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iCloud 보안 알림 피싱 메일
Apple 고객님, 귀하의 Apple 계정에 대한 보안 확인이 필요합니다. 날짜 및 시간: 2026년 10월 26일 오후 6:47 운영 체제: iOS 25 귀하의 계정에 변경이 감지되었습니다 귀하의 계정에서 변경이 감지되어 관련 작업이 일시적으로 동결되었습니다. 계정 보안을 위해 즉시 확인해 주세요. 사용 기기: iPhone 14 시스템: iOS 25 접속 IP: 211.234.252.203 위치: 인천 지금 확인하기 → 본인이 로그인한 것이 아니라면 즉시 Apple 지원에 문의해 주세요. iCloud 고객센터 Apple은 귀하의 개인정보를 소중히 여깁니다.
이오영 면상까고 남들정보 팔아가며 찍은사진
[국제발신] 이오영 면#상#까고#남#들 정#보팔#아가며 #찍#은사진#궁#금한사#람 01079378010 #연#락하#면공#개
코인 주식 리딩방 초대
🏆 HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP 📈 국내 주식 & BTC 단기 전략 무료 공개 시장에는 언제나 기회가 있지만, 중요한 것은 언제 진입하고 어떻게 대응하느냐입니다. HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP은 국내 주식과 BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩을 기반으로 실시간 시장 분석과 단체 트레이딩을 운영하고 있습니다. 무료 공개를 통해 실제 운영 방식과 전문가의 전략을 직접 확인해 보시기 바랍니다. 🔗 무료 입장 링크 https://t.me/+YzI2zf5yamhmZDJk ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📌 무료 공개 내용 ✅ 국내 주식 실시간 전략 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 전문가 대응 전략 ✅ 단체 트레이딩 운영 방식 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 🎁 정회원 전용 혜택 ✅ 국내 주식 트레이딩 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 1:1 맞춤 투자 전략 컨설팅 ✅ 원금보장 프로그램 운영 (적용 대상 별도 안내) ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📅 단체 트레이딩 운영 일정 🕘 09:00 ~ 11:30 │ 오전 국내 주식 트레이딩 ☕️ 11:30 ~ 13:00 │ 휴식 및 시장 모니터링 🕐 13:00 ~ 13:30 │ 오후 국내 주식 트레이딩 ₿ 14:00 ~ 14:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 1부 ₿ 15:00 ~ 15:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 2부 ₿ 16:00 ~ 16:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 3부 ₿ 17:00 ~ 17:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 4부 ₿ 18:00 ~ 18:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 5부 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 💬 운영 방식을 직접 확인하신 후 참여 여부를 결정하셔도 됩니다. 부담 없이 입장하셔서 실시간 리딩을 직접 경험해 보세요.
CB58259 test post (payload removed).
ChainBounty Investigation Analysis | 9 November 2026A BNB Chain wallet gained 160.257771766360162994 BNB across the seed block, then forwarded a reported 162.169168 BNB to a newly observed intermediary. The following morning, that intermediary made ten deposits totaling 162.1 BNB into an address labeled as the Tornado.cash Proxy.This investigation summary draws exclusively on SentinelTX’s CoreVault / InsurancePool — BNB fund-flow investigation, case CASE-AE964964, dated November 8, 2026. The report establishes a transaction trail while leaving the exploit’s full accounting, the operators’ identities and the destination after mixing unresolved. All times below are UTC.The seed transaction and the balance changeAt 21:50:20 on November 3, 2026, address 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304 submitted a successful contract-creation transaction in block 131507810. The report identifies this address as the signer and deployer.The transaction created 0xc28cfeee046e1421e9dbfb2cf689074bf9f387e2 and produced 93 event logs. Those logs were not decoded in the report, and its evidence does not include the internal call tree.Two native-balance readings anchor the financial result:Block 131507809: 1.911397681184347886 BNB.Block 131507810: 162.169169447544510880 BNB.Net change: +160.257771766360162994 BNB, after the signer’s gas cost.This block-level net increase does not establish the reserve outflow, borrowed principal, or repayment and fee.Seed transaction: 0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3 Source: SentinelTX CASE-AE964964, Executive Summary and Conclusion, pages 4 and 12–13.Why the forwarded amount is largerAt 21:51:56 on November 3, the signer transferred a reported 162.169168 BNB to 0x028491b55d0e18aa81ab3324688e42f91bbadacc. The intermediary was first seen November 3, without an identifying label.The forwarded amount includes funds already present before the seed block. The signer began with 1.911397681184347886 BNB, then experienced the documented net increase. Calling the entire onward transfer “profit” would therefore overstate what the balance comparison establishes.Figure 1. The signer's native balance increased by 160.257771766360162994 BNB across blocks 131507809–131507810, net of its own gas. It later sent 162.169168 BNB to the intermediary at 2026-11-03T21:51:56Z. These are different measurements, not additive quantities or incident-loss totals. The PDF records a pre-seed balance of 1.911397681184347886 BNB, which was already present before the gain.Color key: Slate identifies the seed-block balance change; sage identifies the later transfer. The panel titles carry the distinction in B&W. Color does not imply ownership, risk or proof.Address/role key: Signer = 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304. Intermediary = 0x028491b55d0e18aa81ab3324688e42f91bbadacc. These are transaction roles, not real-world identities.Source: Editorial summary of SentinelTX, CASE-AE964964, Executive Summary, p. 4; Transaction Chronology, p. 6. Quantities retain the PDF narrative’s precision. Seed timestamp: 2026-11-03T21:50:20Z.Forwarding transaction: 0xd08a5eda1116941a92907acd3efdbdc6b71272d5e9daa9e0da367196b4701535Ten deposits, one clear tracing boundaryBetween 04:54:04 and 04:57:20 on November 4, the intermediary sent 162.1 BNB to 0x0d5550d52428e7e3175bfc9550207e4ad3859b17. SentinelTX records the Sentinel Protocol label “Tornado.cash, Mixer, Tornado.cash: Proxy” for that contract.The ten deposits followed fixed denominations:1 × 100 BNB6 × 10 BNB2 × 1 BNB1 × 0.1 BNBThese denominations match mixer pools. The split alone does not establish an intent to evade reporting thresholds.At 04:57:48, the intermediary also sent a reported 0.068098 BNB to 0x02dcd01d534477b5e76628a7284e7fa71c7a7ed7. The report’s rounded reconciliation lists 162.168098 BNB forwarded across eleven transactions, leaving a 0.00107 BNB difference from the rounded receipt, which it describes as consistent with gas.Figure 2. Ten BNB deposits entered the Tornado.cash Proxy on 4 November 2026 between 04:54:04 and 04:57:20 UTC: 1 × 100 BNB, 6 × 10 BNB, 2 × 1 BNB and 1 × 0.1 BNB, totaling 162.1 BNB. Bars show the group totals of 100, 60, 2 and 0.1 BNB on a linear, zero-baseline 0–100 BNB scale. The 0.1 BNB bar is below one pixel wide at 720px; its direct label preserves its value. This is a deposit total, not incident loss. The PDF says the denominations are dictated by the mixer and do not by themselves establish structuring intent.Color key: Slate bars identify deposited BNB. Direct count, denomination and amount labels carry the meaning in B&W; color is not a risk scale.Address/role key: Depositor/intermediary = 0x028491b55d0e18aa81ab3324688e42f91bbadacc. Proxy = 0x0d5550d52428e7e3175bfc9550207e4ad3859b17, labeled “Tornado.cash, Mixer, Tornado.cash: Proxy” in the PDF, with Sentinel Protocol given as the label source.Source: Editorial summary of