Defend Against Cybercrime with the Power of Community

Many victims have already taken action through ChainBounty. Report now and join the effort to stop online crime

chainbounty
Risk assessment

Quick AI Scam Check

Help protect others by sharing your scam experience

View More

[국제발신]

[Pi Net work]회원님의 지갑보호를위해 계정제한이되었습니다 본인확인바랍니다 https://pg.piminak.help

klip

・22 reads

이오영 면상까고 남들정보 팔아가며 찍은사진

[국제발신] 이오영 면#상#까고#남#들 정#보팔#아가며 #찍#은사진#궁#금한사#람 01079378010 #연#락하#면공#개

klip

・41 reads

[PI MINE]

회원님 자산 보호를위해 KYC검증을 완료해주시길 바랍니다.

klip

・98 reads

코인 주식 리딩방 초대

🏆 HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP 📈 국내 주식 & BTC 단기 전략 무료 공개 시장에는 언제나 기회가 있지만, 중요한 것은 언제 진입하고 어떻게 대응하느냐입니다. HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP은 국내 주식과 BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩을 기반으로 실시간 시장 분석과 단체 트레이딩을 운영하고 있습니다. 무료 공개를 통해 실제 운영 방식과 전문가의 전략을 직접 확인해 보시기 바랍니다. 🔗 무료 입장 링크 https://t.me/+YzI2zf5yamhmZDJk ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📌 무료 공개 내용 ✅ 국내 주식 실시간 전략 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 전문가 대응 전략 ✅ 단체 트레이딩 운영 방식 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 🎁 정회원 전용 혜택 ✅ 국내 주식 트레이딩 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 1:1 맞춤 투자 전략 컨설팅 ✅ 원금보장 프로그램 운영 (적용 대상 별도 안내) ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📅 단체 트레이딩 운영 일정 🕘 09:00 ~ 11:30 │ 오전 국내 주식 트레이딩 ☕️ 11:30 ~ 13:00 │ 휴식 및 시장 모니터링 🕐 13:00 ~ 13:30 │ 오후 국내 주식 트레이딩 ₿ 14:00 ~ 14:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 1부 ₿ 15:00 ~ 15:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 2부 ₿ 16:00 ~ 16:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 3부 ₿ 17:00 ~ 17:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 4부 ₿ 18:00 ~ 18:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 5부 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 💬 운영 방식을 직접 확인하신 후 참여 여부를 결정하셔도 됩니다. 부담 없이 입장하셔서 실시간 리딩을 직접 경험해 보세요.

klip

・90 reads

애플 계정사기

[국제발신] Apple ID로 비정상적인 결제 거래가 발생했습니다. 설정을 확인해 주세요. https://lnk.ink/cSjwV

klip

・69 reads

리딩방초대

8월 3일 세제 개편 발표하였습니다. 세제 개편안 상세본 보시면 [힌트]가 많습니다. 앞으로는 어떻게 대비해야 되는 지, 굉장히 중요한 순간에 서있습니다. 지난 [5번의 정권] 발표된 수많은 규제 속에서 정확한 데이터를 추줄한 그룹이 있습니다. 현시간부터 정확한 데이터 기반을 통해 앞으로 발표될 부동산 [규제] 속에서 대응 하실 분들만 참고하시면 되겠습니다. https://숏.한국/openkaka/

klip

・31 reads

Contribute by sharing insights to strengthen the community

Philippark
Philippark

October 06, 2026

Community Investigation
Tronify Impersonation: 12 Delegated USDT Calls and a 51,000 USDT Consolidation

