 0.551359380509872312 BNB across 4 receipts; gross sent: 0 BNBRecipient: P2 — Gross receipts reported in the lookback: 0.300741480278112169 BNB across 4 receipts; gross sent: 0 BNBRecipient: P3 — Gross receipts reported in the lookback: 0.170375356553192358 BNB across 6 receipts; gross sent: 0 BNBThe report says that one additional receipt to P1, one to P2 and three to P3 were not itemized. It considers a direct-to-payout route possible, but the missing senders and transaction detail prevent confirmation. P3 also has history from September 23, before the reported incident. Earlier activity cannot simply be relabeled as proceeds of this campaign.There is an important source contradiction here. The PDF’s recovery discussion describes approximately 1.0225 BNB in gross receipts as sitting across the payout wallets, while its limitations explicitly say their current balances were not read. The latter qualification prevents treating that receipt total as an established present balance or recoverable amount. No exchange deposit, bridge or DEX endpoint was identified in the examined evidence; that is a scoped absence of observation, not proof that later or cross-chain exits did not occur.Signed transfers and reported deceptionThe four collector inflows are described as plain native-BNB transfers signed by their sending wallets. The retained BSC rows do not show an approve, permit or transferFrom pull. This distinction matters: the visible movement is not presented as a token allowance being exercised by a third party.A signature establishes the transaction-signing relationship, not whether the person understood the action shown by the interface. The DNS-hijacked-front-end explanation remains a reported allegation in the source. The presence of a valid signature neither establishes nor disproves that deception.The report also excludes suspected unsolicited token distributions from its economic interpretation, including 3.0 units of an unidentified-symbol token and 5.0 TeslaSI. Their units are not BNB and must not be added to BNB totals. Their liquidity was not checked. Shared spam counterparties between addresses are not evidence of common control.Where the evidence stopsThe PDF contains both structured rows labeled verified and narrative warnings that some retained incoming quantities cannot be confirmed. It also gives some blocks, hashes and precise amounts in its chronology or tables while its limitations say those details were not recorded or were available only at displayed precision. These are internal differences in the source, not discrepancies resolved by this article. In particular, a structured “verified” label does not justify silently upgrading an amount the report’s conclusion leaves unverified.The coverage appendix records 19 retained movement rows spanning October 31, 01:00:55 to 01:51:45 UTC. It does not establish enforcement of the requested historical cutoff. The collector’s internal-call history is incomplete, and 12 of 22 transaction-list entries were reviewed. The query interval, retained-row interval and later balance observation therefore answer different questions.The PDF’s optimistic recovery assessment is professional opinion, not a recovery guarantee. With no identified custodial endpoint and payout balances unread, this record does not establish an immediately available freeze target. No recovery, freeze or contact with an exchange is reported as completed.Conclusion: a repeatable pattern, not a complete attributionThe strongest story is a bounded one: a Safe-type collector distributed three observed transfers to the same recipients, using the same submitting account and repeated five-second timing. The largest reported inflow did not follow that path. Address ownership, the DNS change’s cause and subsequent destinations remain unresolved.The report’s priority leads are the Safe’s owner configuration and creation trail, X1’s funding, the unitemized payout receipts and the undecoded executor call. These are proposed investigative steps, not work represented as already performed. The case illustrates why transaction structure, attribution and recoverability must remain separate even when a distribution pattern is visually clear.Figure 3. Conclusion and evidence boundaries. Recorded: three splits, one submitting account and recurring recipients. Not established: address ownership, the DNS change’s cause or final destinations. Some incoming amounts remain unverified, and payout balances were not read. Source: SentinelTX PDF, pages 13–15, 21–22.Reference keysThe following identifiers are transcribed from the source PDF. Role labels are local reading aids, not identity claims.Address key — C1, collector: 0x24497068ca4166ca32a04ae530ce00cf79755bd5. X1, submitting account: 0x33dfc810365193bff54326812d7df34b3e438da3. S1, example sender: 0x4fa1daf1e03759e802452f5543171fa19c0209d7.Recipient key — P1: 0x012f89ff307568f8409bbe379ca92ed41bc4d386. P2: 0x7bf2037264efbff55bd52777772779c1d9e87695. P3: 0x5aff449b63c033df386af0c45384cd20c5918dbf.Transaction key — T1, seed split: 0x39b36904796f53ca801bbd393ba09b1169fe3b87462719a177efde2e30967379. Preceding incoming transfer: 0x911b11cd01af297d62933632d5d59e5adc84e5f88e4b2668ef4d989b8c16c151. Other observed splits: 0xad1e8a632c5ad86b49b571384fb02e529da73e8617112a87907b0cf4271e29b6 and 0x96db9345ea17d232ee659eb55debb75c11e723e0f92dea726e293cef5d7ad86e.Source note: Adapted from the actual SentinelTX platform-generated PDF, CASE-7766DAE6, November 2, 2026, 25 pages. References to external reporting are attributed as they appear in that PDF. No public download URL for the PDF is asserted.