SentinelTX, CASE-AE964964, Executive Summary, pp. 4–5; Transaction Chronology, pp. 6–7; Transaction Typology, p. 9. The group totals are the stated count × denomination; they reproduce the PDF's 162.1 BNB total without adding onward hops.The first 100 BNB deposit also records a same-transaction hop from the Proxy to 0x1e34a77868e19a6647b1f2f47b51ed72dede95dd. This is part of the deposit route, not proof of a later withdrawal to an operator.First deposit transaction: 0xda5964dcc7f5f93a77c77b2a06be89b308cf234c63970c8183b874fb10dd1cffThe deterministic trail ends at the mixer. No withdrawal is linked to these deposits by the report. Timing or a matching denomination alone would not establish that link.The examined evidence identified zero exchange deposit addresses. This does not establish that the funds never reached an exchange: unlabelled counterparties and activity beyond the mixer remain unresolved.The attack narrative remains partly unverifiedPublic-reporting snippets summarized in the PDF describe a flash-loan-funded price manipulation involving CoreVault redemption and an InsurancePool payout. They report approximately $143.6 million of WBNB borrowed through Lista DAO Moolah, a redemption inflated about 33 times, and a reserve payout.These remain leads. The gross reserve outflow and full execution mechanism have not been established by transaction-level evidence in this record. The dollar-denominated loan estimate is not a verified native WBNB principal.The PDF contains WBNB and USDT transfer rows associated with the seed hash, but those rows do not supply a decoded execution trace identifying the lender, manipulated price source, protocol contracts or repayment.The report’s assessment is that the pattern is consistent with flash-loan-funded DEX spot-price oracle manipulation. The balance increase rounds to the public “160.26 BNB” figure without resolving gross-loss accounting.Separate activity and earlier leadsA separate token-disposal sequence began at 22:07:56 on November 3, when the signer received a reported 3,414.5285767965115 OSK from its earlier-deployed contract 0xd9c2e4f19746b4617ad658152adaa306c47ef86b.At 22:07:57, a transaction through the address labeled PancakeSwap Router v2 recorded:3,073.0757191168605 OSK to 0x5986772dc1970d1d9e030867f1156e36f9b07ce4.170.72642883982556 OSK to 0xfe6085dd822acc23352fb6b1fe52509253492422.170.72642883982556 OSK to the zero address, 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000.A reported receipt of 0.06190122454689079 WBNB from 0x3fc593d15c34d2f91ca3b4f2097dddaf3c4de86c.A subsequent WBNB unwrap call is recorded, but its amount was not decoded. BNB, WBNB and OSK remain separate quantities throughout the accounting.On November 2, 8 BNB passed from the signer through its auxiliary contract to 0x302f5084ba0e4a2d4de5e6bc5dd5247028f5d674. The shared recipient 0x02dcd01d534477b5e76628a7284e7fa71c7a7ed7 received a reported 0.066555 BNB from the signer as well as the intermediary’s 0.068098 BNB. Its listed history reaches back to September 21 and includes 25 contract-creation records among 29 control transactions; some creation attempts failed.These relationships are follow-up leads, not evidence of common ownership, identity or earlier attacks. Similar-looking addresses flagged as suspected poisoning had no value-bearing rows in the retained tables and were excluded as connections.Reading the scope correctlyThe report contains 304 movement rows across 30 addresses. Its gross totals include 804,618.047953 WBNB, 27,582,948.606662 USDT, 1,007.303821 BNB, 13,658.114307 OSK and 7.844058 FIST. Value can be counted again at each hop, and broader mixer activity can involve other users. These totals are neither incident losses nor amounts proven to belong to this case.The stated case window is November 3 through November 8, 16:10 UTC. The actual queries extended from October 4 to November 8; retained movement timestamps span November 1–8. The first trace reached three of five requested hops, three address reads were incomplete, and high-volume addresses limited expansion. “No outbound” in the traced set does not establish inactivity outside it.Figure 3. The PDF confirms BNB movement from the signer through the intermediary to the mixer Proxy. Its traced path ends at the mixer, beyond which there is no deterministic on-chain link. The flash-loan principal and repayment, gross reserve outflow, protocol contract addresses, and the identity or control of people behind the addresses remain unestablished. The report recommends decoding the seed receipt and obtaining its call trace, with any later mixer link requiring independent corroboration. It identifies zero exchange deposits in the examined evidence; later exchange use remains unknown.Color and line key: Slate marks structural headings and role boxes only. Solid, equal-width arrows show the observed direction of BNB movement; they do not encode amount or common control. The dashed line beneath the mixer marks the limit of the traced path, not an inferred continuation. Direct labels preserve these distinctions in B&W.Address/role key: Signer = 0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304. Intermediary = 0x028491b55d0e18aa81ab3324688e42f91bbadacc. Mixer Proxy = 0x0d5550d52428e7e3175bfc9550207e4ad3859b17. No real-world identity or control finding is made.Source: Editorial summary of SentinelTX, CASE-AE964964, Recommendations and Conclusion, pp. 11–13. The report also states that the first trace reached 3 of 5 requested hops and that three addresses were not fully read.What investigators should pursue nextA full seed trace and decoded receipt are needed to establish the principal, reserve outflow, repayment, fee and gross credit. The report recommends preserving all ten deposit hashes without attributing withdrawals absent independent corroboration.Follow-up priorities include the shared recipient’s deployment history, earlier 8 BNB route, OSK recipients and unlabelled counterparties. The signer’s reported Ethereum and Optimism activity falls outside this investigation’s scope.The report also recommends compliance watch-list circulation and reporting through the affected parties’ national cybercrime and financial-intelligence channels. With no identified exchange deposit, it supplies no specific exchange account for a freeze or KYC request. Current sanctions treatment requires separate checking; the PDF did not assess OFAC status. A return-bounty message is discussed as a low-cost option with limited prospects, not as an action already taken.The documented BNB balance increase was followed by rapid forwarding and ten mixer deposits. Recovery prospects are assessed as poor on the available on-chain trail. Establishing the exact loss and any recoverable destination requires evidence beyond that boundary.

