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ChainBounty · Investigation analysis · 31 October 2026A SentinelTX report records 1,013,353.611686 USDC leaving an Avalanche contract at 00:00:03 UTC on 28 October 2026, followed by forwarding to a wallet and two subsequent USDC burns. Public reports cited in the PDF associate the contract with a TranchePool linked to Fence Finance, Valinor Digital and Oatfi. Those affiliations are reported leads, not independently established ownership findings.The strongest story is not a seamless trail across three chains. It is an Avalanche sequence alongside a separate Ethereum activity record, with the connection between them unresolved. The PDF also contains conflicting confidence labels and a route whose timing cannot support its stated direction. This article keeps those limits visible rather than presenting a complete, verified cash-out path.1. Roles before routesThe report distinguishes the contract that sent the USDC, the intermediate contract, and the wallet that received it. These are on-chain roles—not identified people. Short reference IDs below organize the PDF's records; the full identifiers appear in the appendix.Role: A1 — source contract — Description in the report: Sender of 1,013,353.611686 USDC. Its identification as the victim TranchePool comes from attributed search snippets.Role: A2 — intermediate contract — Description in the report: Received the source-contract transfer and forwarded 1,013,353.611687 USDC to A3 in the same transaction, E1.Role: A3 — Avalanche wallet — Description in the report: Recipient of that forwarding transfer; recorded creator of A2; sender in the two later burn transactions E2 and E3. Identity not established.Role: A4 — Ethereum address — Description in the report: Reported receiver examined separately. The PDF does not establish common control with A3 or an end-to-end path from the Avalanche burns.Role: Report scope — Description in the report: Narrative examines 27–31 October 2026; the query appendix reports broader 34-day lookbacks. Neither is a claim of complete coverage.The difference between the two E1 amounts is retained exactly: 1,013,353.611686 USDC left A1; 1,013,353.611687 USDC reached A3 from A2. They are distinct transfer legs, not interchangeable loss figures. The report states incident loss using the first leg only. It does not add the forwarding, burn, mint, swap and mixer figures together.2. What the Avalanche record describesOn 27 October, A3 received 100.0 AVAX at 22:42:23 UTC and 11.8294 AVAX at 22:45:24 UTC from an address labelled “KuCoin, Exchange” in the report's label database. The direction was exchange-labelled address to wallet. It is a funding relationship, not proof of an account holder's identity or exchange involvement in the incident.The report's transaction-list record places A2's creation at 23:41:49 UTC. A staging call followed at 23:56:41 UTC. Its retained rows describe a USDC cycle involving an Aave-labelled contract, A2 and A1, with 1,013,353.611686 USDC on three legs and 1,013,860.288492 USDC returned on another. The PDF interprets the difference, 506.676806 USDC, as consistent with a flash-loan premium. Raw receipt logs were not returned for this staging transaction, so that interpretation remains qualified.E1 is recorded at 28 October, 00:00:03 UTC, immediately after the UTC day boundary. The PDF describes the source-contract transfer to A2 and the forwarding to A3 in that same transaction. It then records two later burns:Burn record: E2 — Quantity and time: 250,000.175563 USDC at 00:03:41 UTC on 28 October 2026; block 98731831.Burn record: E3 — Quantity and time: 763,374.836640 USDC at 00:05:22 UTC on 28 October 2026; block 98731940.Burn record: Combined burns — Quantity and time: 1,013,375.012203 USDC. This is an outgoing-flow total, not an additional loss.Burn record: Difference from A3's E1 receipt — Quantity and time: Burns exceeded the 1,013,353.611687 USDC receipt by 21.400516 USDC. The report does not establish the source of that additional amount.Figure 1. The two USDC burn amounts recorded for A3. The total is a disposition flow, not a second incident-loss figure.Color key: slate marks the first burn; sage marks the second. UTC labels and exact quantities distinguish them without color.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, 31 October 2026, pp. 6–8 and 19–21. Source confidence qualifications are retained in the note below.In each burn transaction, the PDF describes a transfer to a Circle-labelled address, a burn event and a transfer to the zero address. Both message payloads contained matching destination words and the ASCII string “cctp-forward.” The report interprets the byte layout as consistent with a destination on Solana, but it did not obtain a decoder result or establish that the destination word matched the reported Solana address.Diagram 2. The report's same-chain transfer and burn sequence. Equal-width arrows show sequence and direction, not value or elapsed time. The onward cross-chain connection is not established; no continuous Avalanche-to-Ethereum route is asserted.Color key: slate marks the source outflow and forwarding; sage marks later burns. Color does not indicate verification.Address / role key: the graphic's P1 corresponds to A1, C1 to A2 and W1 to A3 in this article. B1 denotes burn operations through `0xfd78ee919681417d192449715b2594ab58f5d002`, with transfers to the zero address—not an attributed owner. Full A1–A3 addresses are in the appendix.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, pp. 4–7, 19–20 and 33. The earlier staging transaction must not be treated as downstream proceeds of the later drain.3. A separate Ethereum record, not a completed bridge traceFor A4 on 28 October, the PDF records six USDC mints totalling 1,021,502.948496 USDC, five transfers to a CowProtocol-labelled settlement contract, and eleven deposits totalling 432.2 ETH into four Tornado.Cash-labelled pools. The mint aggregate, the five settlement-leg amounts and the mixer aggregate are explicitly marked unverified for exhibit purposes in the report's limitations.The five settlement quantities are 100,005.0; 200,000.0; 300,000.0; 350,000.0; and 71,497.948496 USDC. The recorded ETH deposit pattern is four deposits of 100.0 ETH, three of 10.0 ETH, two of 1.0 ETH and two of 0.1 ETH. These figures describe the Ethereum address's recorded activity. They do not establish that all of it came from the Avalanche incident.The PDF makes three boundaries explicit:No established bridge completion. Solana activity was not read, and the Avalanche-to-Solana-to-Ethereum connection is not transaction-hash anchored.No reconciled provenance. The reported Ethereum mint total exceeds the Avalanche burn total by 8,127.936293 USDC. The source does not resolve the difference or attribute the entire Ethereum amount to this case.No identified common controller. No retrieved shared gas funder, common deployer or domain cluster establishes that A3 and A4 were controlled by the same party.The report describes CowProtocol settlement as non-custodial, despite the database's “Exchange” label. It does not report a custodial exchange deposit by a case wallet within the traced scope. Likewise, a Tornado.Cash label identifies the report's attributed destination; it does not identify a depositor or establish a current legal designation.4. Mechanism: three hypotheses, not a proven root causeThe source offers three explanations from attributed