ChainBounty investigation · USDT token shown for context; no endorsement or attribution to the issuer.Key conclusion. One collector initiated 12 delegated USDT calls affecting nine token holders. Separately, two collectors consolidated 51,000 USDT. Neither the method nor the consolidation establishes victim consent, operator identity or total incident loss.Executive summaryPublic allegations about Tronify.rent / tron.store prompted a TRON transaction review. The strongest new finding is not merely where tokens moved: all twelve payment events in the examined subset were initiated by the same collector through the USDT contract’s transferFrom method. Nine different token-holder addresses were debited for a combined 15,864.609801 USDT. This contradicts describing these events as direct USDT transfers initiated by the debited wallets.Two later direct transfers separately show 51,000 USDT converging on one address. That consolidation amount is not a verified loss total and is not added to the payment subset. Approval origin, victim consent, domain attribution and operator identity remain unresolved.MeasureResult / scopeReport version1.1 · editorial revision, 6 October 2026; no extension of the evidence windowNetworkTRON mainnet; TRC-20 USDTPrimary period1–30 September 2026 UTCFollow-up cutoff6 October 2026, 02:46:45 UTC, as stated by investigation sourceVerified payment subset12 transferFrom calls; 9 distinct token holders; 15,864.609801 USDTVerified consolidation2 transfer calls; 51,000 USDT received in 81 secondsPublic allegationsApproximately $69,651 / 80 victims; not reconciled or independently established────────────────────────────────Finding 1 — one caller, nine debited walletsQuestion: who initiated the token movement? TRONSCAN distinguishes the transaction owner from the From field in the token-transfer event. In all twelve inspected transactions, the owner is C2, while the token-transfer From field identifies a different balance holder. The method is transferFrom, not transfer. All twelve are successful and confirmed; the token contract is TR7NHqjeKQxGTCi8q8ZY4pL8otSzgjLj6t.This establishes delegated movement of token balances by a common caller. It does not establish how the authorization was obtained, whether it was informed consent, or which website caused it. The sequence merits an approval-history investigation, but an approval-phishing conclusion would require that missing evidence.Figure 1 — Delegated-transfer mechanism. Evidence P1–P12: C2 is the transaction owner; the token-event From field names the debited holder. Approval creation and consent remain unverified.RoleFull addressEvidence boundaryC2 · caller / collectorTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvOwner of every payment call; recipient in some eventsC1 · collectorTLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJRecipient in other payment eventsH · consolidationTDDfKDDttx6rFkq2YWzge83RZqQgerzs9MReceives the two later sweep transfers────────────────────────────────Finding 2 — a concentrated subset, not a complete victim censusQuestion: what does the observed amount measure? It is the sum of twelve transaction-event amounts, counted once per hash. It covers nine distinct token-holder addresses; repeated events for the same address are not additional victims. The largest event is 13,472 USDT, approximately 84.92% of the subset. No conversion to a contemporaneous USD price is applied.Figure 2 — Full payment distribution. All twelve amounts use one linear, zero-based USDT scale. P5 dominates the inspected subset; the chart does not estimate total incident loss.Figure 3 — Magnified smaller events. A separate 0–700 USDT axis makes the eleven smaller events readable. P5 is excluded only from this panel, not the aggregate. Do not compare bar lengths between Figures 2 and 3.Unpaired collector inflows, recycled funding and downstream hops are not added. Publicly reported victim counts and losses are a different population. Their gap with this subset remains unexplained, not filled by assumptions.────────────────────────────────Finding 3 — two collectors converge in 81 secondsQuestion: is the consolidation connection real? Yes: on 30 September, C1 sends 36,000 USDT and C2 sends 15,000 USDT to H. Both transactions call transfer and are confirmed in the explorer. Convergence proves these transfers, not common ownership or that every token in them came from the twelve earlier events.UTC / blockMovementFull transaction2026-09-30 16:24:54 · 86704310E1 · C1 → H · 36,000 USDT501b95a1bd13510e495601f2b19e619763a5a73debc85619be2662301b5f48a92026-09-30 16:26:15 · 86704337E2 · C2 → H · 15,000 USDT63e05ce6c8739cdaf6357d3784e4d23d8d51947b6d9d7c0197990e696aee9bc3Figure 4 — Collection and consolidation network. P1–P12 are payment events, not twelve victims. E1 and E2 identify the two verified consolidation transactions below; E3 is a source-only lead. Arrow direction indicates token movement, not ownership.A later 100 USDT movement from H appears in the investigation output at e783e0a7579b27cd49f87c284b22fac22fea1f65e2fe7f415ec2fbe2fb20667d. Subtracting it from 51,000 does not establish a current balance of 50,900: a current balance snapshot and intervening activity are needed.────────────────────────────────Timeline — transfer observations and public reportingUTC period / timeEventEvidence level7–28 SeptemberTwelve transferFrom calls in the verified subsetIndependently checked30 September 16:24:54–16:26:15Two collector sweeps into HIndependently checked1–5 OctoberNine additional TRX-seeded addresses reported; subsequent payments not establishedInvestigation source only5 October; exact post times not establishedInitial public allegations and subsequent infrastructure correctionPublic source attribution────────────────────────────────Normal infrastructure is not an attacker attributionThe public source corrected its inclusion of TDii6vao7xyWg2rKPbCPWVRpSmne8xcqYx and identified it as legitimate Tronify infrastructure. The correction is material: service usage must not be treated as proof of operator control or collusion. Public correction.Likewise, exchange labels observed on payer-side funding routes do not establish collector cash-out. Shared service use, timing proximity and a visually dense graph are not identity evidence.