ChainBounty · Ethereum mainnet · Activity window: November 1–4, 2026 · SentinelTX report CASE-CBE85A32, November 5, 2026SentinelTX's report on the publicly reported theft from an EU entity follows three Ethereum addresses through USDC transfers, ETH relays, and ETH-to-USDT swaps. It records a 9,582,349.791029 USDC transfer from the first starting address, four transfers totaling 20,000,000 USDC from the second, and 2,592 ETH dispersed from the third. These are separate observations within the traced activity, not components of a verified total loss.The distinction that shapes the report is between a recorded transfer and a complete account of where its value came from or ultimately went. A USDC route passes through a wallet with mixed funding. A relay reaches an address publicly described as a Kraken deposit address, but the report does not confirm that attribution. A reported USDT freeze also remains unconfirmed.1. Three starting addresses, one Ethereum-only scopeThe report uses three starting addresses, called seeds. Their public descriptions explain why they were selected; those descriptions are not ownership findings. Ownership of the three addresses is not established.Role / scope: Seed 1: reported exchange-paid wallet — Description in the PDF: 0x730bcb…723992. Its inbound exchange payout was not traced because the investigation ran outbound.Role / scope: Seed 2: reported swap wallet — Description in the PDF: 0x9eca05…015547. The report records USDC transfers to a resolver-labeled address and other downstream activity.Role / scope: Seed 3: reported frozen-USDT wallet — Description in the PDF: 0xa3a985…74ae0d. The report records ETH dispersal and a USDT holding, but does not confirm a freeze.Role / scope: Network and analysis window — Description in the PDF: Ethereum mainnet, chain ID 1. November 1, 2026, 00:00:00 UTC, through November 4, 2026, 12:35:00 UTC.Role / scope: Tracing depth — Description in the PDF: Outbound movements, up to three downstream hops per seed. Coverage of Seeds 1 and 2 is incomplete.Role / scope: Balance snapshot — Description in the PDF: Block 26341513, November 4, 2026, 12:41:11 UTC. These are historical balances, not current holdings.The report examines one publicly described withdrawal wallet and two additional starting addresses. It does not establish the full extent of the reported theft.The victim’s identity and the circumstances of the reported theft are not established by these Ethereum transactions. This article uses the broader description “EU entity” without identifying a victim or deriving a loss total.2. The USDC route passes through mixed fundingSeed 1 sent 9,582,349.791029 USDC to an intermediary at 22:06:11 UTC on November 1. That intermediary sent 5,270,291.000000 USDC to a second intermediary at 22:20:23 UTC. The second intermediary then sent Seed 2 a total of 13,495,000.000000 USDC in three transfers after midnight on November 2. The PDF summarizes this route as approximately 9.58 million → 5.27 million → 13.50 million USDC. [E1–E3]Stage: Seed 1 to the first intermediary — Recorded movement and meaning: 9,582,349.791029 USDC to 0xc80f1c…4a8ce4. E1.Stage: First intermediary to the commingled wallet — Recorded movement and meaning: 5,270,291.000000 USDC to 0xb40435…06d39b. E2.Stage: Commingled wallet to Seed 2 — Recorded movement and meaning: 13,495,000.000000 USDC across three transfers: 5,000,000.000000; 5,000,000.000000; and 3,495,000.000000 USDC. E3a–E3c.Stage: Attribution limit — Recorded movement and meaning: Only the approximately 5.27 million USDC inflow is observed coming from the Seed 1 branch. The report does not attribute the entire approximately 13.50 million USDC receipt to Seed 1.These amounts describe successive transfers, not separate losses to add together. The larger outgoing total at the second intermediary reflects the report's finding that it pooled funds from at least one other source; the rest of its inflow was not traced.Seed 2's own activity also has a separate chronology. It sent four transfers of 5,000,000 USDC each to 0x225a38…f2dc17, labeled “Rizzolver, Unknown” in the report, between 23:51:23 UTC on November 1 and 00:15:11 UTC on November 2. The report assesses these as swap inputs, but the corresponding ETH outputs were not itemized. Its public-source description of a UniswapX auction remains an attribution, not a confirmed identification of the resolver as a UniswapX filler. [E4a–E4d]The evidence does not establish which funds financed each resolver payment. No allocation of Seed 1-derived value to those payments is made here.Figure 1. The report describes Seed 1 → Seed 2 as a partial path through commingled funds. Display values are approximate: the first two transfers were 9,582,349.791029 USDC and 5,270,291.000000 USDC. Wallet B subsequently sent 5,000,000.000000, 5,000,000.000000, and 3,495,000.000000 USDC to Seed 2. Its other inflows were not traced. These movements are not a loss total.Color key: slate marks the selected USDC route and its displayed amounts. Direct labels identify each address role; color does not establish ownership or attribution. Equal-width arrows are not scaled to value.Address / role key: Seed 1 = 0x730bcb…723992; Relay A = 0xc80f1c…4a8ce4; Wallet B = 0xb40435…06d39b; Seed 2 = 0x9eca05…015547. Wallet B is the commingled intermediary, not an exchange or pool attribution.Attribution note: The funding source of each resolver payment is not established.Source: SentinelTX, Investigation report CASE-CBE85A32, November 5, 2026, pp. 4, 6–7 and 18–20.A separate transfer sent 7,166,580.962400 USDC from Seed 2 to the unlabeled address 0x52b335…e3fb09 at 00:00:47 UTC on November 2. This is the transaction summarized as approximately 7.17 million USDC in the narrative. The broader flow summary lists two transfers to that address totaling 10,661,580.962400 USDC; the single transaction and the aggregate have different scopes. [E5]3. Seed 3's ETH movements lead to a relay and a separate swap sequenceSeed 3's ledger records five outbound transfers totaling 2,592 ETH. One branch includes a 395 ETH transfer to 0xd359df…0a0573, followed by 395.999977992739261 ETH to 0xf5968b…014ae1 and 395.999955100039942 ETH to 0xfa6766…159556. The final transfer occurred at 10:11:47 UTC on November 3. The chronology displays those last two amounts as approximately 395.999978 ETH and 395.999955 ETH. [E6–E8]These three transfers are presented at their recorded amounts. The evidence does not establish that the entire onward amount originated from Seed 3.The final recipient, 0xfa6766…159556, is described as a Kraken deposit address in the public source cited by the PDF. The report does not independently confirm that attribution. The publicly reported onward sweep was beyond the three-hop depth and was not traced. The observed transfer therefore supports an endpoint lead, not a confirmed Kraken cash-out or an identified account holder.Figure 2. The resolved relay rows are ordered, not scaled to elapsed time. Seed 3 sent 395.0 ETH to R1. R1’s full-ledger outflow was 395.999977992739261 ETH, and R2’s was 395.999955100039942 ETH; the graphic rounds these to six decimals. The onward transfers are not attributed in full to Seed 3.Color key: slate marks the selected transfer times and quantities. Direct labels identify the source, relays, and recipient.Address / role key: Seed 3 = 0xa3a985…74ae0d; Relay R1 = 0xd359df…0a0573; Relay R2 = 0xf5968b…014ae1; Recipient R3 = 0xfa6766…159556. Full identifiers appear in the appendix.Attribution note: R3 has no confirmed service attribution. Its identification as a Kraken deposit address is an attributed public-source lead. The reported onward sweep was beyond the three-hop trace; the figure stops at R3.Source: SentinelTX, Investigation report CASE-CBE85A32, November 5, 2026, pp. 8–10 and 17–18.ETH-to-USDT swaps are a separate branchAt 17:10:23 UTC on November 3, Seed 3 sent 2,000 ETH to 0xb3a21e…f99762. That address subsequently funded 0x2fb89a…df8516, where the report describes two ETH-to-USDT swaps on November 4. This is separate from the relay described above. [E9–E11]Stage: First swap, 07:30:35 UTC — Recorded operation: 87.999 ETH was wrapped and sent out as WETH; 202,156.840322 USDT was received. E10.Stage: Second swap, 07:50:35 UTC — Recorded operation: 43.00091147 WETH was sent out; 98,911.866452 USDT was received. E11.Stage: Combined swaps — Recorded operation: The PDF classifies 130.99991147 ETH of input and 301,068.706774 USDT of output. The wrapping and WETH movements are parts of the swaps, not additional value to count again.Stage: Smaller onward payment, 08:25:23 UTC — Recorded