search-result snippets: a day-rollover settlement calculation, inflated tranche shares minted using flash-loan capital, and a permissionless “double-draw” caused by borrowing logic that failed to subtract unpaid matured principal. It attributes these respectively to SlowMist, Blockaid, and DeFiHackLabs/web3VE reporting. The source pages were not read by the investigation, and none of these hypotheses was verified against contract source code.SentinelTX treats the hypotheses as potentially complementary. The timing at 00:00:03 UTC and the earlier staging cycle are the observations behind that interpretation; they do not by themselves prove the contract defect. The PDF also preserves a date discrepancy: one cited snippet dates the drain to 27 October, while its recorded block timestamp places it just after midnight on 28 October.A separate timing problem matters more than the calendar label. One route in the report places a later hop at block 98731443 before the block 98731606 flow that supposedly feeds it. That ordering cannot establish the claimed causal path. The earlier staging activity should not be presented as proceeds of the later drain, and this article does not use that route to connect the two.5. Conclusion: a bounded record, with the missing connection still missingThe PDF records the Avalanche source-contract outflow, forwarding and two subsequent burns. It also records separate Ethereum mint, settlement and mixer activity. The unresolved link between them is central—not a minor footnote. The report does not establish the identity behind the addresses, the definitive root cause, activity at the reported Solana receiver, or common control across the Avalanche and Ethereum wallets.Its proposed next leads are issuer-side attestation and forwarding records, exchange withdrawal records for the initial funding, and a completed Solana record. Those are recommendations in the source, not actions completed for this article. No recovery or freeze outcome is claimed.Figure 3. What the report records and what it leaves unresolved. Its narrative conclusion and structured transfer rows carry conflicting confidence labels; this summary does not upgrade either into a clean end-to-end finding.Color key: slate distinguishes headings only; it is not a confidence or risk scale.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCFF1, pp. 19–20 and 33.6. Reference appendix and source qualificationsSelected transaction recordsReference: E1 — source outflow and forwarding — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x3f6b23292a2e9c2956c7ac56d0b1f79b0271b49edec2156d2675ddf1de058c77`; 2026-10-28T00:00:03Z; block 98731606. A1 → A2: 1,013,353.611686 USDC. A2 → A3: 1,013,353.611687 USDC. PDF pp. 4–7 and 20.Reference: E2 — first burn — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x0e974743161ddb166d5ad698b9a2b0c9ca2ddf5f569a532e6c5665ce2c92218b`; 2026-10-28T00:03:41Z; block 98731831; 250,000.175563 USDC. PDF pp. 6–7.Reference: E3 — second burn — PDF record: Avalanche transaction `0x51bb85e171585a2ec7ec7bd918cd6a08e916e38f79cf2a17b5e5211ee3b9f397`; 2026-10-28T00:05:22Z; block 98731940; 763,374.836640 USDC. PDF pp. 6–7.Address and role registerReference: A1 — Address and qualified role: `0xe25cb545bdd47a8ec2d08001cb5661b00d47621a` — Avalanche source contract; victim-TranchePool attribution is a reported lead.Reference: A2 — Address and qualified role: `0xf09dcf4ede2a88bd316ff355dfc333a281a57805` — Avalanche intermediate contract.Reference: A3 — Address and qualified role: `0x6ff1c3ffa622e1062168f3497a275be9cc2b1246` — Avalanche wallet receiving E1 forwarding and sending E2/E3.Reference: A4 — Address and qualified role: `0xdc3d7cc5383e0f1ac46d2c693aad1a19859a2deb` — separately examined Ethereum address; connection to this case remains partial/inferred.Reference: Reported Solana receiver — Address and qualified role: `C5L5EtcZmTKFc4D7Ntfqi7MtohnHVh4xZn93a5dBhB8` — not read; neither activity nor absence of activity is established.Source and limitations noteSource: the 36-page SentinelTX-generated PDF CASE-ASYNCFF1, generated 31 October 2026. This article adapts that report; it is not an independent on-chain audit. The PDF contains no external hyperlinks. No public PDF URL is supplied here.Confidence conflict: the routing table labels the E1 transfer rows “verified,” while the conclusion begins “unverified (auto-downgraded).” Those source labels are not silently reconciled. The report states that its integrity gate “downgraded 11 claims in the text and flagged 4 findings for review” (p. 4).Material route warning: “[INV-5] (report-wide) — Hop 0 (block 98,731,606) → Hop 2 (block 98,731,443) is time-inverted” and describes “a causally impossible path (the cash-out tx precedes the deposit tx)” (p. 33). The practical consequence is that this path cannot demonstrate that the earlier payment was funded by the later receipt.Amount qualifications: seven amounts are unverified for exhibit purposes: the 432.2 ETH aggregate, five CowProtocol legs and 1,021,502.948496 USDC mint aggregate (p. 18). The final warning appendix also flags 432.2286 ETH, 5.0 OVER and the conclusion's 1,021,502.948496 USDC as not bounded by a readable retained quantity (p. 33).Coverage: the narrative's examined window is 27–31 October, but Appendix A reports two 34-day query windows spanning 27 September–31 October and 138 timestamped retained movement rows from 27 October 22:42:23 to 30 October 22:52:47 UTC. Appendix A both lists timestamped bounds and says exact bounds were not retained; it does not establish that the requested cutoff was enforced. The article does not claim exhaustive period coverage.Other boundaries: two Solana reads failed; four Avalanche bridge-correlation attempts were unresolved, not negative; Avalanche internal traces were unavailable; the staging transaction lacked returned receipt logs; external reporting was available only as attributed snippets. Graph-wide totals include unrelated flows and are not incident loss. A successful PDF export or signed manifest does not remove these source limitations.

On 29 October 2026, a Binance-labelled Ethereum account was associated with a delegation transaction, followed by a large transfer of ETH and tokens to one receiver. A later transaction sent USDC from a different asset-holding account to that same receiver. The important question is how signing authority reached more than one pool of assets—and what the transaction records can actually prove.This investigation follows that narrow Ethereum route: an operator calls a delegated account; assets converge at a receiver; the receiver splits USDT into two branches, and one branch makes a further transfer. A further USDT source also sends directly to the receiver with its own transaction sender, which is a separate signing path. The account labels describe explorer annotations. They do not independently establish custody, a person’s identity or the signing system that produced the authorization.Scope and evidenceThe selected transaction records below, excluding the explicitly attributed internal call path, are direct browser observations of Etherscan overview pages and receipt logs. SentinelTX adds a bounded trace and hypotheses; statements by Binance and an external analyst remain attributed statements. “Direct” here means the explorer record was read, not that a separate Ethereum node independently reproduced it.MeasureVerified scopeNetworkEthereum mainnet onlyFirst selected event29 October 2026, 