────────────────────────────────Evidence classification and alternative interpretationsEvidence classWhat it establishesWhat it does not establishP1–P12 · directly checkedSuccessful transferFrom calls, amounts and transaction ownerApproval origin, consent or victim statusE1–E2 · directly checkedTwo transfers into H; 51,000 USDT in 81 secondsTotal loss, current balance or common ownershipE3 · source-only leadReported later 100 USDT branch; hash retainedIndependent re-verification or remaining balancePublic reportingAttributed incident context and correctionOn-chain domain or human attributionDelegated transfers can occur in legitimate workflows as well as deceptive ones. The transaction method alone cannot establish fraud, intent or a stolen private key. A common transaction owner strengthens the operational connection of the examined calls, while actual operator identity remains unknown. Public allegations concerning Gemini recommendations, AI videos or search manipulation are off-chain claims and do not become proven causes through this ledger.The reported TRX seeding and short delays are investigative context. The seeding transactions have not all been independently checked in this report, so they are not used to establish a universal causal mechanism. The provider also contains conflicting first-activity dates and broader historical paths; those values are not used to date the operation or aggregate losses.────────────────────────────────Case-specific response pointsQuestion to resolveRequired evidencePurposeHow was C2 authorized?USDT approval events, allowance history and wallet interaction recordsSeparate informed delegation from deceptive authorizationWhich domains induced transactions?Victim records, browser history and legitimate service order logsConnect on-chain movement to off-chain inducementWhere are consolidated funds now?Timestamped H balance and subsequent transaction ledgerDetermine actual remaining exposure without assuming a balanceWho owns the affected wallets?Voluntary victim evidence or lawful recordsValidate victim count and loss attributionThese are evidence priorities, not claims that funds have been frozen, recovered or definitively traced to an exchange.────────────────────────────────Evidence appendix — full identifiersEvery payment below was independently checked in the TRONSCAN overview. The method is transferFrom and the transaction owner is C2 in every row. USDT native precision is six decimals. The hash is the deduplication key.Common fields for P1–P12: TRON mainnet USDT; successful and confirmed transferFrom calls; transaction owner TV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rv. The tables separate movement from transaction anchors so full identifiers remain readable. Each P identifier refers to exactly one transaction hash.P1–P4 · token movementsEvidence / USDTToken holder · FromCollector · ToP1 · 100.0TGUfWzCTdYNwVbuzDzfAGKAARkdjCavPq5TLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJP2 · 485.447918TR1amRA6PTyQCn7p3y9r7NUtjLMWdWDtqhTLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJP3 · 412.0TCGZTBwNN6HXU9agUpeA49tSsRkGAr6yrdTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP4 · 181.0TUibaVrq1ZYuDuUc8TVDpEbgespvpuTygcTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP1–P4 · transaction anchorsEvidenceUTC / blockFull transaction hashP12026-09-07 19:51:06Z · 860462943c3b8a6fe26b69a760134f1bb3b944baa0ec049c89d3002a426bd3137784d035P22026-09-10 13:25:27Z · 861249036a93656feb2b32058214bc6e8eaebc697f4312132f30e982f4a66325f2e3f84dP32026-09-11 07:00:33Z · 86145999a521b4b148ca8a58b35438981df742a27ee64a988d4c8077384f3e9ceb409304P42026-09-12 15:18:09Z · 86184741b72f7690b7d5d8e92301018de4ac02c516b356b8d7ea9853564d3847b12977e5P5–P8 · token movementsEvidence / USDTToken holder · FromCollector · ToP5 · 13472.0TF3tXoQpgjokBLr6Qpsu3nixTcMgvtNY9nTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP6 · 177.0TTPa48RruBqu2wvbYYskZASj2ox4iPvSXZTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP7 · 61.372883THmHnytNudoV9FDiDdX9rfmq4UatB5TdwvTLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJP8 · 659.0TJBt8osXN8utgApfAfYdNBR4K5fHrmK9yzTLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJP5–P8 · transaction anchorsEvidenceUTC / blockFull transaction hashP52026-09-13 08:04:39Z · 862048658b003bd469b45956b430df31ad67b0c8d668a114808775e9897787b6e20ccbf6P62026-09-14 02:10:24Z · 86226573e1bbcbac8dd49284e9745757f555dc663b66da42555544fdf5b9c7e2a0a0119eP72026-09-14 20:14:42Z · 86248253877c9e0cb7ebccf7fe18ce63b0a9f4206aa32993b30c688679ad2f0a2bb83a65P82026-09-14 22:44:30Z · 86251249e6bc783dc6f2f180b576a044f037afe44f4c688b87cd534460f49b19cf145cb5P9–P12 · token movementsEvidence / USDTToken holder · FromCollector · ToP9 · 101.0TJBt8osXN8utgApfAfYdNBR4K5fHrmK9yzTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP10 · 1.789TJBt8osXN8utgApfAfYdNBR4K5fHrmK9yzTLv3iSnZxWghEmadLDzuAK2p5GkAwg7tpJP11 · 210.0TAZ9AaA4qQc6T4WAuwAyMSjWcQgVMJz2HJTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP12 · 4.0TAZ9AaA4qQc6T4WAuwAyMSjWcQgVMJz2HJTV6n8cCLmX5mRCMMNvcE1K1i87Yo9Ys5rvP9–P12 · transaction anchorsEvidenceUTC / blockFull transaction hashP92026-09-15 00:21:57Z · 86253196d52998a2a9f33af5894d50ab95cfa63a73427038ce4e059ffb5a14cba5b97a34P102026-09-15 00:22:33Z · 862532083a9d82c197147bfba3d89fe0a3541fed23bf722e51302d690a5c83a94878e4b6P112026-09-28 15:20:33Z · 86645460c0325bd4daa2c1c88668b8b9fbc7a670d1fec73c53a0ef63eb3c3cdc6b6837beP122026-09-28 15:33:48Z · 86645725c4d870bc9b0dc20802324b25641c721bca0a16840284b60d0915476f15f39e33────────────────────────────────Sources and methodologyPrimary public sources: initial disclosure, infrastructure correction, off-chain follow-up. Transaction claims are anchored beside the relevant findings and in the appendix. Public allegations are not independently established totals.The investigation output supplied candidate identifiers and contextual paths. This report independently compared all twelve payment calls and both consolidation transfers against visible explorer results, checked the aggregate and distinct-holder count, and corrected the direct-transfer interpretation. It does not claim a complete approval-history review, complete wallet balance audit or complete incident census.Revision note — 6 October 2026. Version 1.1 improves evidence indexing, appendix structure, figure captions, visual spacing and the smaller-event chart. The verified transaction set, aggregate and investigation cutoff are unchanged.