operation: 5.000000 USDT went to 0x70e9b5…352a3c. E12.Stage: Main onward payment, 08:26:47 UTC — Recorded operation: 301,063.706774 USDT went to the unlabeled address 0x7ebce2…133fd4. E13.The printed rows account for the two USDT outputs through the 5 USDT payment and the 301,063.706774 USDT transfer. They do not establish a destination on another chain. The public-source USDT0/LayerZero description remains unverified, as do the report's other attributed off-Ethereum routes.4. Service labels and historical balances have narrower meaningsThe report lists five transfers to an address labeled “Chainflip, Exchange,” totaling 241.00 ETH, on November 2–3. Its narrative places them in the Seed 2 graph. The retained routing table identifies the sender as 0x05184a…d1b01e. These observations do not supply destination-chain settlement records or prove a completed conversion to cash. [E14a–E14e]At the balance snapshot, Seed 3 held two assets. The second ETH holding below comes from a ledger residual rather than a block-anchored balance read, a distinction the PDF explicitly preserves.Address / measurement: Seed 3: ETH balance — Quantity and stated limit: 1,858.999296273752596983 ETH at block 26341513.Address / measurement: Seed 3: canonical USDT balance — Quantity and stated limit: 1,142,716.43173 USDT at block 26341513, under Tether USD contract 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7.Address / measurement: 0xb3a21e…f99762: ETH ledger residual — Quantity and stated limit: 1,559.999871347187806602 ETH. The PDF identifies this as ledger-derived, not a block-anchored balance read.Address / measurement: Freeze status — Quantity and stated limit: The reported Tether freeze remains unconfirmed. The available evidence does not establish the reason for the unsuccessful USDT transfers and approval calls.Unsuccessful USDT transfers and approval calls do not, on their own, establish a freeze. The ETH balances are not frozen assets or confirmed recoveries, and none of these snapshot quantities describes the present balance.5. What the report concludesThe report documents substantial transfers, relay activity and swaps. These movements do not establish how the exchange accounts were accessed, who controlled the addresses, or the victim’s total loss.The next investigative steps are to corroborate the publicly attributed Kraken endpoint, obtain confirmation of the reported Tether freeze, and seek relevant venue order and destination records. These are investigative leads, not completed actions or recovery assurances.Figure 3. The report separates observed movements from partial links and attributed claims. Seed 3’s five outbound transfers total 2,592 ETH. Its USDT balance was 1,142,716.43173 USDT at block 26341513 (2026-11-04T12:41:11Z), approximately six minutes after the analysis window closed. A balance is not proof of a freeze or a recovery amount, and the asset quantities are not combined into a loss estimate.Color key: slate marks section headings only. Evidence strength is stated in words, not encoded by color.Address / role key: Seed 1 = 0x730bcb…723992; Seed 2 = 0x9eca05…015547; Seed 3 = 0xa3a985…74ae0d.Scope note: Ethereum mainnet only; the outbound trace reached up to three hops. Seed 1 and Seed 2 coverage was incomplete. A direct funding link between Seed 2 and Seed 3 is not established. The report calls for corroborating the Kraken attribution, confirming Tether’s freeze, obtaining service order records, and establishing the remaining funding links.Source: SentinelTX, Investigation report CASE-CBE85A32, November 5, 2026, pp. 4–5 and 16–18.6. Selected evidence appendixThese IDs organize records reproduced from the PDF; they do not indicate a new investigation. Etherscan links below are navigation links constructed from the full Ethereum hashes printed in the PDF. The PDF remains the source for the descriptions, quantities, status, and timing. “Verified” is the report's status for a transfer, not proof of ownership, intent, victim linkage, or final destination.E1–E5: USDC route and Seed 2 transfersEvidence ID: E1 — PDF record: 0x9aa5e3281ce4c8d83f290e20e7c6a66b056965aab2468311115c10e1433050d8. November 1, 2026, 22:06:11 UTC; block 26322798; 9,582,349.791029 USDC; verified. PDF pp. 6, 18.Evidence ID: E2 — PDF record: 0x5a27bea73f50440194aab5744002757af96583a4f7002254d2c6af276f16e161. November 1, 2026, 22:20:23 UTC; block 26322867; 5,270,291.000000 USDC to the commingled wallet; verified. PDF pp. 6, 19.Evidence ID: E3a — PDF record: 0x3d20cf5a8034f5924c555470e1f4fe75e36704b0da6f25d53ba043afb81e85d4. November 2, 2026, 00:09:35 UTC; block 26323412; 5,000,000.000000 USDC to Seed 2; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E3b — PDF record: 0x7e125322be3021b881bafa7a3ccfcba229d2d30511add1a991e4a12103ee2ae0. November 2, 2026, 00:14:11 UTC; block 26323435; 5,000,000.000000 USDC to Seed 2; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E3c — PDF record: 0xbdd896d7ce518156ecd2d564e6eccb6199fa4fc01f67fc619177236429a13931. November 2, 2026, 00:18:11 UTC; block 26323455; 3,495,000.000000 USDC to Seed 2; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E4a — PDF record: 0x04fd5b5e8fbb800f186656ff0dc22709bb40c2844b6ab00e98c36e6dd2510518. November 1, 2026, 23:51:23 UTC; block 26323321; 5,000,000.000000 USDC to the resolver-labeled address; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E4b — PDF record: 0xc3e3296c6a57f3e340592e7afce01a3d76a4bf3e275fe6a71cea1f356272fcca. November 1, 2026, 23:56:23 UTC; block 26323346; 5,000,000.000000 USDC; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E4c — PDF record: 0x0cc65b5600a9d58aed4c0aeb712caaf928f24dc30a6d205ea692436f724d5798. November 2, 2026, 00:11:59 UTC; block 26323424; 5,000,000.000000 USDC; verified. PDF pp. 7, 20.Evidence ID: E4d — PDF record: 0xf89d84a28d9868d361baee22036c2981bc412487a13fcdb339f5b337a06aa8c7. November 2, 2026, 00:15:11 UTC; 5,000,000 USDC. This row is stated in the chronology on PDF p. 7; no separate block or verification status is printed there.Evidence ID: E5 — PDF record: 0x66c8e8dcbe0750d8bfbfc298895b82fb5bb125ff123c8263d0aafdbd75205c07. November 2, 2026, 00:00:47 UTC; block 26323368; 7,166,580.962400 USDC; verified. PDF pp. 7, 19.E6–E9: ETH relay and funding of the separate swap branchEvidence ID: E6 — PDF record: 0x499ab00a77fc9dceeb7141e5a7d6565c36b936d6de7d052a3973986fb451c08f. November 3, 2026, 09:26:59 UTC; block 26333369; 395.000000000000000000 ETH from Seed 3 to the first relay; verified. PDF pp. 9, 22.Evidence ID: E7 — PDF record: 0xcd36c13ff7ad05d7aac27dd6ab7fd7191bb3fc7ed9e5b0e62bd532e4006bd377. November 3, 2026, 10:08:59 UTC; block 26333579; 395.999977992739261000 ETH to the second relay; verified. PDF pp. 9, 22.Evidence ID: E8 — PDF record: 0xfb7a6f5f819e12e9f5220564e03954c616d714a93c0f3626d3867d9f3a9bdca9. November 3, 2026, 10:11:47 UTC; block 26333593; 395.999955100039942000 ETH to 0xfa6766b362461a20046451b16277ec5f7d159556; verified. PDF pp. 8–10, 21. Kraken attribution is unconfirmed.Evidence ID: E9 — PDF record: 0x9c8279d0abf25b2e4c1c7e978517bc9176b5128647c6917ebc27120d562746db. November 3, 2026, 17:10:23 UTC; block 26335681; 2,000.000000000000000000 ETH from Seed 3 to 0xb3a21eb35ba99f2d9a2bc11f1f6fa17e00f99762; verified. PDF pp. 9, 22.E10–E13: swaps and onward USDT paymentsEvidence ID: E10 — PDF record: 0x504d03a1a6f90611d4ba874106463015ecbebf41a1dad7e2df54ebecfd239327. November 4, 2026, 07:30:35 UTC; block 26339966. Recorded legs: 87.999000000000000000 ETH wrapped, 87.999000000000000000 WETH sent, and 202,156.840322 USDT received; verified. PDF pp. 9, 23.Evidence ID: E11 — PDF record: 0xa8d8666e23819babb2f3653c95c17eaa9a369b010722fc99f1f9e92337cd5d08. November 4, 2026, 07:50:35 UTC; block 26340066. Recorded legs: 43.000911470000000000 ETH wrapped, 43.000911470000000000 WETH sent, and 98,911.866452 USDT received; verified. PDF pp. 9, 23.Evidence ID: E12 — PDF record: 0x7f008e0153463b9301dafd2554b6b1917ab31128e3a64cb6854f6d7ce5ec1ae9. November 4, 2026, 08:25:23 UTC; block 26340238; 5.000000 USDT to 0x70e9b573831d62bbc503b1b00bd611bac4352a3c; verified. PDF pp. 9, 23.Evidence ID: E13 — PDF record: 0x066846fd1d44770473109fe8e16f2a91b069d8019f179f0dafbc1728a9408803. November 4, 2026, 08:26:47 UTC; block 26340245; 301,063.706774 USDT to 0x7ebce287d5db06103152bd5dc114b8d5f2133fd4; verified. PDF pp. 9, 24.E14: service-labeled recordsEvidence ID: E14a — PDF record: 0xc92fb17f37ced481e4fb6d8506a85645322dba764d603d535d2d463ebbd9f082. November 2, 2026, 03:08:23 UTC; block 26324303; 50.000000000000000000 ETH to the Chainflip-labeled address; verified. PDF pp. 8, 21.Evidence ID: E14b — PDF record: 