20:20:59 UTC; block 26300753Last selected direct transfer29 October 2026, 21:52:47 UTC; block 26301210USDT seed amount1,615,409,498.973240 USDT; log 519Separate USDC transfer780,000,000.000000 USDC; log 685SentinelTX historical token readBlock 26301950; 30 October 2026, 00:21:23 UTCIndependent explorer review30 October 2026; official follow-up read 31 October. This is a historical transaction selection, not a live balance or restriction audit.ExcludedAll-chain valuation, full incident loss, complete onward balances and victim returnsUSDT and USDC are dollar-linked tokens, while ETH is the network’s native asset. Token quantities are preserved separately. These quantities are movements in different assets, not a dollar-loss total. The 500M, 200M and 175M transfers below are later movements of USDT; adding them to the seed amount would count funds again. No balance is inferred by subtracting this selected list from an inflow.The three findings that survive cross-checkingFirst, the explorer records a delegation before the sweep, but the evidence does not explain how its authorization signature was obtained. Second, the large USDC transfer starts from a different asset account, so the transaction caller and the asset sender must be kept separate. Third, USDT branches are directly visible, while a wBETH token-contract call is not proof of a custodial exchange deposit. The sections below explain each finding in time order.Before the sweep: what changed at the account?An Ethereum externally owned account normally authorizes actions with a signature. EIP-7702 allows such an account to delegate execution to code. That makes a signature about execution authority different from an ordinary payment: later calls can run the delegated code in the account’s context. This is the relevant mechanism described by the official EIP-7702 specification; it does not by itself establish this incident’s root cause.At 20:20:59 UTC, the authorization transaction succeeded. The saved explorer table displays 50 authorization rows, of which one is marked True and 49 False. A nonce is an account sequence number used to prevent an authorization from being reused. The True row has nonce 18914809 and names the delegate in the appendix. These are explorer observations; signer recovery, chain-ID validation and historical account-code reconstruction have not been independently reproduced in this report.The delegate’s current code page shows unverified runtime bytecode containing the operator address, and a creation link naming that operator. A matching byte sequence is not a complete control-flow audit or a historical proof. The analyst’s original thread describes an operator restriction and a rejection test, but those tests were not independently rerun. Key theft, signing-service misuse and a malicious authorization request remain alternative explanations, not findings.Three minutes later: which assets actually moved?At 20:24:23 UTC, the selected sweep transaction shows a successful outer call from the operator to the delegated account with zero ETH in the outer transaction’s value field. This does not mean no ETH moved: the explorer separately displays an internal transfer of 167,464.247856558836135296 ETH from that account to the receiver. The USDT receipt log records the same source and destination, with raw value 1615409498973240 and six token decimals.The transaction overview counts 63 ERC-20 transfers. This report does not present an independently decoded 63-token inventory. A reverted child-call warning is also visible alongside outer success. SentinelTX reports a failed token-transfer frame inside a larger call tree; that supports checking individual subcalls rather than treating the entire sweep as reverted.A different transaction sender appears 24 seconds laterAt 20:24:47 UTC, another transaction sends 55,739,800.500000 USDT from a Binance 16-labelled address to the same receiver. The outer transaction’s From address is this asset sender itself, and its call target is canonical USDT. Receipt log 37 contains raw value 55739800500000. This is a direct token call, unlike the earlier operator calling the delegated account.The shared receiver links the movement, but does not explain the signature. This record prevents an overly simple claim that every selected inflow came through one delegated-account execution path. It does not establish that a second key was stolen: an operational transfer, a misused signing service and other signing circumstances remain unresolved.After receipt: the USDT splitThe receiver sent 500,000,000 USDT at 20:30:11 UTC and 200,000,000 USDT at 20:33:23 UTC to two different addresses. Both canonical USDT Transfer logs were read directly. Following Branch A forward for one selected movement, it later sent 175,000,000 USDT to a third address at 20:59:11 UTC. This is one selected onward transfer within two transfers from the central receiver, not a complete account history.UTC, 29 OctoberMovementEvidence20:30:11Receiver → Branch A; 500,000,000 USDTTransfer log 70020:33:23Receiver → Branch B; 200,000,000 USDTTransfer log 91620:59:11Branch A → next recipient; 175,000,000 USDTTransfer log 389Begin Figure 1 at the central receiver. The arrows show token transfers; the separate continuation from Branch A shows only the selected 175M movement. They do not show a sale, a freeze or an exchange deposit.Figure 1. The 175M movement is part of the earlier 500M branch. It is not an additional incident inflow.The split is consistent with dispersal, but round amounts do not prove a laundering intent or common control of recipients. Etherscan’s editorial Insight points to a third-party tracker describing later freezes and OTC activity. Those descriptions were not adopted as verified conclusions: a transfer alone cannot identify the consideration received, the counterparty or the legal status of funds.Later, a separate USDC account reaches the same receiverReturning to the other source account at 20:41:23 UTC, after the two initial USDT branches, the separate USDC transaction records 780,000,000 USDC reaching the same receiver, but from a different asset-holding address. Figure 2 selects the main delegated source and the separate USDC source for comparison; the direct-signed USDT movement described earlier is not drawn. Read from the two source cards toward the central receiver. Solid arrows represent the selected observed asset movements, not account ownership or signing permissions.Figure 2. Two independently checked sources converge on one receiver. ETH is rounded in this figure; exact quantities, accounts and hashes are preserved in the evidence appendix.The independent receipt confirms the USDC asset source and amount. A function selector is the first four bytes of a contract instruction; it is not a verified function name. The final SentinelTX response additionally returns a seven-frame execution path for this exact transaction. A CALL asks another account to execute; a DELEGATECALL runs implementation code while retaining the calling account’s context. That distinction explains why an implementation address is not another recipient of the 780M USDC.Stage in returned traceObserved call / evidence limitOperator → delegated accountRoot selector 0x043ff9d2Delegated account → separate USDC walletCALL; selector 0xb61d27f6USDC wallet → wallet implementationDELEGATECALL; same selector 0xb61d27f6Wallet execution → USDCFailed 0x01ffc9a7 interface probe, followed by 0xa9059cbb transfer through