On 1 November 2026, a wallet called the same execution contract twice, one second apart. In those transactions, collateral moved out of six source contracts, passed through option pools, and was partly converted into ETH. The execution contract then paid ETH to the wallet that submitted the calls. This review follows that Arbitrum sequence and the sender’s next nine ETH payments. This update extends the route through matched service requests to Ethereum and eight Bitcoin outputs. A separate USDC branch reaches Solana; its later Bitcoin destination remains unlinked.Premia is an options protocol. An option gives its buyer a right to trade an asset on agreed terms; a vault can place depositors’ assets behind those obligations. An option pool is the contract in which the associated positions and collateral are recorded. The distinction matters: collateral leaving a vault, leaving a pool, changing asset and reaching a wallet are different stages of the same movement, rather than losses to add together.Blockaid’s original alert described newly created empty pools, flash loans and options purchases that directed vault collateral into those pools before a liquidity withdrawal. That is the security firm’s mechanism assessment. The records below support a transaction sequence, but this review does not independently establish the precise code defect. Blockaid’s alert.1. The actors and the limits of the routeThe transaction sender signs the call and pays its fee. The execution contract receives the call and performs the contract interactions. The source contracts hold the collateral that later appears in the pools. These are roles in the records; they do not identify people or prove who controlled a destination.Role / chainFull addressTransaction sender · Arbitrum0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBdExecution contract · Arbitrum0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785fThe directly reviewed route is source contracts → option pools → execution contract → transaction sender → nine Arbitrum recipients. The follow-up connects five Arbitrum deposits through NEAR Intents to Ethereum payouts, then five Ethereum swap deposits to Bitcoin outputs. Three other Arbitrum deposits reach Bitcoin directly. A ninth Arbitrum payment follows a separate USDC route to Solana. Service records connect the chain endpoints; matching amounts or identical address text alone would not establish these links.Scope / measureValue / interpretationIncident anchors1 Nov 2026, 03:14:37–03:15:40 UTC; setup and two successful callsSource-contract net outflows3.64410382 WBTC; 43.472545677315167985 WETH; 48479.358725 USDC.e; 46,215.428616328829808 ARBETH paid to transaction sender191.775520770266156270 ETH, two internal paymentsSelected onward payments191.823 ETH, nine Arbitrum transactions; not an exact loss allocationEvidence checkedArbiscan overview / all and net transfers; Blockscout individual transaction details and wallet listings. Direct explorer and official service-record review; SentinelTX findings are assessed separately and do not replace endpoint evidenceReview boundarySelected records read on 2 Nov 2026; cross-chain update reviewed on 3 Nov 2026. No claim of full-history or current-balance coverage2. Preparation came before the two callsWhat was already in place when the collateral moved? At 03:14:37 UTC, the sender called the execution contract in a successful transaction that the explorer records as creating six contracts. The same record shows small transfers into those newly created addresses and option-position mint and burn entries. A mint creates a token record; a burn removes one. Neither entry alone proves that a separate person deposited or received assets.UTC · 1 NovRecord / meaning03:14:37Setup transaction · block 520166285; six created addresses listed03:15:39First attack anchor · block 520166479; same sender and execution contract03:15:40Second attack anchor · block 520166483; same sender and execution contractThe setup predates the first reviewed outflow by 62 seconds. The two later calls are four Arbitrum blocks apart and one second apart by their displayed UTC timestamps. The wallet listing displays the same selector, 0xbcea0a12, for both later calls. A selector is the first four bytes used to indicate a contract function; it is not a decoded explanation of what that function does. Timing connects the sequence, but it does not by itself explain which condition in the vault or pool code permitted the withdrawal.3. What left the source contractsWhich amount measures the collateral movement without counting it again at each step? For this question, the table uses each source address’s net ERC-20 outflow inside its relevant attack transaction. “Net” means transfers out minus transfers back to that same address in the same record. It is not a complete balance reconciliation or a final depositor-loss calculation.Source · ArbitrumNet outflowAnchor0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea5313.64410382 WBTCFirst0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B43.472545677315167985 WETHFirst0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a21,333.613826 USDC.eFirst0x6A1FC0E1c60BA6564CDe4910A425F1F1a1d18C1F20,215.067131 USDC.eSecond0xDC631d88dbB5eb39f5c4Bf8B4e5298d098912fFf46,215.428616328829808 ARBSecond0xBe3E229319f86F5EE96EE1Dc0B6D55e8b68a439e6,930.677768 USDC.eSecondThe three USDC.e rows sum to 48,479.358725 USDC.e. USDC.e denotes the bridged token contract in these records; it is not silently substituted with native USDC. WBTC and WETH are token representations of Bitcoin and ether. Their token outflows should remain separate by asset, and the explorer’s changing dollar display should not be used to manufacture a single historical loss price.Read Figure 1 from the source group into the central execution contract, then down