0x0983fc81da40e8f4cca0773f7b2e6ed307804e7924a1bd34e0d8322d16c9d4b8. November 2, 2026, 03:13:59 UTC; block 26324331; 100.000000000000000000 ETH; verified. PDF pp. 8, 21.Evidence ID: E14c — PDF record: 0xf5b035bca990e0de75dba21b42cbcb8f2b2e97cfe76f5fc8991d9def6259e860. November 2, 2026, 05:14:11 UTC; block 26324931; 45.000000000000000000 ETH; verified. PDF pp. 8, 21.Evidence ID: E14d — PDF record: 0x377743658f05b76d8a47e68201c217a2673aa0bd4c99f7878c280ff5d847eefd. November 2, 2026, 05:24:11 UTC; block 26324981; 32.000000000000000000 ETH; verified. PDF pp. 8, 21.Evidence ID: E14e — PDF record: 0x19820a17988318c2d56771b2a6349e6eca027549b61fa6937de02cc0fe8e2dd8. November 3, 2026, 21:51:59 UTC; block 26337084; 14.000000000000000000 ETH; verified. PDF pp. 8, 21.Address and role registerLabel: Seed 1 — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x730bcb1296758c377149d7409f98f041cf723992. Publicly described as exchange-paid; ownership unconfirmed.Label: First USDC intermediary — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xc80f1cd39dc15a341c4ff083ece7d526964a8ce4. Receives E1 and sends E2.Label: Commingled USDC intermediary — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xb4043516a2e5c20e6227ea074c4112457d06d39b. Sends E3a–E3c.Label: Seed 2 — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x9eca05d78f6751c91ab048858b7d21a67c015547. Publicly described as a swap wallet; ownership unconfirmed.Label: Resolver-labeled recipient — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x225a38bc71102999dd13478bfabd7c4d53f2dc17. “Rizzolver, Unknown.”Label: Other USDC recipient — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x52b335fd4d229c4b4ffa6190526e4b5fb8e3fb09. Unlabeled.Label: Seed 3 — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xa3a98584d410c4e32f9825f6af1168f4e774ae0d. Publicly described as frozen-USDT wallet; ownership unconfirmed; freeze unconfirmed.Label: First ETH relay — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xd359dfac0ec3032939f95839cba50b5ad10a0573. Single-forward relay in the report.Label: Second ETH relay — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xf5968bc4d8cd1c75a7ddb93b158689eff9014ae1. Single-forward relay in the report.Label: ETH relay recipient — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xfa6766b362461a20046451b16277ec5f7d159556. Service attribution unconfirmed; publicly attributed Kraken deposit address.Label: Separate ETH branch — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xb3a21eb35ba99f2d9a2bc11f1f6fa17e00f99762. Receives 2,000 ETH from Seed 3.Label: Swap address — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x2fb89a93a1908b1902da6b5a6e3459df75df8516. Site of E10 and E11.Label: Main onward USDT recipient — Full address and role in the PDF: 0x7ebce287d5db06103152bd5dc114b8d5f2133fd4. Unlabeled; bridge role unconfirmed.Label: Chainflip-labeled recipient — Full address and role in the PDF: 0xf5e10380213880111522dd0efd3dbb45b9f62bcc. “Chainflip, Exchange.”7. Source and scopeSource: SentinelTX, Investigation report CASE-CBE85A32, 5 November 2026. This article presents selected records and assessments from the report; it is not an independent on-chain validation. The report cites Bitquery’s EU theft investigation for public-source context.The analysis covers selected Ethereum activity. Some records predate the November 1–4 analysis window and provide background only. Coverage is incomplete; the recorded movements do not establish total incident loss or demonstrate that every listed transfer belongs to the incident. Values moving through successive addresses are not added together, and different assets are not combined into a loss estimate.The Seed 1 route passes through commingled funds. The evidence does not allocate Seed 1-derived value to individual resolver payments or establish a direct funding link between Seed 2 and Seed 3. Service-labeled transactions alone do not establish a case-linked cash-out, an account holder or settlement on another chain.The publicly reported Kraken attribution and Tether freeze remain unconfirmed. A historical balance is not a current holding, confirmed frozen amount or recovery. The report does not establish the victim’s identity, account-access mechanism or final destination of the funds. Other-chain routes remain outside the demonstrated scope.


Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…
Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated Laundering OperationThe laundering infrastructure behind the recent Gravity Bridge exploit has now been largely uncovered.After tracing 87 confirmed attacker transactions and an additional 26 downstream movements, the overall flow of stolen funds is becoming clear. What initially appeared to be a straightforward bridge exploit has evolved into a highly structured laundering operation involving decentralized exchanges, relay wallets, non-custodial swap services, and centralized exchanges.This report summarizes the complete fund flow observed so far and highlights the remaining recovery opportunities.Executive SummaryTotal tracked transactions: 113Initial stolen assets converted into ETH almost immediatelyApproximately $4.7M converted through KyberSwap and 1inch2,600 ETH consolidated into a secondary aggregation walletFunds dispersed through dozens of one-time relay walletsConfirmed deposits identified at ChangeNOW and KuCoinMultiple staging wallets still hold potentially recoverable fundsSeveral laundering paths remain active and require real-time monitoringPhase 1 — Asset ConversionThe attacker-controlled wallet:0x7B582033061b96cC3F9421e73a749ED7C62da1F9immediately began converting stolen stablecoins into ETH.The swaps were executed primarily through KyberSwap and 1inch, suggesting the attacker wanted to reduce exposure to token freezes while maximizing liquidity.Observed transactions include:$100K USDC → ETH$200K USDC → ETH$500K USDC → ETH$400K USDT → ETHMultiple additional swapsIn total:Approximately $4.3M USDCApproximately $434K USDTwere converted into ETH within a short time window.The rapid conversion indicates pre-planning and suggests the operator anticipated potential blacklisting or asset recovery attempts.Phase 2 — ETH ConsolidationAfter conversion, the attacker consolidated funds into a second wallet:0x4d3ca32e687e871a58b78AcAc73bE59AC37C7A47A total of 2,600 ETH was transferred through multiple transactions:600 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETHThis wallet appears to have functioned as the primary distribution hub for the laundering operation.Rather than cashing out directly, the operator implemented a layered relay strategy designed to fragment attribution and complicate tracing efforts.Phase 3 — Distributed Relay LaunderingThe most notable discovery is the laundering architecture itself.Instead of sending large transfers directly to exchanges, the attacker repeatedly split funds into dozens of temporary wallets.The observed pattern resembles:Primary Wallets → One-Time Relay Wallets → Swap Service / Exchange → Cross-Chain ExitIndividual transfers were commonly observed in the 6–10 ETH range.This methodology significantly reduces the visibility of exchange deposits and makes automated clustering more difficult.The pattern appears intentional and operationally mature.Confirmed ChangeNOW ActivityThe largest identified laundering route currently leads to ChangeNOW.Observed destination:0xeba88149813bec1cccccfdb0dacefaaa5de94cb1Estimated deposits:Approximately 114 ETHRoughly $230,000 equivalentBecause ChangeNOW is non-custodial, recovery options are more limited.However, transaction records still exist.The highest priority investigative question is determining what assets these ETH deposits were converted into.Particular attention should be given to:Monero (XMR)Privacy-focused assetsCross-chain bridge destinationsIf conversion into privacy-preserving assets occurred, tracing may become significantly more difficult.Confirmed KuCoin DepositsA second laundering path has been identified through KuCoin.Known deposit address:0x45300136662dd4e58fc0df61e6290dffd992b785Estimated deposits:Approximately 6 ETHAdditional suspected deposit address:0x58edf78281334335effa23101bbe3371b6a36a51Status:Further confirmation requiredUnlike ChangeNOW, KuCoin operates as a custodial exchange and maintains KYC records.This creates a potential recovery and attribution opportunity if law enforcement or affected parties act quickly.Remaining On-Chain FundsSeveral wallets remain active and continue to warrant monitoring.Primary Staging Wallet0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562Current