the USDC implementationThe trace comes from SentinelTX and was not independently re-executed. Its source, destination and transfer quantity match the independently read USDC receipt; that corroborates the movement, not every execution frame. Function names for the two wallet selectors, owner/executor storage and historical privilege assignments remain unknown. It would be premature to call the delegated account the wallet’s owner, or to infer an allowance exploit from the transfer alone.Why the wBETH leg is not an exchange-deposit findingAt 21:52:47 UTC, the wBETH transaction calls the wBETH token contract. Its receipt log transfers 29,934.013163146020067927 wBETH from the receiver to a separate recipient. The called contract and the asset recipient are different addresses. Treating the token contract’s Binance association as a deposit destination would misclassify the movement.SentinelTX’s narrative corrects an earlier exchange-deposit classification; the independent receipt-log check supports that correction. No custodial exchange deposit has been established in the selected verified paths. That is a coverage-limited conclusion, not evidence that no such deposit occurred elsewhere. DEX interactions returned by the wider trace are also distinct from custodial deposits and do not establish fiat cash-out.Frozen, recovered and returned are different statesIn its statement published on 29 October at 23:22 UTC (30 October, 08:22 KST), Binance says its verified frozen total is USD2.54B and that an older USD1.8B figure is outdated. This is a historical company aggregate, not the latest total. It has not been reconstructed here from issuer event logs, asset quantities and a common valuation time.In Security Incident Update #2, dated 30 October, read on 31 October, Binance reported approximately USD3B frozen on-chain. It also said it had identified additional breach points and had found no evidence at that stage that wallet private keys had leaked. These are company statements, not conclusions from this report’s selected Ethereum transactions. They neither establish how the observed authorizations were obtained nor turn a freeze into a verified return of assets.A blacklist restriction can prevent movement of a token at an address. It does not itself prove that the assets were transferred to a recovery custodian or returned to users. The initial SentinelTX issuer-event queries failed. The final follow-up response lists prior-session blacklist events, but omits re-anchored transaction hashes and says current blacklist state was not read. It also reports only 15 of 55 Blacklisted-topic rows displayed. This incomplete list is retained as a lead, not a verified issuer inventory. Authorization signer recovery and USDC owner/executor privileges also remain unresolved. No zero-event or “not frozen” conclusion is drawn from a failed query.Connections, alternatives and response pointsThe strongest links are the exact asset sender, recipient and Transfer log in each selected transaction. The same operator and called account provide additional execution context. Explorer tags, shared timing, similar amounts and token-contract branding provide weaker context and are not beneficial-ownership proofs.QuestionEvidence needed / bounded actionWhat authorized execution?Recover and validate the authorization tuples; preserve signing-policy and signer audit records. A valid signature does not identify how it was obtained.Why did another wallet send USDC?Returned call path is available from SentinelTX; verify wallet rules and historical owner/executor storage before claiming an owner role or allowance.Can the stablecoins move?Read address-specific issuer events and state at explicit blocks; separate event time from a later status snapshot.Where did ETH go?The selected receiver inflow does not establish the onward ETH path or an exchange endpoint.What can be called recovered?Require a verified recovery transfer and custody/return evidence; do not equate freeze with restitution.These are evidence-preservation and verification priorities, not proof of a person’s responsibility. No issuer, exchange or law-enforcement message has been sent as part of this investigation.Coverage and remaining uncertaintyThe original SentinelTX trace reports 525 transactions and 52 addresses. Its live graph displays 71 nodes, which is a different representation and not a verified count of recipients. One displayed call tree contains 191 of 192 frames; 17 label queries and two address-history reads were incomplete. Only selected transactions were independently cross-checked for this report. A later continuation reports 23 incompletely read addresses; that belongs to the follow-up’s different coverage and is not merged with the initial graph counts.The original report also contains different temporal boundaries: a query window from 29 September to 30 October 00:19:56.232761 UTC, a snapshot header through block 26301901, selected displayed routing rows through block 26301699, and a later token read at block 26301950. Those records are preserved separately. They cannot be presented as one exhaustive incident cutoff.Bitcoin, TRON, full all-chain valuation, all 63 token transfers, complete receiver balances, onward ETH movements, final incident loss and user restitution are outside the independently verified scope. The observed 204-second interval between authorization and sweep is not the full attack duration. The evidence establishes a narrow sequence of authority-related activity and asset movements; it does not yet establish the signature’s origin or the final recovery outcome.Evidence appendix: accountsRole on EthereumFull addressOuter transaction operator / sponsor0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0Delegated account; selected ETH and USDT sender0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60Central receiver0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8cExplorer-reported delegation target; current bytecode page read0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAeSeparate 780M USDC asset sender0xEe7aE85f2Fe2239E27D9c1E23fFFe168D63b4055Branch A0x9749292D74Fd460982d0912eA9515EA24736C762Branch B0x0Ddf0480016e6bCb2C1F5d190D221FBA1320697eSelected next recipient from Branch A0x811f15855476156Ebf86ba3b84faFb8Ceaa4e84CCalled token contract; not deposit recipient0xa2E3356610840701BDf5611a53974510Ae27E2e1Actual wBETH Transfer recipient0x7f9DC988B46336aD536828fAD50fa8fA1E5415E3Direct USDT transaction sender; explorer label Binance 160xDFd5293D8e347dFe59E90eFd55b2956a1343963dWallet implementation in SentinelTX-returned USDC trace; not an asset recipient0xd206ac7fef53d83ed4563e770b28dba90d0d9ec8USDC implementation in returned trace; not an asset recipient0x43506849d7c04f9138d1a2050bbf3a0c054402ddUSDT token contract; six decimals0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7USDC token contract; six decimals0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48Evidence appendix: transaction anchorsRecord / UTC on 29 OctoberFull transaction hashDelegate creation referenceExplorer creator link; event time not separately recorded in this review0x97408e7562eb2b28efcd24ba01609607b5749bc89448d007fa8b50ecf290329cAuthorizationBlock 2630075320:20:59 UTCExplorer authorization table; no independent signer recovery0xad99264d5532ae0dd04b2004eebda05f25657e70dacb764f7ac8d4ccd051298bDirect-signed USDTBlock 2630077220:24:47 UTCUSDT log 370xd4e08d3ef0cb02a75922913c61984fbf7fe4bbc4b95324735ef27f908fd6c49cSeed