Tronify Impersonation: 12 Delegated USDT Calls and a 51,000 USDT Consolidation
0 likes・14 reads
dooooo
dooooo

October 05, 2026

Community Investigation
MUSystem: The four-transaction Ethereum sequence

ChainBounty · Report analysis · CASE-10DA91A7Ethereum mainnet · Activity: September 30, 2026 · Source: SentinelTX report generated October 5, 2026SentinelTX’s MUSystem report follows four Ethereum transactions that combine supplied capital, repeated deposit-and-return cycles, and repaid flash loans. It reports a 5.335155071161390070 ETH reduction at the affected contract and a 3.190655071161390070 ETH increase at the initiating account before fees. A third address received 2.1445 ETH. The distinction between those amounts is central to the report: receipts, account changes, and an incident-wide loss answer different questions.Report status matters here. The exported PDF says its automated integrity gate downgraded six claims and flagged one finding. Its chronology and conclusion carry an “unverified (auto-downgraded)” label, and page 83 flags a time-inverted path. This article presents the report’s findings with those qualifications. The figures below adapt its bounded transaction narrative; they do not reproduce the flagged onward path or certify the report’s findings. (SentinelTX, pp. 4, 10, 17, 21, 83)The scope of the reportAll four transactions fall in Ethereum block 26,087,602, timestamped September 30, 2026, at 03:27:35 UTC. SentinelTX calls the first transaction the Run and the following three Sample 1, Sample 2, and Sample 3. The report’s accounting covers those four operations. It does not establish that they comprise the entire campaign or all activity involving the affected contract.The principal roles are the initiating and receiving externally owned account, or EOA; the contract it created and used to coordinate the operations; the affected MUSystem contract; and newly created helper contracts. The report calls the coordinating contract the attack contract. This article uses “orchestration contract” to make its execution role clear without suggesting a separately identified operator. The third recipient’s role and control remain unresolved.The report sets an observation cutoff of October 5, 2026, at 10:00 UTC. It separately identifies address-history, token, and balance observations retrieved around 10:11–10:15 UTC that day as later observations. That distinction matters when reading its statements about activity after the four transactions. (SentinelTX, pp. 4, 8, 18)The Run belongs in the calculationThe last three transactions produced receipts of approximately 5.9475 ETH, 5.0703 ETH, and 2.8368 ETH for the EOA. Together, those receipts total 13.854604425661360100 ETH. Looking only at that part of the sequence omits the EOA’s earlier contribution in the Run.In the Run, the EOA sent 10.7 ETH to the orchestration contract and received 0.036050645500029970 ETH back. Its net change for that transaction was therefore −10.663949354499970030 ETH before fees. The Run also contained the same repeated-cycle pattern seen later; it was more than a preliminary funding transfer.SentinelTX breaks the Run into a priming deposit and sixteen helper cycles. The orchestration contract first paid 44.101139073399812544 ETH to the affected contract. During that call, the affected contract sent 26.460683444039887526 ETH back to the orchestration contract and 2.1445 ETH to the unresolved third address. The report gives the affected contract’s net increase on this leg as 15.495955629359925018 ETH.The sixteen subsequent cycles reduced the affected contract’s ETH by 6.976506274859954988 ETH. Combining those two parts leaves the affected contract with a reported Run increase of 8.519449354499970030 ETH. The later sample transactions then reduce that amount. Including the Run is essential to understanding the four-transaction result. (SentinelTX, pp. 6, 10–11)Figure 1. The report’s four-transaction sequence in one Ethereum block. It records 16 helper contracts in the Run, 16 in Sample 1, 16 in Sample 2, and 11 in Sample 3, for 59 in total. These counts describe contracts, not independent people. All four transactions share the block timestamp; spacing shows sequence rather than elapsed time.Color key: Slate identifies sequence markers and the directly labeled helper counts.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 4, 8, 10, 13–15. The chronology is marked unverified by the report’s automated gate. Transaction links appear in the source register below.One deposit, two returnsThe first helper cycle in Sample 1 provides a compact example of the pattern SentinelTX describes. The proxy at 0x8b0856e9b0787d09f9abded66bccc85feb5561d4 calls the affected contract with 53.355703172210117028 ETH. It receives an initial payment of 32.253522567601017211 ETH. After a second call, it receives another 21.502348378400678141 ETH.The two payments total 53.755870946001695352 ETH. The proxy then forwards that amount to the orchestration contract. The excess over the original deposit is 0.400167773791578324 ETH for this cycle. Repeated deposits and forwarding create much larger gross movement volumes, so adding every leg would obscure the net result. The report explicitly excludes gross helper forwarding and large graph aggregates from its economic totals. (SentinelTX, pp. 12, 15)Diagram 1. The ETH legs in Sample 1’s first helper cycle, as described in the report. The same proxy sends 53.355703172210117028 ETH and receives two payments totaling 53.755870946001695352 ETH, an excess of 0.400167773791578324 ETH. Artwork values are rounded. Equal-width arrows show the direction of each leg, not its relative size.Color key: Slate outlines the same proxy P in each row; sage outlines the affected contract. Slate amount text labels the deposit and sage amount text labels the two returns.Address key: Proxy = 0x8b0856e9…561d4; affected contract = 0x9bdf81e6…d9364. The proxy appearing in each row is the same account. MUS token movements are outside this native-ETH calculation.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 12, 17–18; Sample 1 transaction. The report marks the cycle-pattern observation unverified and treats the root-cause explanation as attributed analysis.The proposed explanation comes from external research cited in the PDF. SentinelTX attributes to SlowMist a first-deposit bonus that was credited both in an immediate ETH refund and in the user’s MUS allocation, with same-transaction redemption allowing total ETH returned to exceed the deposit. It also cites the DeFiHackLabs reproduction. SentinelTX did not execute that reproduction, and it does not present the root cause as independently verified from the affected contract’s source code.The report distinguishes that explanation from its interpretation of the calls. It says the first selector matches the common deposit() signature, while the second selector’s ABI meaning remains undecoded. It treats the use of fresh proxies as consistent with a per-address first-deposit condition, rather than as decoded proof of that condition. In the example, the first and second payments are approximately 60.45 percent and 40.30 percent of the deposit. Those proportions describe this example; they are not a constant return promised for every cycle. (SentinelTX, pp. 17–18)Borrowed WETH supplied working capitalSentinelTX reports a Balancer Vault WETH loan in each transaction, with the principal returned in the same transaction. It also says the corresponding native-ETH unwrap and rewrap amounts match. These movements explain how substantial capital passes through the execution sequence without turning the entire principal into a reported loss.WETH principal borrowed and repaidRun: 70.940455629359925017 WETHSample 1: 53.355703172210117028 WETHSample 2: 45.486053167691556828 