to the transaction sender. Solid arrows summarize transfers within the reviewed Arbitrum records; arrow width is not proportional to amount. The key observation is that different collateral assets converge into two ETH payments. The next question is how those payments relate to later outgoing ETH.Figure 1. The reviewed Arbitrum route. Source amounts are net outflows; the two ETH payments describe a later stage and are not added to them. Exact quantities and source links appear in the adjacent tables.4. Working capital is different from proceedsThe first transaction shows the Balancer-labelled vault sending 0.9 WBTC, 11 WETH and 6,000 USDC.e to the execution contract, with matching token repayments in that same transaction. A flash loan supplies temporary working capital that is borrowed and repaid within one transaction. The matching round trips support that description; they are not separate victim losses.After the first call, the explorer’s net-transfer view shows 3.62484902 WBTC and 21,223.508226 USDC.e retained by the execution contract. Its second-call net view shows those same quantities leaving it, with swap counterparties receiving those tokens and sending WETH. The second record includes WETH receipts of 124.023037246690632576, 21.175933432587279601 and 3.338052413673076108. Their sum is the 148.537023092950988285 WETH unwrapped in that call. Second call: transfer and unwrap record. This supports the asset-conversion sequence without treating the retained tokens and resulting ETH as two losses.Call / stageETH paid to senderFirst call43.238497677315167985 ETHSecond call148.537023092950988285 ETHCalculated total191.775520770266156270 ETHEach payout is visible as an internal ETH transfer from the execution contract to the sender. The same transaction also shows the corresponding WETH unwrap. Unwrapping changes the form of ether; it is not another independent theft. These payouts also differ from the source-contract net outflow amounts because trading, premiums and other transfers intervene. They are not a gas-adjusted profit statement.5. Nine onward payments, not nine proven cash-outsWhat happened to the sender’s ETH next? Nine selected transaction details show successful outgoing ETH payments between 03:18:09 and 03:30:58 UTC. The timestamps below are normalized from Blockscout’s explicitly displayed +09:00 offset; the original display is retained in the evidence files. These transactions total 191.823 ETH.UTC · 1 NovETHTransaction03:18:09100x5027bfc48c6b7ba29182aaf03dd1e3ce0f616c39736570649fe9f9d74e359d3c03:19:18100x731dabd98f5761de0ba13982e5d0ebaa21a5c0b49e437ee056ec03fb958a5d6a03:22:30200xe45b834091218960383c8383fa64b5d793d572194072e28424044a703432639403:23:34200x31cb4ec03ae836e68fa10cf626f001a915e72ea3a577d23293a07bc50dad8c5603:26:08200xd31eccc1175164508fdd06348b386e01fc089312bbbb0b70c9b092dd89a4b8bd03:27:19200x281fe73a4d11453b560bdb0b970ac6ea39d80e2098b02419bc6d675484aee5c103:28:23300x39da76ea9396abaa7e589460baee088d7e181fd24d73fe914cedac8d950d512a03:29:42300x7db39a7cfa5c64fb87d1ee21f8c8509cb25d463dfc9e437af5752ff42d67714f03:30:5831.8230x2e0fef226cbb105c01b4ff5155117a818aa9c71eee02c8ab9117caf5e4e7f0e6The outgoing total exceeds the two reviewed attack payouts by 0.047479229733843730 ETH. This arithmetic difference does not establish a second theft, a service fee or a missing bridge payment. A pre-event internal-transfer listing also records 0.05946476252970877 ETH entering the sender at block 520146086 from an address labelled “Across Protocol: Spoke Pool.” The listing establishes an earlier inflow lead, not the identity of a depositor or a verified cross-chain origin. Its parent transaction has not been independently decoded in this review. Internal-transfer listing.Read Figure 2 from the sender into the three branches. Solid arrows summarize endpoint connections matched through service or Circle message records; equal-width lines are not scaled to value or time. The Ethereum branch continues through five BTC swap deposits. The Solana branch stops at the verified USDC receipt and transfer: it is not drawn as a completed Bitcoin route.Figure 2. The selected payment branches. Each arrow summarizes a matched route and omits service execution steps. The eight Bitcoin outputs are a follow-up-output total, not an incident-wide loss or a current balance. The earlier funding record still prevents an exact allocation of every later unit to stolen collateral.Blockscout’s transaction details include “Sent to Ethereum Mainnet” and a commitment transaction as part of the L1 status of these Arbitrum transactions. That is rollup publication and confirmation information. It is not evidence that the recipient received the payment on Ethereum or that a bridge delivered the stolen assets there.6. From service deposits to actual Bitcoin outputsA SentinelTX run corroborated the Arbitrum transaction anchors and Ethereum transfers toward service-labelled addresses, but did not independently retrieve the complete service-to-Bitcoin joins. A later focused SentinelTX check independently confirmed the first listed Bitcoin output at vout 0; it did not establish the complete service binding. The request records and all eight exact Bitcoin outputs below were checked separately in public service explorers and Bitcoin explorer records. A service label alone is not used to complete the route.What evidence takes the trail beyond a deposit address? A cross-chain swap accepts an asset on one network and pays a different asset or network at a specified destination. Here, the service request supplies the connection between those records. The chain transaction then shows what was actually paid. A service display and a blockchain output are related observations, but they