sweepBlock 2630077020:24:23 UTCUSDT log 519; internal ETH displayed separately0x53bd38b816c23e74134786c29a8c18d792777998a3b9326047b583100e88e2f3Separate USDCBlock 2630085520:41:23 UTCUSDC log 6850xdc102dd89dded5a83f1008906883ffb7c81ff3b7d7965d8c7277d170b5e17481F08Block 2630079920:30:11 UTCUSDT log 7000x68d7d69deaeb9750c38020b4f8d3728146ca8d2267eba1e38cf9b56722ad659aF09Block 2630081520:33:23 UTCUSDT log 9160x1fc0ef33a767132edad434834a5555b30fcb5a171206c03b86175ef6dafac81cF10Block 2630121021:52:47 UTCwBETH log 4860xc19a2dcc7508e45f2743558cebefa50140fe68d9450ab18d14fd34039eb4bce2F11Block 2630094220:59:11 UTCUSDT log 3890x1fb992f92a45afec23d7d5740c7958a644fb90ef0cba19ca39bd2c6534fb670bEvidence appendix: exact token quantitiesAnchor / assetRaw value → normalized unitsDirect-signed USDT55739800500000 ÷ 10⁶ = 55,739,800.500000Seed / USDT1615409498973240 ÷ 10⁶ = 1,615,409,498.973240Separate source / USDC780000000000000 ÷ 10⁶ = 780,000,000.000000F08 / USDT500000000000000 ÷ 10^6 = 500000000F09 / USDT200000000000000 ÷ 10^6 = 200000000F10 / wBETH29934013163146020067927 ÷ 10^18 = 29934.013163146020067927F11 / USDT175000000000000 ÷ 10^6 = 175000000

SentinelTX’s examination of the zkLink Nova withdrawal incident follows one Ethereum signer from preparation to a single transaction that paid ETH and eleven token types, then through conversions and dispersal to three recipient accounts. The execution sequence is visible in the report, but the forged-root explanation, wallet controllers and incident-attributable share of later holdings are not established.The report also contains conflicting confidence labels and material amount warnings. This article preserves those qualifications: the observed DAI balances are not presented as traced cash-out, and the FixedFloat-labelled destination remains an unverified lead rather than a confirmed exit.1. Scope and roles before the numbersThe seed account is the wallet at the centre of the examined withdrawal, not an identified person. Contract roles below distinguish what the call trace shows from identities or functions supplied by public reporting.Label / RecordNetwork and collection: Ethereum mainnet (chain ID 1) only. Collection: 29 October 2026, approximately 13:24–13:31 UTC; chain tip moved from block 26298676 to 26298706. Other chains were not screened.Seed account: 0xaca0655a11200a80d33d0e48786317304cde5718. An externally owned account (EOA): signer of the examined transaction, withdrawal recipient and disperser. Its real-world identity is unknown.Execution contract: 0xd5f162b68a0281686e8dc76db8d67d2f3e6aff07. Created by the seed account and called in the examined transaction.Payout contracts: 0x5fd9f73286b7e8683bab45019c94553b93e015cf paid ETH and was consulted before token transfers; its core/escrow role is an inference. 0xad16edcf7deb7e90096a259c81269d811544b6b6 supplied eleven token types; its zkLink Nova ERC20 bridge identity is reported, not label-verified.Recipient shorthand: 0x211b…9c6a = 0x211b4aebefea02470587286b398ed28fb7e09c6a; 0x75dc…c0f3 = 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3; 0x2d5a…afb0 = 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0. Similar behaviour does not establish common control.Meaning of an amount: A receipt or transfer is a movement; a balance is a snapshot. Gross movement counts value again at each hop. None is automatically the incident loss, a cash-out total or a recoverable amount. Unlike assets are not added together.Public reporting collected by SentinelTX described a forged batch root injected through a public relayer and attributed detection to Blockaid. The report records estimates from USD 778,625 to about USD 786k; the USD 805k upper bound in the referral did not appear in its search results. These are reported estimates, not a loss calculated by the investigation. Only search snippets were read, not publisher pages, Blockaid’s primary publication or the Defimon Telegram channel.2. From preparation to the withdrawalAll event times below are UTC block timestamps. The report describes a short wallet lifecycle on 28 October 2026:15:49:11, block 26292232: the seed received a reported 0.02723853 ETH from a database-labelled FixedFloat address. The funding hash is not cited in the narrative, and the amount is unverified.15:59:59–17:49:11: preparation included a reported 0.00045-ETH swap for 1.045988 USDC, a zero-value USDC call, a reported deposit of 0.00032933333342 ETH plus 1.0 USDC to the ERC20 bridge, and a reported 0.0021-ETH payment to a contract later seen in the call path. The preparation amounts carry the report’s unverified-amount qualification.18:51:11, block 26293139: the seed created its execution contract at nonce 4.22:21:35, block 26294188: the seed called that contract in position 0 of the block. The transaction succeeded, carried zero native value, used 1,109,471 gas and paid a fee of 0.001161701384313756 ETH. The report records an internal payment of 22.431294525563808989 ETH to the seed plus eleven token types. [E01]The seed then sent itself a zero-value transaction at position 1 of the same block. The narrative gives its fee as about 1 ETH, an unverified amount. A builder-priority-payment interpretation is the report’s assessment, not established intent.The main conclusion treats the withdrawal as block-anchored because its hash is not cited in that section’s prose. Appendix A does list the full seed-transaction hash; it is retained in the evidence register below. That additional reference does not establish whether the withdrawals were authorised.3. What the execution sequence actually showsThe call trace has 100 frames, a maximum depth of 9 and no revert. The seed’s contract first read the ETH-paying contract, then made two relay-path calls through several contracts. Those calls reached the ETH-paying contract before the payout. Next came the ETH payment and eleven calls to the ERC20 bridge. Each token call consulted the ETH-paying contract before ending in a token transfer. [E01]Diagram 1. Simplified execution order within the seed transaction. Solid arrows indicate sequence, not a separately proven funds route. A forged batch root, bypassed checks and a public-relayer identity are not established.Color and line key: slate marks observed execution stages; amber marks claims not established by the record. Solid arrows indicate execution order.Address/role key: seed = 0xaca0655a11200a80d33d0e48786317304cde5718; execution contract = 0xd5f162b68a0281686e8dc76db8d67d2f3e6aff07; ETH-paying contract = 0x5fd9f73286b7e8683bab45019c94553b93e015cf; ERC20 payout contract = 0xad16edcf7deb7e90096a259c81269d811544b6b6. The role of 0x0fdc28e64772a70109d10fd068f859cfa7dea2c6 as a public relayer remains reported, not established.Source: SentinelTX native PDF, CASE-ASYNCEA1, pp. 14–15; seed control record on p. 35.This ordering has the shape of a message or root submission followed by withdrawal finalisation, which is the report’s inference. No selector, event log or calldata was ABI-decoded. The trace therefore does not establish that a root was submitted, that it was forged, or which validation checks were bypassed. No owner-signature execTransaction calls were present; the seed account, not the bridge or protocol, signed the transaction.4. Token receipts and the conversion sequenceThe receipt table records the following eleven token types. Quantities are reproduced at the table’s precision, without adding unlike assets or turning them into a new USD total:pufETH: 