WETHSample 3: 38.777129899239648888 WETHThe report attributes a zero FlashLoan fee to the analyst’s receipt parsing, citing log indexes 276, 345, 414, and 463. It also notes a conflict with a comment in the public reproduction about attacker-owned capital and says it prefers the receipt evidence. These are the report’s stated source choices; this article does not claim to have rerun the reproduction or independently re-established the loans. (SentinelTX, pp. 7, 17)MUS remains a separate token record. The PDF describes a 49.75309010988246 MUS transfer, at display precision, from the affected contract to the orchestration contract in the Run. It calls this a transfer or allocation because the source is the affected contract rather than the zero address. It leaves token decimals, raw values, and log-level completeness unresolved in its anchored evidence. Neither that displayed quantity nor the WETH principal is added to native ETH when calculating the four-transaction changes. (SentinelTX, pp. 7–8, 21–22)From receipts to the net changeThe EOA’s three sample receipts exceed 13.85 ETH, but the preceding Run produces a negative EOA change of more than 10.66 ETH. SentinelTX’s four-transaction total incorporates both sides.EOA native-ETH change before feesRun: −10.663949354499970030 ETHSample 1: +5.947512945688151244 ETHSample 2: +5.070290034224630664 ETHSample 3: +2.836801445748578192 ETHFour-transaction change: +3.190655071161390070 ETHThe report separately attributes 0.005781774786752720 ETH in fees to these four transactions. Deducting those fees gives its stated EOA change of +3.184873296374637350 ETH. That number excludes other costs and any value associated with residual MUS. It is not an account balance or a campaign-wide profit figure. (SentinelTX, pp. 6–7, 21–22)Figure 2. The report’s native-ETH changes for the EOA across the four transactions, before fees. The negative Run and three positive sample receipts produce a reported total increase of 3.190655071161390070 ETH. Values in the artwork are rounded; the table preserves the PDF’s precision. The scope is a change across selected transactions, not the wallet’s starting or ending balance.Color key: Slate is the Run; sage is Samples 1–3. Explicit signs and the zero axis distinguish decreases from increases.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 6–7, 21–22. The report’s conclusion marks these findings unverified (auto-downgraded). Full transaction links and hashes are listed below.At the account level, SentinelTX reports a reduction of 5.335155071161390070 ETH at the affected contract, an increase of 3.190655071161390070 ETH at the EOA before fees, and a 2.1445 ETH receipt at the third address. Its reconciliation assigns zero net ETH to the orchestration contract and the 59 helpers within each transaction. These net changes are an accounting summary; they do not identify the third recipient’s owner or purpose.The approximately $36,900 headline remains a separate, attributed claim. SentinelTX credits it to SlowMist and explicitly declines to reconcile it to the native-asset figures. The article therefore does not convert the report’s ETH changes into a new dollar-loss estimate. (SentinelTX, pp. 6, 8, 18, 21–22)The third recipient and the limits of the traceThe third address, 0xA30911099156608A32e35c11aCf2956258E0F645, receives its 2.1445 ETH during the Run’s priming-deposit call. SentinelTX does not establish whether the recipient is controlled by the attacker, unrelated to the attacker, a fee or referral recipient, or an existing participant. Its appearance in the sequence supports a reported payment, not one of those explanations.The PDF’s post-incident observations are also bounded. It says no outbound movement from the EOA was observed in the queried datasets through the later retrieval period around 10:11–10:15 UTC on October 5. It identifies no exchange deposit on the examined outbound paths of the EOA or orchestration contract. The report expressly says those observations do not prove unspent proceeds, recovery, a freeze, or current balances. Later blocks, other chains, and off-chain disposition fall outside those conclusions. (SentinelTX, pp. 8, 18, 22)Earlier funding history should be read in its own time. The report places the RAILGUN Relay Adapt receipt and LiFi departure before the incident, and it leaves the origin of the later Relay.link payout unresolved. It excludes that earlier history from incident proceeds and cash-out totals. The service labels do not establish who controlled the EOA or what anyone intended. These earlier routes are not drawn as an onward path in this article. (SentinelTX, pp. 10, 18)What the report concludesThe useful distinction in this case is between capital that passed through the contracts and the net changes the report assigns to the selected transactions. SentinelTX describes a repeated two-payment cycle and reports a positive EOA change after including the Run’s contribution. It keeps the repaid WETH principal, native-ETH account changes, and MUS transfer record separate.Its unresolved questions remain material: the third recipient’s role, activity outside the four transactions and outside Ethereum, the origin of the Relay.link payout, token-level details, and an additional orchestration-contract nonce increment. The PDF’s own proposed next steps include source and ABI decoding, a fuller log-level token ledger, and a dated valuation with an agreed incident scope. None of these is presented as completed work. (SentinelTX, pp. 18, 21–22)Figure 3. The conclusion and its limits, adapted from SentinelTX. The reported four-transaction amounts do not establish total campaign loss, real-world control of the third recipient, current holdings, recovery, or completed cash-out. The source PDF retains an automated integrity warning and labels the conclusion unverified.Color key: Slate labels the unresolved section; amber frames the directly stated report-integrity warning. Color does not indicate attribution or independently verified status.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 21–22 and 83. The INV-5 warning concerns a time-inverted path in the report; that path is not included in these figures.Source register and report noteThis article adapts SentinelTX’s “MUSystem: Four-Transaction Ethereum Investigation — 30 September 2026,” case CASE-10DA91A7, an 85-page PDF generated on October 5, 2026, at 11:25:40 UTC. Page references above refer to that export. The source is the exported report, including its attributed claims and integrity qualifications; the article is not an independent on-chain audit or a certification of the report’s signature or custody claims.The four transaction identifiers in the PDF are:Run: 0xc6116f5ffa7935f3b06f71fc13e3ab0bf5e09a2b1091a134c79619447ce456f2Sample 1: 0xfe28118e48c64b275b587c90da472fc13b8c3dbed9d3cded1e18c1e7a7fc0392Sample 2: 0xaa172fcaa4800b14826daed1a78c9d6dcd8f26ae45ce5f31786d55768b709ec6Sample 3: 0x905af4e8cdaf32c183605358c97181e9ad57393bd4ed1d945baf6d6eebe983feExternal analysis cited by the report:SlowMist’s MUS disclosure, for the attributed mechanism and approximately $36,900 headlineDeFiHackLabs’ MUS reproduction, which the report cites but did not executeAddress key, using the roles in this article:Initiating / receiving EOA: 0x1a083ADf234a8f67ad65A9B9B616853ACf5998E5Orchestration contract, called the attack contract in the PDF: 0xD1a7A2A3c27962E80E9B6B46D54094F93267e988Affected contract: 0x9bdf81e6066d32764b7e75a1b5577237e06d9364Third recipient, role and control unresolved: 0xA30911099156608A32e35c11aCf2956258E0F645Sample 1’s first proxy: 0x8b0856e9b0787d09f9abded66bccc85feb5561d4Balancer Vault: 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8WETH contract: 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2