are not automatically the same measurement.PeckShield originally reported an Ethereum-to-Bitcoin route through Chainflip and NEAR Intents. The follow-up below supports specific parts of that route with request-to-transaction joins. It also separates the direct Arbitrum-to-Bitcoin and Solana branches. Original PeckShield alert.Selected branchAmount / observed destinationArbitrum → NEAR → Ethereum5 source deposits: 131.823 ETH; 5 Ethereum payouts: 131.572177248700785015 ETHArbitrum → BTC directly3 deposits: 50 ETH; 2 Chainflip swaps and 1 NEAR requestArbitrum → USDC → Solana1 deposit: 10 ETH; 22,636.606158 USDC minted on SolanaEthereum → BTC5 later deposits: 131.5 ETH; 3 Chainflip swaps and 2 NEAR requestsFive requests connect Arbitrum to EthereumBetween 03:26:35 and 03:31:23 UTC on 1 November, five Ethereum transactions paid the same full address that submitted the Arbitrum calls. The bridge-service request pages name the corresponding Arbitrum deposit and Ethereum payout. Those explicit joins, rather than the repeated address alone, are why these payments are included. The Ethereum receiving address is 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd.Source / service joinEthereum receiptNEAR requestArbitrum deposit: 0xd31eccc1175164508fdd06348b386e01fc089312bbbb0b70c9b092dd89a4b8bd19.961937075995962012 ETHNov-01-2026 03:26:35 AM +UTCEthereum block 263172200x039ea36ecdde802f321c07ef35695f44b5b7734d55ea1157b749f4ea12604f2cNEAR requestArbitrum deposit: 0x281fe73a4d11453b560bdb0b970ac6ea39d80e2098b02419bc6d675484aee5c119.961937075995962012 ETHNov-01-2026 03:27:35 AM +UTCEthereum block 263172250x6e21de2e80e88b9f583e2eb8cacab3a8f902ae6477b75004bedf2611b489488aNEAR requestArbitrum deposit: 0x39da76ea9396abaa7e589460baee088d7e181fd24d73fe914cedac8d950d512a29.942923113993943018 ETHNov-01-2026 03:28:47 AM +UTCEthereum block 263172310x865d5b0256ebe403aa5756982103468fd19e06effb7918e504e1d5dc3a393116NEAR requestArbitrum deposit: 0x7db39a7cfa5c64fb87d1ee21f8c8509cb25d463dfc9e437af5752ff42d67714f29.942923113993943018 ETHNov-01-2026 03:29:59 AM +UTCEthereum block 263172370x93f0d2189ea345c893a0731619ceb80e2e4ce43233a0e9b770e57d35c70d46c8NEAR requestArbitrum deposit: 0x2e0fef226cbb105c01b4ff5155117a818aa9c71eee02c8ab9117caf5e4e7f0e631.762456868720974955 ETHNov-01-2026 03:31:23 AM +UTCEthereum block 263172430xb85cd5b07693b251b7d14faeca35247348b8fdbf90eb551756c2f7eb669f1f19The five receipts sum to 131.572177248700785015 ETH. That is smaller than the 131.823 ETH deposited on Arbitrum. This comparison alone is not a complete fee reconciliation. It also does not assign one later Ethereum payment to one earlier deposit: the receipts gather in the same receiving account before further transfers.Ethereum funds five swaps, while three swaps start on ArbitrumThe first reviewed Ethereum swap deposit is 20 ETH at 03:32:47 UTC. Four more follow through 03:43:59 UTC, bringing these five deposits to 131.5 ETH. Three official Chainflip swap records identify the Ethereum source hashes and Bitcoin payout hashes. The other two connections appear in the NEAR Intents request records. These source-side transfers and service records are preserved together below.Ethereum source / serviceDeposit / UTCChainflip 19973330x01cf92cdf09f8d1b7e2eb53c5ff1efa12cd2c50015b5d8fa22894d6d98e250e620.00 ETHNov-01-2026 03:32:47 AM +UTCBlock 26317250NEAR request0x2e4405c50477d9a7d1f4d8929e0ec59877d83b2a50417f40d3a9f496b64ef11d20 ETHNov-01-2026 03:33:35 AM +UTCBlock 26317254Chainflip 19973470x0438a84445dde9b3828ba13104ffadd72d1d2b72c36ceae1b686d0ec38f7bb1f30.00 ETHNov-01-2026 03:39:23 AM +UTCBlock 26317283NEAR request0x432a6e9e170d379e2da6955347a579956dd760d149ea1435062d5375b41ea8af30 ETHNov-01-2026 03:39:35 AM +UTCBlock 26317284Chainflip 19973560xbd1a82484c3575420a30b5f2249d20b2571b1ccbbe09b5d71a677597f2df074e31.50 ETHNov-01-2026 03:43:59 AM +UTCBlock 26317306Subtracting these 131.5 ETH deposits from the five selected Ethereum receipts leaves an arithmetic difference of 0.072177248700785015 ETH. This is not a verified balance. Gas, other activity and the precise query cutoff would need a complete account reconciliation. The earlier nine Arbitrum deposits are likewise not nine extra losses: some are earlier stages of these same cross-chain routes.Direct Arbitrum service recordSource depositChainflip 1997315 · 20.00 ETH0xe45b834091218960383c8383fa64b5d793d572194072e28424044a7034326394Chainflip 1997310 · 10.00 ETH0x5027bfc48c6b7ba29182aaf03dd1e3ce0f616c39736570649fe9f9d74e359d3cNEAR request · 20 ETH0x31cb4ec03ae836e68fa10cf626f001a915e72ea3a577d23293a07bc50dad8c56Eight Bitcoin outputs, with a display discrepancy preservedSome NEAR request pages also list an additional deposit from a different, similar-looking sender. Only the exact main sender and source hashes in this register are included. Extra deposits are not assigned to the incident, and address resemblance does not establish common control. Bitcoin block times below are confirmation-block timestamps, not the exact time a swap request was submitted.A Bitcoin transaction can pay several recipients. Adding its entire output value would count funds outside the requested destination. This register therefore counts only the output sent to each exact service-designated address, once per transaction/address pair. The eight observed outputs sum to 5.26801280 BTC. That sum includes five payouts from the Ethereum branch and three from the direct Arbitrum branch. The five Ethereum-branch outputs sum to 3.81773584 BTC, while the three direct Arbitrum-branch outputs sum to 1.45027696 BTC. It is not an additional loss, proof of control of those addresses, or proof of a sale for cash.Service / Bitcoin recipientObserved output / Bitcoin transactionChainflip 