observations:Received 59 ETHOnly 15 ETH moved onwardApproximately 44 ETH potentially remains under attacker controlThis wallet may represent an operational staging point rather than a final cash-out destination.Additional Unresolved Destinations0xf1ed839d08309e2a52e58d69b06d286d35fc18bc — 15 ETH0xe1e471614305656114c39294637b65adccf665a3 — ~13 ETH0x58432e011aa493c404f80409d997b1eabdfd8e24 — 9 ETH0x79f376453537878eeb79fb7d2cdb2c10bc58f454 — 9 ETH0x98d9022fa2789c0d8e9cd49707599c6848619ed8 — 10 ETHThese wallets currently represent unresolved portions of the laundering network.Immediate Investigative Priorities1. KuCoin Cooperation RequestThis remains the strongest recovery opportunity.Required actions:Identify account owner(s)Preserve account recordsFreeze assets if still presentObtain associated KYC informationTiming is critical.2. ChangeNOW Exit TracingInvestigators should determine:Destination chainDestination assetConversion timingPotential privacy-coin exposureThis path likely contains the most important unanswered questions in the investigation.3. Real-Time Monitoring of Staging WalletsThe wallet:0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562should be monitored continuously.A significant portion of attacker-controlled funds may still be sitting on-chain.Any future movement could reveal:Additional exchange depositsAdditional swap servicesNew laundering infrastructureFinal cash-out attemptsConclusionThe Gravity Bridge attacker did not rely on a simple exchange cash-out strategy.Instead, the operator employed a structured relay-wallet laundering network designed to fragment attribution, obscure exchange deposits, and delay investigation.While a meaningful portion of the funds has already entered laundering channels, several opportunities remain.The most actionable leads currently include:KuCoin deposit attributionChangeNOW conversion tracingMonitoring of the 59 ETH staging walletThe next movements from these wallets will likely determine whether investigators can continue following the money — or whether the trail disappears into privacy infrastructure permanently.
ChainBounty
5 months ago
Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation
How automated bots and shared infrastructure revealed a 10-month-old organized crime syndicate.The blockchain never forgets, but it can be incredibly complex to navigate. Recently, ChainBounty conducted a deep-dive forensic investigation into a significant asset theft involving $SUBY and other Solana-based tokens. What began as a single incident report evolved into the discovery of a professional, long-standing scam infrastructure that has now led to an active criminal investigation by the Cyber Crime Investigation Division in Seoul, South Korea.1. The Incident: Precision and AutomationOn May 30, 2025, a victim’s wallet was drained of approximately 8.2 million $SUBY tokens, along with $SSE and $DAW. The speed of the transfer was alarming.Our forensic analysis revealed that this wasn’t a manual operation. The assets were moved to an intermediary wallet (46S5bgHq...) and immediately processed through automated scripts. These bots executed swaps into stablecoins and distributed funds across multiple "hop" wallets with 0-second latency, ensuring the trail became as fragmented as possible within minutes.2. Identifying the “Cash Out” InfrastructureBy tracing the flow of stolen assets, we identified two primary exit points: Bitget Exchange and FixedFloat (a mixing service). While some deposits to these platforms occurred shortly before or after the specific $SUBY theft, our “Infrastructure Analysis” proved a definitive link. We discovered a massive, interconnected network:27 Common Fee Payers: A cluster of wallets consistently funded the gas fees for the attack wallets.63 Shared Addresses: These wallets acted as a central hub for multiple thefts over a 10-month period.The Forensic Anomaly: Why tracking the criminal organization is more effective than tracking the tokens aloneThis confirms that the attackers are not “lone wolves” but an organized syndicate operating a “Scam-as-a-Service” model on the Solana network.3. The Evidence: The Smoking GunThe most compelling evidence of organized crime was the Machine-like Transfer Patterns. Our timeline analysis showed batch processing intervals of exactly 15 to 28 seconds. This level of synchronization is only possible through a dedicated command-and-control (C2) botnet designed for money laundering.Through our investigation, we identified over $142,430 USDT funneled through the Bitget deposit addresses associated with this specific group.Inhuman execution: Batch processing and mechanical intervals confirm the use of laundering bots.4. Active Investigation and Next StepsChainBounty has officially submitted this forensic package to the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. The investigation is currently focused on:KYC De-anonymization: Working with Bitget to identify the account holders behind the identified deposit addresses.Cross-Chain Tracking: Tracing funds that exited via FixedFloat into Ethereum and Bitcoin.Asset Freezing: Coordinating with exchanges to blacklist and freeze the identified criminal infrastructure.Conclusion: Vigilance in the Web3 EraThis case is a stark reminder that in the world of DeFi, your digital footprint — and that of the hackers — is permanent. At ChainBounty, we are committed to turning the tide against these scam networks.We urge the community to stay vigilant. Do not click on suspicious partnership links or authorize “blind signings” in your wallet. The scammers are professional, but so is our pursuit of justice.Join the Fight. Follow our investigation and report suspicious activities at our community: 🔗 https://community.chainbounty.io 📧 For inquiries: [email protected]#ChainBounty #Solana #Forensics #CyberCrime #Web3Security #OSINT #CryptoInvestigation
ChainBounty
9 months ago
MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report
IntroductionThis report details a real-world case submitted by an applicant to ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program. The victim approached us after suffering a significant loss due to a targeted social engineering attack. ChainBounty is actively assisting the victim by providing comprehensive on-chain forensics and intelligence analysis to trace the stolen assets and identify the perpetrators for law enforcement purposes.1. Executive SummaryThis report synthesizes the results of on-chain forensic analysis and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) investigation regarding the digital asset theft incident that occurred between December 7 and 8, 2025.The incident appears to have originated from a social engineering attack targeting an active user of Memex, a major dApp in the MemeCore (M) ecosystem. The attacker impersonated community administrators and creators to lure the victim into a fake Telegram group, then induced them to connect their wallet to a fraudulent bot service using “high-yield staking rewards” as bait.The victim created a new wallet and transferred assets as instructed, but the flow was designed to funnel funds into the attacker’s scam network.On-chain analysis reveals that the stolen funds did not end with a simple transfer. A multi-stage laundering flow was observed, involving MRC-20 token swaps within the MemeCore network, repetitive transactions based on the WM contract, cross-chain bridging via Meson Finance, inflows into Centralized Exchanges (CEX), and dispersed withdrawals across multiple exchanges.Notably, a “direct-to-exchange” flow is clearly visible in the early stages. M tokens were directly transferred from the victim’s wallet to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and this fund was collected into the exchange’s hot wallet (0x1ab4…) within a short period. This suggests the attacker operated a direct route to the exchange alongside other methods to accelerate cash-out early on.The damage is calculated based on two criteria:Total M Token Outflow (Direct): 2,151.11 M, approx. $2,881.39 (Combined sum of direct transfers to exchange + EOA/Gathering Wallet).Total M Token Outflow (Including Bridge): 8,280.11 M, approx. $11,150.17 (Direct outflow + Meson bridge outflow included).Furthermore, clues suggesting a connection to specific social accounts and developer community profiles were identified in Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), which was confirmed as a key hub for money laundering. Based on this, grounds to narrow down suspect candidates have been partially secured. However, this is a circumstantial judgment based on the correlation between public information (OSINT) and on-chain data, and is not a legally confirmed conclusion.1.1 Summary StatisticsThe key flows are summarized as follows:1.2 Summary of Key Flows (4 Core Paths)Path 1: Victim → Direct Outflow to Bitget (Attempt at Immediate Cash-out)A total of 2,140.72 M (approx. $2,867) was directly transferred from the Victim Wallet (0xdc54…) to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…).The deposit was collected into the Bitget exchange hot wallet (Bitget 6, 0x1ab4…) within minutes (approx. 