245.73789885106106. The two described conversion legs were 132.0 pufETH to the null address with 141.9532103998426 WETH received, then 113.73789885106108 pufETH to a counterparty contract with 123.264115827052162383 ETH returned. Both pufETH leg quantities are flagged unverified. [E02] [E03]USDC: 18,113.448053 received. The later conversion sent 18,113.494041 USDC and returned 18,109.0636110923 DAI. The report explains the larger outgoing USDC amount as the receipt plus 1.045988 USDC bought during preparation, less the 1.0 USDC deposit. [E04]WBTC: 0.17360197 received, followed by a conversion returning 14,048.682073834 DAI. [E05]Renzo Restaked ETH: 12.569253862270157, forwarded to 0x211b…9c6a at 22:55:35. Its subsequent conversion is possible but unverified.rsETH: 6.86647159999; STONE: 6.299750644063014; USDT: 3,360.898152; rswETH: 0.500000001; wstETH: 0.4659585510407948. The report lists sales through MetaMask Swap between 22:42:35 and 22:44:47, but does not itemise their proceeds.mswETH: 2.4826191990067406; mstETH: 2.6372057700999996. These were not moved in the report’s account and remained at the seed at collection.There is a source inconsistency in the pufETH receipt section: its table gives 245.73789885106106 pufETH, while the opening sentence separately describes an unverified receipt attributed as 132.0 pufETH. Both statements remain in the PDF; this article does not substitute the smaller figure for the table total or silently reconcile them.The USDC and WBTC conversions are described as producing 32,157.7456849263 DAI. The seed forwarded a reported 32,157.745684926304 DAI to 0x75dc…c0f3 at 23:03:59; that forwarding amount is flagged unverified. A 22:57:35 WETH-contract call is consistent with an unwrap by its selector, but its amount is not established. Two further zero-value pufETH calls were not decoded.5. Three recipients, with amount and control limitsThe chronology labels three native-ETH dispersals as signer-verified. The conclusion and warning appendix nevertheless mark their quantities unverified. The entries below therefore retain the report’s numbers as qualified source figures, not independently confirmed amounts:22:58:35, block 26294373: 101 ETH to 0x211b…9c6a; amount unverified in the conclusion. [E06]23:00:11, block 26294381: 100 ETH to 0x2d5a…afb0; amount unverified in the conclusion. [E07]23:01:23, block 26294387: 102.061003174173709298 ETH to 0x75dc…c0f3; amount unverified in the conclusion. [E08]The narrative’s gross total is 303.061003174173709298 ETH, subject to the same component-amount qualifications. The recipients then converted ETH into DAI through MetaMask Swap and Uniswap during the first hour of 29 October. Several swaps lack cited hashes or established inputs. Similar timing and sizes support the report’s description of splitting, but do not identify controllers or prove structuring intent; slippage management is an alternative explanation given in the PDF.At 0x75dc…c0f3, the report describes roughly 270,847.79 DAI of inflows and 49,000 DAI leaving: a flagged 24,000-DAI MetaMask movement plus an unresolved approximately 25,000-DAI candidate leg. At 0x2d5a…afb0, the narrative includes an unverified 5,000-DAI transfer and two MetaMask movements of 4,895 DAI and 11,750 DAI. The approximately 25,000-DAI and 5,000-DAI onward legs remain unresolved in its conclusion. [E11] [E12]6. What the recipient balances meanThe report’s balance snapshot is separate from its flow tracing. It records the following holdings at collection; no incident-attributable share was computed, and control of the three recipients is not established.Holder / Observed balance and measurement0x211b…9c6a: 268,344.091493 DAI; 0.012780831346009828 native ETH.0x75dc…c0f3: 221,847.790589 DAI; 0.304521672474179225 native ETH.0x2d5a…afb0: 211,962.663173 DAI; 0.293706861952877501 native ETH.Same-asset totals: 702,154.545255 DAI; separately, 0.611009365773066554 ETH. These are observed balances; no case-attributable share was computed and address control is not established.Seed account: 0.000927 ETH at approximately 13:26 UTC; 2.482619 mswETH and 2.637206 mstETH. These are the PDF’s displayed balance figures, not the higher-precision receipt quantities.Measurement boundary: DAI contract: 0x6b175474e89094c44da98b954eedeac495271d0f. DAI read at approximately 13:30 UTC on 29 October 2026; token-balance block not recorded. The three recipient ETH balances are at block 26298706. Source: PDF pp. 10, 21–22.Figure 2. Observed DAI balances read at approximately 13:30 UTC on 29 October 2026. The token-balance block was not recorded. These balances are not traced proceeds, attributed cash-out or an established recoverable amount.Color key: slate bars show DAI quantities on a common linear zero baseline. Labels preserve the exact reported balance values.Address/role key: 0x211b…9c6a = 0x211b4aebefea02470587286b398ed28fb7e09c6a; 0x75dc…c0f3 = 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3; 0x2d5a…afb0 = 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0. Recipient control is not established.Source: SentinelTX native PDF, pp. 10, 21–22 and 37. The PDF flags the aggregate 702,154.545255 DAI against a structured traced ceiling of approximately 270.8K DAI; it also explicitly describes the larger number as a commingled destination balance, not attributed cash-out.The warning and the balance description coexist in the source. The larger balance must not be converted into a claim that all 702,154.545255 DAI was traced from this withdrawal. Nor does the smaller approximately 270.8K DAI ceiling establish a recoverable balance, a total incident loss or the status of the separate ETH exchange lead.7. The FixedFloat-labelled lead is not a confirmed exitThe report describes a path from 0x75dc…c0f3 through 0x05b38c2d3c66031d72c990753f464271a7fd6def to 0x4e5b2e1dc63f6b91cb6cd759936495434c7e972f, which its attribution database labels FixedFloat. It gives the two legs as 5 ETH and 4.99999664 ETH, respectively; both amounts carry unverified-quantity qualifications. The second transaction is placed at 01:58:59 UTC on 29 October, block 26295266. [E09] [E10]The PDF’s confidence wording is inconsistent. The executive summary calls this path “anchored end to end,” and a table prints a deposit transaction hash. The cash-out confidence paragraph nevertheless calls the destination an “Unverified lead,” says no inbound hash anchors it, and states that the path cannot be confirmed. The warning appendix repeats that downgrade. This article retains the unverified-lead status and discloses the stronger wording rather than choosing one statement as a repair.Exchange identity is label-based, not a finding about a person. The report also says the incident-derived fraction was not computed because the native-ETH account implies other inflows. The same labelled address reportedly funded the seed earlier; that earlier payment was a withdrawal from the venue, not a deposit. No other exchange-deposit leg was identified, and Uniswap or MetaMask interactions are on-chain swaps, not custodial deposits.8. Mimic records and the remaining evidence gapsThe report excluded four apparent ETH movements after checking their full transaction records. Each was signed by a third party, 0x80d04079ffc53eb14edbeeb37279d126f45552df, carried zero native value and called a third-party contract, while the transfer listing mimicked a case transfer. Other exclusions include token-symbol mimics “ЕТН”, “DAl.” and “ERC ”, look-alike recipient