1997356bc1qf7mj9v40z07wrwgynrs53tqalz8ncda7ehr2al0.91330180 BTCb1d6a4556100a7456a5c38bae83a2e70c67cc63493251441d39024b8de2bb9f3vout 0 · block 974077 · 2026-11-01 04:15:45 UTC (block time)Chainflip 1997347bc1qq7g2rga577hvu33uuacj0e3h69nyqzd8tevas80.86941499 BTCc3caf249266c068dcbbac929d47282bcc9df9ad7992bb59fd9fb4417c295437cvout 0 · block 974075 · 2026-11-01 03:50:11 UTC (block time)Chainflip 1997333bc1qsufvt5qywhwjxpnsejhx8dppez8966xdvwxy4p0.58023818 BTC3bc63728c72d9a5baf54e80f43618c9bc363ad85131a608cdcecf1778ce13235vout 0 · block 974074 · 2026-11-01 03:40:02 UTC (block time)Chainflip 1997315bc1qlzpfmspcg3fh02rq9v4t7z46fx3cckejxl8vu80.57908997 BTC3b376dfb28fd179b4d0214caa5670fcb7c83081f65e342f7bb57c6511968abc7vout 0 · block 974071 · 2026-11-01 03:25:45 UTC (block time)Chainflip 1997310bc1qzwfn7y3d7kf2g0tv2lef7ndp0kgwyez3m02tsf0.28964574 BTCe7f2c620f72eb334b943eed0b766bb274d93f58c8ac1e84d50fa74b279ac2e3cvout 0 · block 974071 · 2026-11-01 03:25:45 UTC (block time)NEAR requestbc1qeulqp5ndq3hukgq7q0drun5l7xehm3j8uflq9s0.87329953 BTC2cbe712930eb86783ecb1f90d10b58a6c39713cc5f6e972a8db0874975eede4bvout 0 · block 974075 · 2026-11-01 03:50:11 UTC (block time)NEAR requestbc1qt4zknpptpj54n92epf5u3h2swuyhydnljnl0pe0.58148134 BTC77278a6f7c5d7027509ab78f6ff70e96ec579b6795dae9bde7f12287bdb530bevout 0 · block 974074 · 2026-11-01 03:40:02 UTC (block time)NEAR requestbc1q6u95n6vde7ymwuwzhd8axy5mamkxcqjx9t8zrp0.58154125 BTCd8a7c71b0a71654450281b554cc2bcc58c08f0af7759e0b36c3fce0d98f1e728vout 0 · block 974072 · 2026-11-01 03:32:38 UTC (block time)Three NEAR pages display a slightly smaller amount than the exact output to the stated Bitcoin recipient. Both values are retained below. The difference totals 6,423 satoshis, or 0.00006423 BTC. A satoshi is one hundred-millionth of a bitcoin. The records inspected here do not establish why these display values differ; the difference is not labelled as a fee or a newly discovered loss.NEAR recipientService display → actual BTC outputbc1qeulqp5ndq3hukgq7q0drun5l7xehm3j8uflq9s0.87327253 → 0.87329953 BTCDifference 2700 satbc1qt4zknpptpj54n92epf5u3h2swuyhydnljnl0pe0.58147124 → 0.58148134 BTCDifference 1010 satbc1q6u95n6vde7ymwuwzhd8axy5mamkxcqjx9t8zrp0.58151412 → 0.58154125 BTCDifference 2713 satThe separate 10 ETH branch reaches SolanaThe sweep transaction has a different transaction signer from the initial sender. That distinction is preserved: a service can submit a transaction that moves value out of a deposit address. The value-path join here is the initial 10 ETH payment into the exact deposit address, followed by that address’s internal 10 ETH transfer in the sweep. It is not a claim that the signer, deposit address and incident sender have the same owner. SentinelTX’s later current-state query returned no code at this deposit address. This article uses “deposit address” as a transaction role and does not establish a persistent deployed contract or independently reconstruct its historical code lifecycle.The remaining 10 ETH Arbitrum deposit does not belong to the five Ethereum receipts. Its sweep transaction records a conversion into USDC and a Circle CCTP burn. CCTP moves USDC between chains by burning tokens on the source network and minting them on the destination network. Circle’s message record identifies Arbitrum as source domain 3 and Solana as destination domain 5. The matched Solana transaction mints 22,636.606158 USDC. Circle message record.RecordValue / exact evidenceArbitrum sweep ·03:19:23 UTC0xb60efcaa089c285b4aa1984af31ee149b2eb7f845ad026a5b812894f529d43f4Burn / Circle fee22,639.775726 USDC burned; 3.169568 USDC fee; 22,636.606158 USDC netSolana mint ·03:19:29 UTC2vaG654T3P5EWzhD2oqRtQRhYJArAo7zKcgdGxBcWdTKd3ek7GzswCFfuookrLq6NQCNpEvAmF6XBbYhZ2N6T2YQMint token accountERm55gDj5GWoGtsw4M4VLmwV1SEXjS5HQheesAurSAyfToken-account owner displayedHnapB88hmh3f7kRLnQf7KF56WkMPvyM6JstxQxmt3G9aNext transfer ·03:19:42 UTC2JwVhmQNyZ7LP4n6N1iTCu68jtjEuXBEUwYAoLKiUA9rz31WEgfvfWWVL69anhyxzjeW4oDXo59HuHdqVfXTs82WEBk7pSomiBbHe21WFEWGN6UvkXPrAyymNm95gjiEAKwq45.294822 USDCJEJGkbBaoas7soCcTXK67q9VZ9rg3wJWSLEfj83ZgZi922591.311336 USDCOn Solana, a token account stores a particular asset balance; its owner field is a separate address, not a verified human identity. The next reviewed transfer splits the net receipt into 45.294822 and 22,591.311336 USDC. The larger recipient already has mixed activity. No exact subsequent service request was joined to a Bitcoin payout for this branch. Later transactions from a mixed recipient cannot be assigned to this incident merely because the amounts or timing look similar. Circle’s returned attestation was not independently verified cryptographically in this review.The original $400.5K and $464.6K estimates remain attributed source claims with different scopes. This update does not turn the eight-output total into a price-at-block loss estimate. The precise vulnerable function, deployed-code replay, operator identity, recovery and compensation remain unverified.7. Incident-specific response pointsFor protocol operators, the question raised by the sequence is how an option-writing vault accounts for collateral when a newly created pool has little or no independent liquidity. A meaningful review would reproduce the full first-trade and withdrawal sequence against the deployed implementation, test whether collateral ownership is preserved, and compare any proposed fix against that same sequence. This is an analysis priority, not a verified diagnosis of a particular function.For investigators and relevant services, the useful handoff is the exact sender, execution contract, source transactions and nine recipient payments below. The matched service requests now give investigators specific Bitcoin output