3–5 mins).This flow represents the attacker sending “M tokens that are easy to cash out immediately” straight to the exchange.Path 2: Victim → Gathering Wallet 1 → Meson Bridge → Gathering Wallet 2 (Mainstream of Indirect Laundering)After WM contract processing, 5 types of MRC-20 tokens were received by the Victim Wallet and then drained to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…e6).In Gathering Wallet 1, MRC-20s were swapped back to M, and 6,129 M was bridged via Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3).6,122.87 M arrived at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) on the BNB Chain.Path 3: Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Reconsolidation at Bitget Deposit 2 (Possible Mixing with Other Victims’ Funds)900.65 M from Gathering Wallet 1 and 5,007.02 M from Gathering Wallet 2 flowed into Suspect Bitget Deposit 2 (0xb408…).The combined total is 5,907.67 M. As there is a “possibility of other victims’ funds being mixed,” this needs to be interpreted separately from the victim’s sole damage amount.Subsequent collection into Bitget 6 (0x1ab4…) was confirmed.Path 4: Multi-chain Dispersed Withdrawal from Gathering Wallet 2 (Evasion/Smurfing)From Gathering Wallet 2, after swapping M → BNB, there is a record of 37.51 BNB being dispersed and withdrawn in 48 transactions to 5 exchanges: Bybit, Bitget, MEXC, Binance, and Remitano.Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base as well as BNB, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern.2. Incident Mechanism and Psychological AnalysisThis incident appears to have started from a social engineering scenario targeting human trust rather than technical flaws such as system vulnerabilities. It seems to be a variation of the typical “Pig Butchering (Sha Zhu Pan)” tactic adapted to the MemeCore ecosystem context. There are indications that the attacker analyzed the community atmosphere and the victim’s activity patterns beforehand to approach with a tailored script.2.1 Manipulating the Environment to Build Trust: “The Illusion of the Fake Room” The attack seems to have begun with an approach from an account mimicking an acquaintance active on Memex. In anonymous messenger environments like Telegram, profile pictures and Display Names can be configured similarly, and Usernames (Handles) are hard to distinguish with just a one-character difference. The attacker judged to have secured trust by exploiting these characteristics. The Telegram room the victim was invited to contained multiple accounts impersonating Admins and Creators. They staged the room to look like an “Official Community” by continuing conversations or sharing profit verification screenshots even before the victim joined. In such an environment, it was easy to mistake the room for an extension of the official Memex community, which became the basis for the fraud.2.2 Technical Deception: Fake Bot and Inducing Wallet Connection Once a certain level of trust was established, the attacker guided the victim saying, “You can receive staking rewards if you connect your wallet via the Telegram bot”. The method is close to a typical Phishing or Drainer type. The wallet (0xDC54…69b) the victim newly created and connected was a “clean wallet” with almost no transaction history. The moment the victim trusted the instructions and moved assets, it is likely the attacker secured control through one (or a combination) of the following methods:Possibility that the transaction signed via the bot was actually an Unlimited Token Approval, not staking.Possibility that it was designed to execute an asset Transfer transaction during the signing or connection process.Possibility that keys or permissions were exposed to the attacker during the wallet creation/connection process. The key point is that “Wallet Connection” may have turned into an act of handing over actual asset authority, rather than simple login or authentication.3. Technical Characteristics of MemeCore Ecosystem and Asset StructureTo interpret the fund flow, it is necessary to first understand the background of the MemeCore chain where the victim’s assets existed and the asset structure. This explains why the attacker performed repetitive swaps and why the laundering path developed into a specific pattern.3.1 MemeCore and Proof of Meme (PoM) MemeCore is a Layer 1 chain aimed at connecting the cultural value of Memes with an economic reward structure. It promotes Proof of Meme (PoM) as its consensus structure, which includes elements like community contribution and viral activities in the reward system alongside simple staking. The base asset of this chain is the M token. M is used for core functions such as gas fees, governance, and validator staking, and has relatively high liquidity, which is why the attacker ultimately pooled funds into M for laundering.3.2 MRC-20 Token Standard and Cash-out Constraints Tokens such as NinjaMEX, walxop, LIFT, Bubger, and Abudium identified in the swap path of this incident follow the MemeCore-specific token standard (MRC-20). These appear to be “transit tokens” temporarily passed through during the process of the attacker exchanging stolen assets on the internal DEX, rather than assets originally held by the victim. Technically similar to ERC-20, they are structured for the creation and circulation of meme tokens within MemeCore. The issue is external compatibility. Since it is rare for external chains, centralized exchanges, or bridges to directly support MRC-20, it is difficult for the attacker to move them out externally and cash them out in the MRC-20 state. Eventually, to proceed to the actual cash-out stage, they must go through the flow of: converting back to M on the internal DEX -> moving to an external chain (BNB Chain, etc.) via a bridge -> attempting cash-out via swap/dispersed withdrawal on the external chain. The massive internal swap transactions observed in the report are interpreted as reflecting the constraint of having to convert back to M for external export, along with the possibility of transit swaps intended to confuse tracking in some sections.4. Incident Timeline and Detailed Forensic ReconstructionThis incident is clearly divided into Reconnaissance & Testing on December 7 and the Main Exploit on December 8. The attacker checked the validity of the path the day before, and then stole all available assets and proceeded with rapid laundering the next day.4.1 Phase 1: Reconnaissance and Initial Infiltration (Dec 7) — Traces Left by Destination Choice Immediately after securing access rights, the attacker showed a pattern of verifying two things with small (or relatively small) transfers first, rather than moving the full amount immediately:Whether the wallet is actually usable by the attacker.Whether the exchange deposit is processed normally (no risk of detection/blocking). At 10:18 UTC, 388.717 M was transferred to Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and at 14:08 UTC, an additional 752 M was transferred via the same path. This flow aligns with the typical pattern of a small test followed by additional transfers. The notable point is that the receiving address 0x7a5d…337 is estimated to be a User-Assigned Deposit Address of a Centralized Exchange (Bitget), not a personal wallet. Funds flowing into this address were observed being collected into the Bitget hot wallet (0x1ab4…f23) within minutes. If cooperation with the exchange is established, there is a possibility that tracking can continue on an account basis (KYC-based).4.2 Phase 2: Full-Scale Asset Theft and Laundering (Dec 8) — Forced Conversion to M and Exfiltration The full-scale theft proceeded rapidly on December 8. In this phase, it is observed that repetitive processing of the WM contract and mass liquidation (swap) of MRC-20 tokens were carried out in parallel with simple transfers.4.2.1 WM Repetitive Processing Pattern: Between 06:45 and 06:49 UTC, 8 repetitive transactions occurred against the WM contract, confirming processing (Deposit/Withdraw) of approximately 8,000 M. This repetitive wrapping/unwrapping can be interpreted as (1) a staging to confuse tracking, or (2) a preparatory step to match the asset form required for subsequent swaps/bridging.4.2.2 Organized Outflow of 5 MRC-20 Tokens and Immediate Cash-out: Around 1:24 PM, continuous M→MRC-20 swap transactions via the internal DEX occurred in the victim’s wallet, which appear to have been performed by the attacker. Subsequently, these 5 MRC-20 tokens were transferred to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…eae6), where a process of converting them back to M via the Swap Router was observed. This choice is pragmatic from the attacker’s perspective. The longer low-liquidity meme tokens are held, the greater the price fluctuation and tracking traces may become. It seems the attacker chose to quickly convert MRC-20 to M to increase mobility and cash-out potential.4.3 Phase 3: Cross-Chain Bridging and Final Concealment — Attempt to Evade Tracking via Chain Hopping The secured M tokens did not stay in the MemeCore chain for long and were observed moving to the BNB Chain via the Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3) cross-chain bridge.Meson Bridge: 6,129 M Deposited.BNB Chain Arrival: 6,122.87 M received at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) (Approx. 