addresses, unsolicited OVER receipts and small apparent ETH receipts that were not signer-verified.That distinction matters because a similar-looking address or symbol does not identify the genuine asset or recipient. The report set aside a DAI branch attributed to a look-alike address. Whether the candidate 5,000-DAI movement was intentional or a poisoning-induced mis-send remains unresolved. [E12]The report’s remaining boundaries are specific:Mechanism and coverage: one withdrawal transaction and one signer were examined. Other bridge withdrawals on 28–29 October were not screened. No cross-chain bridge deposit was identified among observed reachable deposits; this was not a screen of every chain.Trace depth and attribution: onward tracing reached four of five planned steps; 13 of 41 traced transactions are itemised in the retained view described by the narrative; 11 counterparties have no attribution result. The seed’s internal-transaction history was only partly readable. The deterministic cash-out propagation did not complete and was not relied on.Amounts and onward movement: unresolved items include the approximately 25,000-DAI and 5,000-DAI legs, the Renzo Restaked ETH disposition, the ETH inputs to 0x211b…9c6a’s swaps, the seed’s MetaMask proceeds and the WETH unwrap amount. The narrative also describes unexplained native-ETH inflows; these are not assigned to the incident.Measurement and valuation: token balances lack a recorded block. The report’s broader movement inventory includes repeated hops and unidentified token symbols, so it is not a loss total. Its pricing appendix says 53 movements have a USD value, with no price source recorded for 24; six symbols could not be priced.9. Response priorities and conclusionThe report prioritises preservation of the relevant FixedFloat order records, monitoring of the recipient and lead addresses, decoded protocol events and confirmation of contract roles. It also proposes asking the mswETH and mstETH operators whether the residual seed balances can be blocked or recovered; that capability was not verified. These are the report’s proposed actions, not actions taken for this article.Its expert opinion is that the sequence matches a bridge proof or message-forgery exploit with rapid conversion and splitting. The supporting record remains narrower: one examined Ethereum withdrawal, later movements with amount qualifications, observed DAI holdings without established control, and a disputed exchange-destination confidence label. The report’s recovery discussion depends on negotiation, legal identification or later movement to a custodial venue, not on treating the balance snapshot as secured funds.Figure 3. The report’s recorded execution and material limits. The forged-root mechanism and wallet controllers remain unestablished; some transfer quantities are unverified. Observed balances are not attributed cash-out, and other bridge withdrawals were not screened.Color key: slate identifies recorded execution; amber identifies unestablished claims; sage identifies amount and scope limits. The meaning is also stated in text.Source: SentinelTX native PDF, pp. 11, 14–15, 20–23 and 37–38. Its FixedFloat confidence text treats the destination as an unverified lead despite stronger wording elsewhere; that contradiction is preserved above.10. Evidence appendix and source limitations10.1 Selected transaction registerThe evidence IDs in the article link to transaction pages built from hashes printed in the PDF. These links are navigation aids, not a claim of a fresh explorer check. The register states the use, UTC time, block, quantity and source qualification for each selected record. It is not an exhaustive ledger.Evidence ID and use / PDF record and limitationE01 — Seed execution: 28 October 2026, 22:21:35 UTC; block 26294188. Zero native transaction value; the narrative records an internal payout of 22.431294525563808989 ETH and eleven token types. Status: successful control transaction in Appendix A; the main conclusion calls the withdrawal block-anchored. Mechanism and authorisation remain unestablished. PDF pp. 4, 14–15, 21, 35. Full transaction: 0x4f3c23e75b9134e8cae5a462550daad42fbbc19242567fcc34c0a035e297462cE02 — First pufETH leg: 28 October 2026, 22:24:35 UTC; block 26294203. Narrative: 132.0 pufETH to the null address and 141.9532103998426 WETH received. Status: pufETH quantity flagged unverified; the routing table separately prints a verified row. PDF pp. 7, 27, 37. Full transaction: 0xc6918af5df66ff7b632216bd0d01389a888d8c28d83c2572858f85bde4b573b3E03 — Second pufETH leg: 28 October 2026, 22:28:47 UTC; block 26294224. Narrative: 113.73789885106108 pufETH to the counterparty contract; 123.264115827052162383 ETH returned. Status: pufETH quantity flagged unverified. PDF pp. 7, 28, 37. Full transaction: 0x123bd9627d3c06f73498bd466100a62d4f7db76783ef9cd5ce5906a1e4fe4460E04 — USDC conversion: 28 October 2026, 22:30:47 UTC; block 26294234. Narrative: 18,113.494041 USDC sent and 18,109.0636110923 DAI returned. Status: conversion listed; the article uses narrative precision, without substituting the routing table’s additional digits. PDF pp. 7, 25. Full transaction: 0x2ddf70327a009c55960dd4d68fe308df772ef2816ca91215b25546f5c9d306f3E05 — WBTC conversion: 28 October 2026, 22:33:59 UTC; block 26294250. Narrative: 0.17360197 WBTC sent and 14,048.682073834 DAI returned. Status: conversion listed. PDF pp. 7, 25. Full transaction: 0x58bbdeebc886bfab35fa83366905fdf8c370c9ba1f9ff2dc4c39f7991c8cb239E06 — First native dispersal: 28 October 2026, 22:58:35 UTC; block 26294373. Narrative: 101 ETH to 0x211b4aebefea02470587286b398ed28fb7e09c6a. Status: signer-verified in the chronology, amount unverified in the conclusion and warning list. PDF pp. 8, 20, 28, 38. Full transaction: 0x2522281fbc77a612193e78e27f8cddd8147c605759216b67ce40320b9c8ff56eE07 — Second native dispersal: 28 October 2026, 23:00:11 UTC; block 26294381. Narrative: 100 ETH to 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0. Status: signer-verified in the chronology, amount unverified in the conclusion and warning list. PDF pp. 8, 20, 28, 38. Full transaction: 0x5696e2178bf680110d927d9bf71bdf05fcc22a282ad8a15bbdb938e5f852de44E08 — Third native dispersal: 28 October 2026, 23:01:23 UTC; block 26294387. Narrative: 102.061003174173709298 ETH to 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3. Status: signer-verified in the chronology, amount unverified in the conclusion and warning list. PDF pp. 8, 20, 29, 38. Full transaction: 0x04c207b1b0e181fa3aa6eb5f2ee35cdd629db5d706a555ac8e0e2a26c0b0e3bcE09 — Pass-through leg: 29 October 2026, 01:57:35 UTC; block 26295259. Narrative: 5 ETH from 0x75dc…c0f3 to 0x05b38c2d3c66031d72c990753f464271a7fd6def. Status: amount unverified in the conclusion; the routing table separately prints a verified row. PDF pp. 9, 20, 30, 38. Full transaction: 0x8b6d9b0a7696857ae7b956e458a1999891dcd3f73236fc7d9a10703468fbe8c1E10 — FixedFloat-labelled destination: 29 October 2026, 01:58:59 UTC; block 26295266. Narrative: 4.99999664 ETH to 0x4e5b2e1dc63f6b91cb6cd759936495434c7e972f. Status: destination called an unverified lead in the confidence text; amount unverified; label-based exchange identity and partial case attribution. Stronger wording and verified table rows elsewhere conflict with these qualifications. PDF pp. 4, 11–12, 19–20, 24–25, 37–38. Full transaction: 0x0268cf861201bbec96285c54cf25d66d058100a4ebd81021eeab2747dbe0127cE11 — Candidate