MUSystem: The four-transaction Ethereum sequence
0 likes・11 reads
dooooo
dooooo

October 05, 2026

Community Investigation
Base vault incident: from receipt tokens to bridge withdrawals

ChainBounty · Investigation analysisBase mainnet · Activity: October 4, 2026 · Reviewed: October 5, 2026Six transactions moved 1,783.067 aBaswstETH from a Base vault to an intermediate contract on October 4. The selected records then show receipt-token forwarding, a withdrawal of the underlying wstETH, and two Base-side bridge initiations totaling 1,001 wstETH. This reconstruction follows those movements through 20 transaction records, separating the token route from the reported exploit mechanism and the still-unverified destination-chain receipts.Key findingsSix vault outflows transferred exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH to a contract deployed by the same address that submitted the outflow transactions.Eight forwarding transfers preceded a pool withdrawal that released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH.Two Base bridge initiations burned 1 and 1,000 wstETH. The events identify an intended recipient; this review has not established receipt on Ethereum.The review covers one contract deployment and 19 token-movement transactions. All times below are UTC. Approximate figures are marked in the text. The linked receipts retain full addresses and native token precision, and all 20 records are listed below.Figure 1. The observed route from vault receipt tokens to two Base-side bridge initiations. Circular nodes identify roles; equal-width arrows show the token route without encoding quantities or elapsed time. Six vault transfers moved exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH; eight forwards moved approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH to Address A. At 09:23:13 UTC, a pool withdrawal burned aBaswstETH and released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH to that same address. Address A then made two transfers to Address B, which initiated bridge withdrawals of 1 and 1,000 wstETH. These are successive stages, not amounts to add together. This schematic groups the route by role; Figure 4 shows the interleaved downstream transaction order. ≈ marks rounding to three decimals. Ethereum receipt has not been verified.Address key: Vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc; intermediate contract 0xcdfe91…1f569d; Address A 0x0b5126…edb034; Address B 0xc73448…297f8d. Base burn denotes the token Transfer to the zero address in each bridge initiation, not a transfer to the bridge contract.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The reported incident and the two assetsBlockaid’s October 4 public alert described an exploit of an unnamed vault involving a newly whitelisted contract and estimated about US$2.02 million across approximately four transactions. PeckShield’s alert separately suggested that about 1,783 wstETH, valued at roughly US$6 million, had been drained. These are attributed alert estimates. This review does not assign a revised dollar loss.The distinction between the two assets is central to the trace. aBaswstETH is an Aave receipt token representing supplied assets and accrued yield. wstETH is the underlying asset released in the later pool withdrawal. Aave’s tokenization documentation explains that a withdrawal burns aTokens and releases the underlying asset. Adding the receipt-token transfers, the withdrawal, and the bridge burns would count successive stages of the same position repeatedly.Contract deployment and vault outflowsAddress 0x0b5126…edb034 deployed the intermediate contract, 0xcdfe91…1f569d, at 07:28:57. It later submitted the six transactions that moved aBaswstETH from vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc to that contract.The first outflow, for 1 aBaswstETH, occurred at 08:55:01, 86 minutes and four seconds after deployment. Five more transfers followed: 100, 500, 500, 500, and 182.067 aBaswstETH. The last outflow occurred at 09:12:37. Together, the six transfers moved exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds.Figure 2. Six vault-to-contract outflows of aBaswstETH on October 4, 2026, in UTC transaction order. The exact amounts are 1, 100, 500, 500, 500, and 182.067, totaling 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds. Bar length starts at zero and encodes token quantity. Rows are equally spaced for comparison, not elapsed time; the 1-token outflow is less than one pixel long at the 720-pixel image width, so its exact value is labeled.Source: the six vault-outflow receipts linked under Sources and method.The route in Figure 1 follows the token Transfer events; Figure 2 compares the six vault outflow amounts. The transaction sender is a separate field: 0x0b5126…edb034 submitted calls to the intermediate contract, while the token Transfer events name the vault as the source of aBaswstETH. That distinction connects the calls to the observed movements without claiming that the vault itself signed a transaction.Receipt-token forwardingEight transactions moved aBaswstETH from the intermediate contract to 0x0b5126…edb034. The first forward, for 1 aBaswstETH, occurred at 08:56:25, 84 seconds after the first vault outflow. The forwarding sequence ended at 09:15:09.Figure 3. Six vault outflows and eight receipt-token forwards through an intermediate contract. The outflows total exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds. Forwarding overlaps the outflows; ≈ marks its rounded total. Rows are evenly spaced, not an elapsed-time scale. The receiving address deployed the contract at 07:28:57 UTC.Address key: Vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc; Intermediate contract 0xcdfe91…1f569d; Receiving address 0x0b5126…edb034.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The repeated calls have two distinct selectors: 0x9a39f8dd in the transactions containing vault outflows and 0xcb984317 in the forwarding transactions. Their timing supports a description of staged transfer-and-forward execution. A small first movement followed by larger transfers does not, by itself, establish whether the first movement was a deliberate test.The observed forwarding total is approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH. At full precision it differs slightly from the vault-outflow total, and the receipts also include small zero-address mint transfers. These are separate recorded totals; their small difference should not be treated as an additional loss.Withdrawal of the underlying wstETHAt 09:23:13, 0x0b5126…edb034 called a contract labeled “Aave: Pool Proxy Base” by Basescan. Its decoded Withdraw event identifies wstETH as the reserve asset and the same address as the recipient.The transaction burned approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH and released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH. Those are related sides of one pool withdrawal. The underlying asset moves out of the pool to the recipient, supporting the description of a withdrawal or redemption rather than a debt repayment.Diagram 1. Two accounting legs of one Aave pool withdrawal on Base at 09:23:13 UTC on October 4, 2026. The selected receipt records a Transfer of exactly 1,783.067000109162566728 aBaswstETH to the zero address (a receipt-token burn) and the release of exactly 1,783.067000294435092335 wstETH to the same holder, Address A. The displayed amounts are rounded to three decimals. The upper arrow represents the receipt-token burn within the pool operation; it is not an additional transfer to a new address. The diagram describes the recorded withdrawal and does not establish an exploit mechanism.Address key: Holder / same holder is Address A, 0x0b5126…edb034. Pool operation is a process label; reserve denotes the underlying-wstETH reserve in the selected receipt.Source: Pool-withdrawal receipt and logs.This is the point where the reviewed route changes from receipt-token transfers to movement of the underlying asset. The pool interaction provides no evidence of a vulnerability in Aave’s contracts. The separate question is how the vault’s receipt tokens became available to the transaction-sending address.Two Base bridge initiationsAt 09:24:15, the withdrawing address sent 1 wstETH to 0xc73448…297f8d. At 09:27:29, that second address initiated a withdrawal through 0xac9d11…4287ab. Lido’s official contract list identifies the call target as its Base L2 ERC20 Token Bridge.The bridge receipt records a 1-wstETH Transfer to the zero address and a WithdrawalInitiated event. The call went to the bridge contract; the token movement was a burn on Base.The larger transfer to the second address came at 10:47:23, for approximately 1,782.067 wstETH. Using their full precision, the two selected transfers sum exactly to the wstETH received in the pool withdrawal.At 12:10:59, the second address initiated a further withdrawal of 1,000 wstETH through the same bridge. Both WithdrawalInitiated events specify 0xc73448…297f8d as the intended destination-side recipient.Figure 4. Five downstream transactions in order: pool withdrawal; transfer; bridge-withdrawal burn; transfer; bridge-withdrawal burn. The 1-wstETH bridge initiation precedes the larger transfer between addresses. Both bridge branches end at Base-side burns; Ethereum receipt has not been verified. Rows are evenly spaced, not an elapsed-time scale.Address key: Token contract 0x99cbc4…42ef0d; First address 0x0b5126…edb034 (the upstream receiving address); Second address 0xc73448…297f8d; Base-side burn is the zero address.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The two initiations total exactly 1,001 wstETH. Their order matters: the first bridge initiation happened before the second address received the larger transfer. Grouping both transfers ahead of both burns would misrepresent that sequence.Where the trace stopsThe vault’s permission path remains unresolved. Blockaid reported a newly whitelisted contract, but the reviewed transfers do not independently establish that change or show how it was authorized. The relevant vault implementation, administrative history, and execution traces are needed to test that explanation. The transaction records also do not identify a person or establish common beneficial control of both addresses.The two Base events specify an intended recipient, but this review has not matched either initiation to an Ethereum finalization transaction. A destination-chain continuation needs the corresponding withdrawal message, token amount, receiving address, and confirmed receipt before it can follow any onward movement.Finally, subtracting the two bridge burns from the two selected inflows to 0xc73448…297f8d leaves approximately 782.067 wstETH. This is an arithmetic difference, not a verified current balance. A balance finding needs a query at a specified block or a complete reconciliation through a stated cutoff, including any other transfers.Figure 5. Where the verified trace stops. The selected Base receipts show two bridge-withdrawal initiations of 1 and 1,000 wstETH, totaling exactly 1,001 wstETH. Ethereum receipt has not been verified. Vault permission, destination finalization, and current balance remain to be established from the evidence listed here. A difference between selected transfer amounts is not a verified balance.Source: 1 wstETH initiation; 1,000 wstETH initiation.Sources and methodThis reconstruction uses 20 successful Base transaction records inspected on Basescan on October 5, 2026, including relevant decoded events. It is a selected-record review, not a complete account-history reconciliation or a self-hosted chain replay. The public alert estimates are separately attributed above.Chart 1. Composition of the 20 distinct successful Base transaction records reviewed for this article. Receipt-token movements: 14 (70%), comprising six vault outflows and eight forwards. Underlying-asset records: five (25%), comprising one pool withdrawal, two transfers between addresses, and two Base bridge initiations. Contract deployment: one (5%). Each transaction is assigned once by its role; the withdrawal is counted once with the underlying-asset records despite including both a receipt-token burn and underlying release. The percentages describe the selected evidence, not token quantities, losses, account balances, or coverage of all chain activity.Source: the 20 distinct transaction receipts in the source list below; reviewed October 5, 2026.Contract deployment: 07:28:57Vault outflows: 08:55:01, 09:08:13, 09:09:21, 09:10:19, 09:11:11, 09:12:37Receipt-token forwards: 08:56:25, 09:08:53, 09:09:43, 09:10:45, 09:11:49, 09:13:27, 09:14:15, 09:15:09Pool withdrawal: 09:23:13Transfers between addresses: 09:24:15, 10:47:23Base bridge initiations: 09:27:29, 12:10:59

Base vault incident: from receipt tokens to bridge withdrawals
0 likes・52 reads

Your journey to defend against cyber crime starts here.