anchors. The next narrow questions are the unexplained NEAR display differences and the unlinked Solana continuation. Recipient ownership, common control and recoverable balances still require separate evidence; shared service liquidity is not an attacker cluster.8. Evidence appendixThe pre-event funding listing names 0xe35e9842fceaCA96570B734083f4a58e8F7C5f2A as the sending contract and 0xd07a31b62136d22c461b1d2aa383bd530b6ccc01f7c03d0108be3270b01cde04 as the parent transaction. This is a listing-level observation; its original depositor and cross-chain source remain unconfirmed.The following onward-recipient table covers Arbitrum One and links to that chain’s address detail pages. Other chains are identified separately in the cross-chain register. Full transaction hashes are preserved above and in the anchor register below. Explorer labels are descriptions of displayed roles, not independent identity evidence. The nine onward recipients are not labelled as accomplices or proven service wallets.Onward paymentFull Arbitrum recipient03:18:09 UTC · 10 ETH0x3f70716B99d0fb4df24c02404190045D7d617FD503:19:18 UTC · 10 ETH0x673310E15136C97dDa90C2853b01743C346B551703:22:30 UTC · 20 ETH0x480863ab3521AFa2c7E51273646bf265f850334D03:23:34 UTC · 20 ETH0x979A3892232CDdD740EE04BC44c86245E8191Bf203:26:08 UTC · 20 ETH0xA8e24E87b224abd6977Dc2Aa0e0285D71E784f2F03:27:19 UTC · 20 ETH0xe4c4A88Be8F6fCB5bbD2dc28f6a53E35fCC5b02C03:28:23 UTC · 30 ETH0xbc065c9Da182Ab8909eFE4FeC873ac19Cfe0f52403:29:42 UTC · 30 ETH0xdD49933388DD59f087d2319F65c9AE8Fbc66987a03:30:58 UTC · 31.823 ETH0x42F2B5B9A2B9859FE7b0cc74bB2A016966d4A7DBAttack transaction anchorsRecordFull transaction hashSetup0xe3c263fcae544954367998e48e13112875cfd38a3b9a240e7818bb96313831f5First attack anchor0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441acSecond attack anchor0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ffThe direct checks cover the displayed explorer records and exact arithmetic described in this article. They are not an execution replay or an independent RPC receipt verification. The follow-up establishes the service and destination joins enumerated in Section 6. The precise contract defect, later Solana-to-Bitcoin link, operator identity and current balances remain outside the verified scope. No conclusion about the identity of an operator follows from the observed flow alone.Cross-chain deposit-address registerThese are service deposit roles in the matched records, not identities. Each EVM link below uses the input chain of its request.Role / input chainFull deposit addressNEAR request · Arbitrum0xdD49933388DD59f087d2319F65c9AE8Fbc66987aNEAR request · Arbitrum0xbc065c9Da182Ab8909eFE4FeC873ac19Cfe0f524NEAR request · Arbitrum0xe4c4A88Be8F6fCB5bbD2dc28f6a53E35fCC5b02CNEAR request · Ethereum0xe3760f0f561C00EbBF3d055f6E367A7a88776725NEAR request · Arbitrum0x979A3892232CDdD740EE04BC44c86245E8191Bf2NEAR request · Ethereum0x5afF72c14Eb3b1749B2A87cab7500B158129Fc30NEAR request · Arbitrum0xA8e24E87b224abd6977Dc2Aa0e0285D71E784f2FNEAR request · Arbitrum0x42F2B5B9A2B9859FE7b0cc74bB2A016966d4A7DBChainflip 1997333 · Ethereum0x7dd0f781655a628aceb44ce07f2f5e9a641e048aChainflip 1997356 · Ethereum0x53df77e44a66212e7bc674354c7ed0bca1871918Chainflip 1997347 · Ethereum0x23eb7aeea82cbf9cb37fd16420a1074ba1073125Chainflip 1997315 · Arbitrum0x480863ab3521afa2c7e51273646bf265f850334dChainflip 1997310 · Arbitrum0x3f70716b99d0fb4df24c02404190045d7d617fd5Arbitrum deposit address · 10 ETH branch0x673310E15136C97dDa90C2853b01743C346B5517Arbitrum sweep transaction signer0x36e8972e6227b332244Fc57877fb5970175DADd0Arbitrum internal sweep recipient0xf9e6D0D6f3a4Ce89384A1387a32aC124E5C3CF84

ChainBounty · Investigation analysis · 31 October 2026A SentinelTX report records 1,013,353.611686 USDC leaving an Avalanche contract at 00:00:03 UTC on 28 October 2026, followed by forwarding to a wallet and two subsequent USDC burns. Public reports cited in the PDF associate the contract with a TranchePool linked to Fence Finance, Valinor Digital and Oatfi. Those affiliations are reported leads, not independently established ownership findings.The strongest story is not a seamless trail across three chains. It is an Avalanche sequence alongside a separate Ethereum activity record, with the connection between them unresolved. The PDF also contains conflicting confidence labels and a route whose timing cannot support its stated direction. This article keeps those limits visible rather than presenting a complete, verified cash-out path.1. Roles before routesThe report distinguishes the contract that sent the USDC, the intermediate contract, and the wallet that received it. These are on-chain roles—not identified people. Short reference IDs below organize the PDF's records; the full identifiers appear in the appendix.Role: A1 — source contract — Description in the report: Sender of 1,013,353.611686 USDC. Its identification as the victim TranchePool comes from attributed search snippets.Role: A2 — intermediate contract — Description in the report: Received the source-contract transfer and forwarded 1,013,353.611687 USDC to A3 in the same transaction, E1.Role: A3 — Avalanche wallet — Description in the report: Recipient of that forwarding transfer; recorded creator of A2; sender in the two later burn transactions E2 and E3. Identity not established.Role: A4 — Ethereum address — Description in the report: Reported receiver examined separately. The PDF does not establish common control with A3 or an end-to-end path from the Avalanche burns.Role: Report scope — Description in the report: Narrative examines 27–31 October 2026; the query appendix reports broader 34-day lookbacks. Neither is a claim of complete coverage.The difference between the