onward DAI leg: 29 October 2026, 02:08:35 UTC; block 26295314. Narrative candidate: 24,999.999999999996 DAI to 0xdf410542aa35dab5e1ff3f46fcbd671d5e243977. Status: unverified lead; onward movement not established, despite a verified 25,000.0 DAI row in the routing table. PDF pp. 9, 21–22, 30, 36–37. Full transaction: 0x7c6955ba4e2a9e954966975a3d63187784a75c092a7013de447260e6e1c9d3ffE12 — Candidate 5,000-DAI leg: 29 October 2026, 01:32:35 UTC; block 26295135. Narrative: an unverified amount attributed as 5,000 DAI to 0x791a1cff9f9431ef98ca25c2e31ecb92a8ac2f25. Status: unresolved in the narrative; the hash appears in the routing and control records. Whether this was intended or a poisoning-induced mis-send is unresolved. PDF pp. 10, 16–17, 22, 31, 36. Full transaction: 0x8f0796105a30c02fffe21ae8410217dbc385d653578ef2fa3445073356eec3e010.2 Source and method registerPrimary source: SentinelTX’s 41-page native investigation report, CASE-ASYNCEA1, dated 29 October 2026. Its document-integrity block prints generation time 2026-10-29T13:53:18Z. Use: source for this article’s findings, figures and evidence references. Limitation: the PDF retains its own warnings and conflicting confidence statements. The executive summary also carries the separate case reference CASE-20261029-0001; neither identifier has been silently substituted for the other.Narrative and exhibits, pp. 3–23: used for chronology, call sequence, balances, exclusions, assessments and recommendations. Limitation: reported public accounts, inferred roles and qualified amounts remain distinct from established execution facts. The pufETH receipt wording and FixedFloat confidence wording are internally inconsistent, as described above.Path Routing Evidence, pp. 23–32: used to retain transaction references and their printed fields. Limitation: some rows are marked “verified” and show readable transfer amounts even where the narrative or warning appendix calls those quantities unverified. These conflicting labels are not resolved by this adaptation; no replacement totals or attribution shares were computed.Methodology, pp. 33–36: one recorded 90-day query window, 31 July–29 October 2026. The 217 retained rows with readable timestamps span 28 October 15:49:11 to 29 October 07:35:59 UTC; three retained rows have no readable timestamp. A query window is not the evidenced event span. Provider-wide account lists and the rows followed by a trace are different populations; they are not interchangeable funding or balance totals.Control records, pp. 34–36: used for the creation and call references, including [E01]. Limitation: a selector and successful status do not alone establish storage changes, contract control, actor intent, a loss or cash conversion.Warnings and integrity record, pp. 36–39: the report records one downgraded claim and 19 findings flagged for review, then lists one INV-12 entry and eighteen INV-13 entries. A signed manifest identifies the compiled source; it does not remove the substantive qualifications. Exact material warning wording is retained below.10.3 Exact source warningsThe following is the report’s own warning record, with line wrapping normalised only. Its practical consequences are the unconfirmed destination, unverified transfer quantities and prohibition on treating the full destination balance as attributed cash-out. Where other source passages disagree, those disagreements remain disclosed rather than repaired.PDF p. 3: INTEGRITY GATE — the integrity gate downgraded 1 claim in the text and flagged 19 findings for review. See the appendix at the end of this document for the full list.PDF p. 4, repeated inline amount qualification: [⚠ unverified amount — auto-check: a retained transfer this line names has no readable quantity, so no retained amount bounds this figure]PDF p. 4, holdings qualification: [⚠ exceeds the traced amount — auto-check: the structured evidence traces at most ≈270.8K DAI]PDF p. 20, opening conclusion label: unverified (auto-downgraded) (transaction-hash anchored in this section): the cited transfer of 101 ETH is unverified, as its token scale or symbol was not retrieved andPDF p. 37: [INV-12] Cash-out endpoints (every exchange-deposit leg in the evidence) — a row naming a confirmed freeze target / cash-out deposit address carries no inbound TX hash anchor (a label and co-occurrence cannot establish a destination) → downgraded to an unverified leadPDF p. 37: [INV-13] Case narrative (time order, UTC block timestamps) — the cash-out / attributed amount '702,154.545255 DAI' exceeds the structured evidence's traced ceiling (≈270.8K DAI) by 2.6× → likely a destination's commingled total deposits counted as traced taint; auto-downgraded (re-state against the traced amount)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Case narrative (time order, UTC block timestamps) — the cited transfer amount '0.00045 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Case narrative (time order, UTC block timestamps) — the cited transfer amount '0.00032933333342 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Case narrative (time order, UTC block timestamps) — the cited transfer amount '0.0021 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Case narrative (time order, UTC block timestamps) — the cash-out / attributed amount '4.99999664 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Seed receipts in the seed transaction and their disposition — the cash-out / attributed amount '132.0 pufETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] Seed receipts in the seed transaction and their disposition — the cited transfer amount '113.73789885106108 pufETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3 — the cash-out / attributed amount '32,157.745684926304 DAI' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3 — the cited transfer amount '1.0 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3 — the cited transfer amount '24,000 DAI' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 37: [INV-13] 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3 — the cited transfer amount '25,000 DAI' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0 — the cash-out / attributed amount '100 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0 — the cited transfer amount '49.8 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] 0x211b4aebefea02470587286b398ed28fb7e09c6a — the cited transfer amount '101 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] 8. Recommendations — the cited transfer amount '4.99999664 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] Findings by evidence tier — the cited transfer amount '100 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] Findings by evidence tier — the cited transfer amount '102.061003174173709298 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)PDF p. 38: [INV-13] Findings by evidence tier — the cited transfer amount '5 ETH' names a retained transfer with no readable quantity (its token scale or symbol was not retrieved, or its amount is unusable), so no retained amount bounds it → auto-downgraded (state it against a retained transfer's amount, or as unverified)Source qualification, PDF p. 22: “Treat these as unverified amounts until corroborated against the sealed evidence table.” The same page states that the 702,154.545255 DAI figure is an observed commingled destination balance and must not be presented as traced or attributed cash-out. Labels are database attributions, not identity findings.