Join us to turn your expertise into a force for a safer digital world.

Blog

Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…

Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…

Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated Laundering OperationThe laundering infrastructure behind the recent Gravity Bridge exploit has now been largely uncovered.After tracing 87 confirmed attacker transactions and an additional 26 downstream movements, the overall flow of stolen funds is becoming clear. What initially appeared to be a straightforward bridge exploit has evolved into a highly structured laundering operation involving decentralized exchanges, relay wallets, non-custodial swap services, and centralized exchanges.This report summarizes the complete fund flow observed so far and highlights the remaining recovery opportunities.Executive SummaryTotal tracked transactions: 113Initial stolen assets converted into ETH almost immediatelyApproximately $4.7M converted through KyberSwap and 1inch2,600 ETH consolidated into a secondary aggregation walletFunds dispersed through dozens of one-time relay walletsConfirmed deposits identified at ChangeNOW and KuCoinMultiple staging wallets still hold potentially recoverable fundsSeveral laundering paths remain active and require real-time monitoringPhase 1 — Asset ConversionThe attacker-controlled wallet:0x7B582033061b96cC3F9421e73a749ED7C62da1F9immediately began converting stolen stablecoins into ETH.The swaps were executed primarily through KyberSwap and 1inch, suggesting the attacker wanted to reduce exposure to token freezes while maximizing liquidity.Observed transactions include:$100K USDC → ETH$200K USDC → ETH$500K USDC → ETH$400K USDT → ETHMultiple additional swapsIn total:Approximately $4.3M USDCApproximately $434K USDTwere converted into ETH within a short time window.The rapid conversion indicates pre-planning and suggests the operator anticipated potential blacklisting or asset recovery attempts.Phase 2 — ETH ConsolidationAfter conversion, the attacker consolidated funds into a second wallet:0x4d3ca32e687e871a58b78AcAc73bE59AC37C7A47A total of 2,600 ETH was transferred through multiple transactions:600 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETHThis wallet appears to have functioned as the primary distribution hub for the laundering operation.Rather than cashing out directly, the operator implemented a layered relay strategy designed to fragment attribution and complicate tracing efforts.Phase 3 — Distributed Relay LaunderingThe most notable discovery is the laundering architecture itself.Instead of sending large transfers directly to exchanges, the attacker repeatedly split funds into dozens of temporary wallets.The observed pattern resembles:Primary Wallets → One-Time Relay Wallets → Swap Service / Exchange → Cross-Chain ExitIndividual transfers were commonly observed in the 6–10 ETH range.This methodology significantly reduces the visibility of exchange deposits and makes automated clustering more difficult.The pattern appears intentional and operationally mature.Confirmed ChangeNOW ActivityThe largest identified laundering route currently leads to ChangeNOW.Observed destination:0xeba88149813bec1cccccfdb0dacefaaa5de94cb1Estimated deposits:Approximately 114 ETHRoughly $230,000 equivalentBecause ChangeNOW is non-custodial, recovery options are more limited.However, transaction records still exist.The highest priority investigative question is determining what assets these ETH deposits were converted into.Particular attention should be given to:Monero (XMR)Privacy-focused assetsCross-chain bridge destinationsIf conversion into privacy-preserving assets occurred, tracing may become significantly more difficult.Confirmed KuCoin DepositsA second laundering path has been identified through KuCoin.Known deposit address:0x45300136662dd4e58fc0df61e6290dffd992b785Estimated deposits:Approximately 6 ETHAdditional suspected deposit address:0x58edf78281334335effa23101bbe3371b6a36a51Status:Further confirmation requiredUnlike ChangeNOW, KuCoin operates as a custodial exchange and maintains KYC records.This creates a potential recovery and attribution opportunity if law enforcement or affected parties act quickly.Remaining On-Chain FundsSeveral wallets remain active and continue to warrant monitoring.Primary Staging Wallet0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562Current observations:Received 59 ETHOnly 15 ETH moved onwardApproximately 44 ETH potentially remains under attacker controlThis wallet may represent an operational staging point rather than a final cash-out destination.Additional Unresolved Destinations0xf1ed839d08309e2a52e58d69b06d286d35fc18bc — 15 ETH0xe1e471614305656114c39294637b65adccf665a3 — ~13 ETH0x58432e011aa493c404f80409d997b1eabdfd8e24 — 9 ETH0x79f376453537878eeb79fb7d2cdb2c10bc58f454 — 9 ETH0x98d9022fa2789c0d8e9cd49707599c6848619ed8 — 10 ETHThese wallets currently represent unresolved portions of the laundering network.Immediate Investigative Priorities1. KuCoin Cooperation RequestThis remains the strongest recovery opportunity.Required actions:Identify account owner(s)Preserve account recordsFreeze assets if still presentObtain associated KYC informationTiming is critical.2. ChangeNOW Exit TracingInvestigators should determine:Destination chainDestination assetConversion timingPotential privacy-coin exposureThis path likely contains the most important unanswered questions in the investigation.3. Real-Time Monitoring of Staging WalletsThe wallet:0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562should be monitored continuously.A significant portion of attacker-controlled funds may still be sitting on-chain.Any future movement could reveal:Additional exchange depositsAdditional swap servicesNew laundering infrastructureFinal cash-out attemptsConclusionThe Gravity Bridge attacker did not rely on a simple exchange cash-out strategy.Instead, the operator employed a structured relay-wallet laundering network designed to fragment attribution, obscure exchange deposits, and delay investigation.While a meaningful portion of the funds has already entered laundering channels, several opportunities remain.The most actionable leads currently include:KuCoin deposit attributionChangeNOW conversion tracingMonitoring of the 59 ETH staging walletThe next movements from these wallets will likely determine whether investigators can continue following the money — or whether the trail disappears into privacy infrastructure permanently.