two E1 amounts is retained exactly: 1,013,353.611686 USDC left A1; 1,013,353.611687 USDC reached A3 from A2. They are distinct transfer legs, not interchangeable loss figures. The report states incident loss using the first leg only. It does not add the forwarding, burn, mint, swap and mixer figures together.2. What the Avalanche record describesOn 27 October, A3 received 100.0 AVAX at 22:42:23 UTC and 11.8294 AVAX at 22:45:24 UTC from an address labelled “KuCoin, Exchange” in the report's label database. The direction was exchange-labelled address to wallet. It is a funding relationship, not proof of an account holder's identity or exchange involvement in the incident.The report's transaction-list record places A2's creation at 23:41:49 UTC. A staging call followed at 23:56:41 UTC. Its retained rows describe a USDC cycle involving an Aave-labelled contract, A2 and A1, with 1,013,353.611686 USDC on three legs and 1,013,860.288492 USDC returned on another. The PDF interprets the difference, 506.676806 USDC, as consistent with a flash-loan premium. Raw receipt logs were not returned for this staging transaction, so that interpretation remains qualified.E1 is recorded at 28 October, 00:00:03 UTC, immediately after the UTC day boundary. The PDF describes the source-contract transfer to A2 and the forwarding to A3 in that same transaction. It then records two later burns:Burn record: E2 — Quantity and time: 250,000.175563 USDC at 00:03:41 UTC on 28 October 2026; block 98731831.Burn record: E3 — Quantity and time: 763,374.836640 USDC at 00:05:22 UTC on 28 October 2026; block 98731940.Burn record: Combined burns — Quantity and time: 1,013,375.012203 USDC. This is an outgoing-flow total, not an additional loss.Burn record: Difference from A3's E1 receipt — Quantity and time: Burns exceeded the 1,013,353.611687 USDC receipt by 21.400516 USDC. The report does not establish the source of that additional amount.Figure 1. The two USDC burn amounts recorded for A3. The total is a disposition flow, not a second incident-loss figure.Color key: slate marks the first burn; sage marks the second. UTC labels and exact quantities distinguish them without color.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, 31 October 2026, pp. 6–8 and 19–21. Source confidence qualifications are retained in the note below.In each burn transaction, the PDF describes a transfer to a Circle-labelled address, a burn event and a transfer to the zero address. Both message payloads contained matching destination words and the ASCII string “cctp-forward.” The report interprets the byte layout as consistent with a destination on Solana, but it did not obtain a decoder result or establish that the destination word matched the reported Solana address.Diagram 2. The report's same-chain transfer and burn sequence. Equal-width arrows show sequence and direction, not value or elapsed time. The onward cross-chain connection is not established; no continuous Avalanche-to-Ethereum route is asserted.Color key: slate marks the source outflow and forwarding; sage marks later burns. Color does not indicate verification.Address / role key: the graphic's P1 corresponds to A1, C1 to A2 and W1 to A3 in this article. B1 denotes burn operations through `0xfd78ee919681417d192449715b2594ab58f5d002`, with transfers to the zero address—not an attributed owner. Full A1–A3 addresses are in the appendix.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, pp. 4–7, 19–20 and 33. The earlier staging transaction must not be treated as downstream proceeds of the later drain.3. A separate Ethereum record, not a completed bridge traceFor A4 on 28 October, the PDF records six USDC mints totalling 1,021,502.948496 USDC, five transfers to a CowProtocol-labelled settlement contract, and eleven deposits totalling 432.2 ETH into four Tornado.Cash-labelled pools. The mint aggregate, the five settlement-leg amounts and the mixer aggregate are explicitly marked unverified for exhibit purposes in the report's limitations.The five settlement quantities are 100,005.0; 200,000.0; 300,000.0; 350,000.0; and 71,497.948496 USDC. The recorded ETH deposit pattern is four deposits of 100.0 ETH, three of 10.0 ETH, two of 1.0 ETH and two of 0.1 ETH. These figures describe the Ethereum address's recorded activity. They do not establish that all of it came from the Avalanche incident.The PDF makes three boundaries explicit:No established bridge completion. Solana activity was not read, and the Avalanche-to-Solana-to-Ethereum connection is not transaction-hash anchored.No reconciled provenance. The reported Ethereum mint total exceeds the Avalanche burn total by 8,127.936293 USDC. The source does not resolve the difference or attribute the entire Ethereum amount to this case.No identified common controller. No retrieved shared gas funder, common deployer or domain cluster establishes that A3 and A4 were controlled by the same party.The report describes CowProtocol settlement as non-custodial, despite the database's “Exchange” label. It does not report a custodial exchange deposit by a case wallet within the traced scope. Likewise, a Tornado.Cash label identifies the report's attributed destination; it does not identify a depositor or establish a current legal designation.4. Mechanism: three hypotheses, not a proven root causeThe source offers three explanations from attributed search-result snippets: a day-rollover settlement calculation, inflated tranche shares minted using flash-loan capital, and a permissionless “double-draw” caused by borrowing logic that failed to subtract unpaid matured principal. It attributes these respectively to SlowMist, Blockaid, and DeFiHackLabs/web3VE reporting. The source pages were not read by the