3 mins to arrive). Gathering Wallet 2 subsequently acts as a hub to send funds to exchanges or disperse them to other chains (Base, Arbitrum). It has a strong character of a “Operational Wallet” used repeatedly rather than a simple transit point.5. Fund Flow Structure AnalysisFunds drained from the victim’s wallet moved largely in two directions:Direct Outflow straight to the exchange (Priority: Speed).Indirect Laundering via gathering wallets and bridges (Priority: Evasion).5.1 Key Deposit (Receiving) AddressesSuspect Bitget Deposit 1: 0x7a5d...337 / Received: 2,140.72 M (~$2,867.47) / Note: Exchange Transfer.Gathering Wallet 1 (MemeCore): 0x8325...eae6 / Received: 5 MRC-20s + 10.39 M / Note: MRC-20 → M Swap.Gathering Wallet 2 (Multi-chain Same Address): 0x1c00...285f / Received: 6,122.87 M & Multi-chain activity (BNB/Arbitrum/Base).Suspect Bitget Deposit 2: 0xb408...dd5c / Received: 5,907.67 M (~$7,969) / Note: From Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Exchange. Caution: Possibility of mixing with other victims' funds..5.2 Characteristics and Implications in Fund Flow First, the laundering strategy is split into two. Part of it prioritized speed by sending it quickly to the exchange (Path 1), while the rest tried to make tracking difficult through bridging and multi-chain dispersion (Paths 2, 4). Second, Bitget appears repeatedly. Both the direct outflow path (0x7a5d…) and the path from the gathering wallet (0xb408…) converge to Bitget deposit addresses. In particular, 0xb408… is a common point receiving funds from both Gathering Wallet 1 and Gathering Wallet 2, making it a candidate for a key cash-out window. However, as other victims’ funds may be mixed in this section, definitive conclusions should be avoided. Third, Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) functions as a central node that receives bridged funds and then performs exchange transfers or dispersion to other chains.5.3 Multi-Exchange Dispersed Withdrawal (Smurfing) Statistics (BNB Only) From Gathering Wallet 2 (BNB Chain) → Exchange Withdrawal Statistics:Bybit: 23.44 BNB / 16 txsBitget: 7.15 BNB / 2 txsMEXC Global: 5.06 BNB / 22 txsRemitano: 1.30 BNB / 4 txsBinance: 0.56 BNB / 4 txsTotal Exchange Withdrawals: 37.51 BNB / 48 txs / 5 Exchanges Note: After swapping M → BNB at Gathering Wallet 2, dispersed withdrawals were made to multiple exchanges. Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern. Reference: Remitano is known as a platform widely used for P2P trading in Southeast Asia, which can serve as a reference clue for geographic profiling (Note: Do not conclude).6. Relevant Actor Intelligence AnalysisIn this investigation, by cross-examining on-chain flows and off-chain public activity traces, we secured clues to narrow down the relevant Actor (Actor A) and associated account/profile candidates. The central address of the analysis is Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), and OSINT information was organized around this address.6.1 Circumstances Connecting On-Chain Activity and Digital Identity In this case, some clues were observed where 0x1c00…5f, identified as a key gathering address, could be connected to external public activities. If the same address is repeatedly mentioned or exposed in specific social accounts or community profiles, it can serve as important evidence connecting on-chain addresses with off-chain activities. There are circumstances where a specific social account marked as (Redacted) posted the 0x1c00…5f address multiple times in posts related to past airdrops, whitelist registrations, faucet participation, etc. This raises the possibility that the address is associated with the account’s activity to a certain level.6.2 Detailed Identity Profile (Circumstantial) In the OSINT investigation, circumstances were confirmed where the social account/handle marked as (Redacted) is connected to a specific bounty/task platform (e.g., Superteam Earn) account/profile. The following additional information is derived from this:Real Name/Legal Identity: (Redacted)Country/Region of Residence: (Redacted; Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns, etc.)Professional Identity: (Redacted; Based on self-introduction)Tech Stack Claims: (Redacted)Activity Character: (Redacted)Additional Explanation: Meaning of “Partially Consistent with Remitano Usage Patterns” Here, “Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns” does not mean concluding residence in a specific country/region (e.g., Vietnam) solely because Remitano appeared. It is intended to be referred to as a supplementary clue that increases probability from the perspective of Geo-profiling. specifically:Regional Character of Remitano: Remitano is known to be relatively widely used for P2P On/Off-ramp (cash-out/settlement) purposes in Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) rather than being used equally worldwide like global major exchanges. Therefore, if Remitano is naturally included and repeatedly observed in the multi-exchange withdrawal flow, the possibility that the actor’s living sphere/settlement environment touches the Southeast Asian region (including Vietnam) relatively increases.Hints form “Exchange Combination”: In this case, regional P2P channels like Remitano appear alongside general-purpose exchanges like Bybit, Binance, and MEXC. This combination can be interpreted as a form often observed in dispersed withdrawals considering the final cash-out route, rather than simple investor propensity.Therefore, Remitano traces are worth referencing as a “Geographic Clue Candidate”. However, it is a “Supplementary Clue,” not definitive evidence. Final confirmation must be made through cooperation/investigation data such as exchange KYC, login/access logs (IP/Device), and withdrawal methods (Bank/Payment info).7. Conclusion & Our CommitmentComprehensive Conclusion This incident, occurring on December 7–8, 2025, was a social engineering-based asset theft. Funds were laundered through two parallel paths:A direct path flowing straight into the Bitget exchange (Speed).An indirect path exfiltrated to external chains via the Meson bridge after internal swaps on MemeCore (Stealth).Additionally, circumstantial evidence links “Gathering Wallet 2” (0x1c00...5f) to specific social accounts and developer profiles, providing strong identification clues for law enforcement.Response Strategy ChainBounty has advised a phased response:Phase 1: Immediate reporting to law enforcement with key TxIDs and requesting asset freezing at Bitget.Phase 2: International cooperation review for cross-border tracking.Phase 3: Continuous monitoring of suspect addresses and community education on risk factors.Need help tracking stolen funds? Recovering stolen assets starts with professional tracking. If you have been targeted by a similar exploit, do not hesitate to reach out. ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program provides the forensic evidence needed for law enforcement reporting and exchange cooperation.👉 Apply for Victim Relief Program: https://chainbounty.io/en/event/campaign-victim-support/(Disclaimer: This report is based on on-chain data and public OSINT. Identity-related content is circumstantial estimation. Final legal judgments must be confirmed through lawful procedures by law enforcement agencies.)
ChainBounty
10 months ago