investigation, and none of these hypotheses was verified against contract source code.SentinelTX treats the hypotheses as potentially complementary. The timing at 00:00:03 UTC and the earlier staging cycle are the observations behind that interpretation; they do not by themselves prove the contract defect. The PDF also preserves a date discrepancy: one cited snippet dates the drain to 27 October, while its recorded block timestamp places it just after midnight on 28 October.A separate timing problem matters more than the calendar label. One route in the report places a later hop at block 98731443 before the block 98731606 flow that supposedly feeds it. That ordering cannot establish the claimed causal path. The earlier staging activity should not be presented as proceeds of the later drain, and this article does not use that route to connect the two.5. Conclusion: a bounded record, with the missing connection still missingThe PDF records the Avalanche source-contract outflow, forwarding and two subsequent burns. It also records separate Ethereum mint, settlement and mixer activity. The unresolved link between them is central—not a minor footnote. The report does not establish the identity behind the addresses, the definitive root cause, activity at the reported Solana receiver, or common control across the Avalanche and Ethereum wallets.Its proposed next leads are issuer-side attestation and forwarding records, exchange withdrawal records for the initial funding, and a completed Solana record. Those are recommendations in the source, not actions completed for this article. No recovery or freeze outcome is claimed.Figure 3. What the report records and what it leaves unresolved. Its narrative conclusion and structured transfer rows carry conflicting confidence labels; this summary does not upgrade either into a clean end-to-end finding.Color key: slate distinguishes headings only; it is not a confidence or risk scale.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, pp. 19–20 and 33.6. Reference appendix and source qualificationsSelected transaction recordsReference: E1 — source outflow and forwarding — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x3f6b23292a2e9c2956c7ac56d0b1f79b0271b49edec2156d2675ddf1de058c77`; 2026-10-28T00:00:03Z; block 98731606. A1 → A2: 1,013,353.611686 USDC. A2 → A3: 1,013,353.611687 USDC. PDF pp. 4–7 and 20.Reference: E2 — first burn — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x0e974743161ddb166d5ad698b9a2b0c9ca2ddf5f569a532e6c5665ce2c92218b`; 2026-10-28T00:03:41Z; block 98731831; 250,000.175563 USDC. PDF pp. 6–7.Reference: E3 — second burn — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x51bb85e171585a2ec7ec7bd918cd6a08e916e38f79cf2a17b5e5211ee3b9f397`; 2026-10-28T00:05:22Z; block 98731940; 763,374.836640 USDC. PDF pp. 6–7.Address and role registerReference: A1 — Address and qualified role: `0xe25cb545bdd47a8ec2d08001cb5661b00d47621a` — Avalanche source contract; victim-TranchePool attribution is a reported lead.Reference: A2 — Address and qualified role: `0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805` — Avalanche intermediate contract.Reference: A3 — Address and qualified role: `0x6ff1c3ffa622e1062168f3497a275be9cc2b1246` — Avalanche wallet receiving E1 forwarding and sending E2/E3.Reference: A4 — Address and qualified role: `0xdc3d7cc5383e0f1ac46d2c693aad1a19859a2deb` — separately examined Ethereum address; connection to this case remains partial/inferred.Reference: Reported Solana receiver — Address and qualified role: `C5L5EtcZmTKFc4D7Ntfqi7MtohnHVh4xZn93a5dBhB8` — not read; neither activity nor absence of activity is established.Source and limitations noteSource: the 36-page SentinelTX-generated PDF CASE-ASYNCFF1, generated 31 October 2026. This article adapts that report; it is not an independent on-chain audit. The PDF contains no external hyperlinks. No public PDF URL is supplied here.Confidence conflict: the routing table labels the E1 transfer rows “verified,” while the conclusion begins “unverified (auto-downgraded).” Those source labels are not silently reconciled. The report states that its integrity gate “downgraded 11 claims in the text and flagged 4 findings for review” (p. 4).Material route warning: “[INV-5] (report-wide) — Hop 0 (block 98,731,606) → Hop 2 (block 98,731,443) is time-inverted” and describes “a causally impossible path (the cash-out tx precedes the deposit tx)” (p. 33). The practical consequence is that this path cannot demonstrate that the earlier payment was funded by the later receipt.Amount qualifications: seven amounts are unverified for exhibit purposes: the 432.2 ETH aggregate, five CowProtocol legs and 1,021,502.948496 USDC mint aggregate (p. 18). The final warning appendix also flags 432.2286 ETH, 5.0 OVER and the conclusion's 1,021,502.948496 USDC as not bounded by a readable retained quantity (p. 33).Coverage: the narrative's examined window is 27–31 October, but Appendix A reports two 34-day query windows spanning 27 September–31 October and 138 timestamped retained movement rows from 27 October 22:42:23 to 30 October 22:52:47 UTC. Appendix A both lists timestamped bounds and says exact bounds were not retained; it does not establish that the requested cutoff was enforced. The article does not claim exhaustive period coverage.Other boundaries: two Solana reads failed; four Avalanche bridge-correlation attempts were unresolved, not negative; Avalanche internal traces were unavailable; the staging transaction lacked returned receipt logs; external reporting was available only as attributed snippets. Graph-wide totals include unrelated flows and are not incident loss. A successful PDF export or signed manifest does not remove these source limitations.