ChainBounty

ChainBounty

4 months ago
Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation

Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation

How automated bots and shared infrastructure revealed a 10-month-old organized crime syndicate.The blockchain never forgets, but it can be incredibly complex to navigate. Recently, ChainBounty conducted a deep-dive forensic investigation into a significant asset theft involving $SUBY and other Solana-based tokens. What began as a single incident report evolved into the discovery of a professional, long-standing scam infrastructure that has now led to an active criminal investigation by the Cyber Crime Investigation Division in Seoul, South Korea.1. The Incident: Precision and AutomationOn May 30, 2025, a victim’s wallet was drained of approximately 8.2 million $SUBY tokens, along with $SSE and $DAW. The speed of the transfer was alarming.Our forensic analysis revealed that this wasn’t a manual operation. The assets were moved to an intermediary wallet (46S5bgHq...) and immediately processed through automated scripts. These bots executed swaps into stablecoins and distributed funds across multiple "hop" wallets with 0-second latency, ensuring the trail became as fragmented as possible within minutes.2. Identifying the “Cash Out” InfrastructureBy tracing the flow of stolen assets, we identified two primary exit points: Bitget Exchange and FixedFloat (a mixing service). While some deposits to these platforms occurred shortly before or after the specific $SUBY theft, our “Infrastructure Analysis” proved a definitive link. We discovered a massive, interconnected network:27 Common Fee Payers: A cluster of wallets consistently funded the gas fees for the attack wallets.63 Shared Addresses: These wallets acted as a central hub for multiple thefts over a 10-month period.The Forensic Anomaly: Why tracking the criminal organization is more effective than tracking the tokens aloneThis confirms that the attackers are not “lone wolves” but an organized syndicate operating a “Scam-as-a-Service” model on the Solana network.3. The Evidence: The Smoking GunThe most compelling evidence of organized crime was the Machine-like Transfer Patterns. Our timeline analysis showed batch processing intervals of exactly 15 to 28 seconds. This level of synchronization is only possible through a dedicated command-and-control (C2) botnet designed for money laundering.Through our investigation, we identified over $142,430 USDT funneled through the Bitget deposit addresses associated with this specific group.Inhuman execution: Batch processing and mechanical intervals confirm the use of laundering bots.4. Active Investigation and Next StepsChainBounty has officially submitted this forensic package to the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. The investigation is currently focused on:KYC De-anonymization: Working with Bitget to identify the account holders behind the identified deposit addresses.Cross-Chain Tracking: Tracing funds that exited via FixedFloat into Ethereum and Bitcoin.Asset Freezing: Coordinating with exchanges to blacklist and freeze the identified criminal infrastructure.Conclusion: Vigilance in the Web3 EraThis case is a stark reminder that in the world of DeFi, your digital footprint — and that of the hackers — is permanent. At ChainBounty, we are committed to turning the tide against these scam networks.We urge the community to stay vigilant. Do not click on suspicious partnership links or authorize “blind signings” in your wallet. The scammers are professional, but so is our pursuit of justice.Join the Fight. Follow our investigation and report suspicious activities at our community: 🔗 https://community.chainbounty.io 📧 For inquiries: [email protected]#ChainBounty #Solana #Forensics #CyberCrime #Web3Security #OSINT #CryptoInvestigation

ChainBounty

ChainBounty

8 months ago
MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report

MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report

IntroductionThis report details a real-world case submitted by an applicant to ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program. The victim approached us after suffering a significant loss due to a targeted social engineering attack. ChainBounty is actively assisting the victim by providing comprehensive on-chain forensics and intelligence analysis to trace the stolen assets and identify the perpetrators for law enforcement purposes.1. Executive SummaryThis report synthesizes the results of on-chain forensic analysis and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) investigation regarding the digital asset theft incident that occurred between December 7 and 8, 2025.The incident appears to have originated from a social engineering attack targeting an active user of Memex, a major dApp in the MemeCore (M) ecosystem. The attacker impersonated community administrators and creators to lure the victim into a fake Telegram group, then induced them to connect their wallet to a fraudulent bot service using “high-yield staking rewards” as bait.The victim created a new wallet and transferred assets as instructed, but the flow was designed to funnel funds into the attacker’s scam network.On-chain analysis reveals that the stolen funds did not end with a simple transfer. A multi-stage laundering flow was observed, involving MRC-20 token swaps within the MemeCore network, repetitive transactions based on the WM contract, cross-chain bridging via Meson Finance, inflows into Centralized Exchanges (CEX), and dispersed withdrawals across multiple exchanges.Notably, a “direct-to-exchange” flow is clearly visible in the early stages. M tokens were directly transferred from the victim’s wallet to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and this fund was collected into the exchange’s hot wallet (0x1ab4…) within a short period. This suggests the attacker operated a direct route to the exchange alongside other methods to accelerate cash-out early on.The damage is calculated based on two criteria:Total M Token Outflow (Direct): 2,151.11 M, approx. $2,881.39 (Combined sum of direct transfers to exchange + EOA/Gathering Wallet).Total M Token Outflow (Including Bridge): 8,280.11 M, approx. $11,150.17 (Direct outflow + Meson bridge outflow included).Furthermore, clues suggesting a connection to specific social accounts and developer community profiles were identified in Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), which was confirmed as a key hub for money laundering. Based on this, grounds to narrow down suspect candidates have been partially secured. However, this is a circumstantial judgment based on the correlation between public information (OSINT) and on-chain data, and is not a legally confirmed conclusion.1.1 Summary StatisticsThe key flows are summarized as follows:1.2 Summary of Key Flows (4 Core Paths)Path 1: Victim → Direct Outflow to Bitget (Attempt at Immediate Cash-out)A total of 2,140.72 M (approx. $2,867) was directly transferred from the Victim Wallet (0xdc54…) to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…).The deposit was collected into the Bitget exchange hot wallet (Bitget 6, 0x1ab4…) within minutes (approx. 3–5 mins).This flow represents the attacker sending “M tokens that are easy to cash out immediately” straight to the exchange.Path 2: Victim → Gathering Wallet 1 → Meson Bridge → Gathering Wallet 2 (Mainstream of Indirect Laundering)After WM contract processing, 5 types of MRC-20 tokens were received by the Victim Wallet and then drained to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…e6).In Gathering Wallet 1, MRC-20s were swapped back to M, and 6,129 M was bridged via Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3).6,122.87 M arrived at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) on the BNB Chain.Path 3: Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Reconsolidation at Bitget Deposit 2 (Possible Mixing with Other Victims’ Funds)900.65 M from Gathering Wallet 1 and 5,007.02 M from Gathering Wallet 2 flowed into Suspect Bitget Deposit 2 (0xb408…).The combined total is 5,907.67 M. As there is a “possibility of other victims’ funds being mixed,” this needs to be interpreted separately from the victim’s sole damage amount.Subsequent collection into Bitget 6 (0x1ab4…) was confirmed.Path 4: Multi-chain Dispersed Withdrawal from Gathering Wallet 2 (Evasion/Smurfing)From Gathering Wallet 2, after swapping M → BNB, there is a record of 37.51 BNB being dispersed and withdrawn in 48 transactions to 5 exchanges: Bybit, Bitget, MEXC, Binance, and Remitano.Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base as well as BNB, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern.2. Incident Mechanism and Psychological AnalysisThis incident appears to have started from a social engineering scenario targeting human trust rather than technical flaws such as system vulnerabilities. It seems to be a variation of the typical “Pig Butchering (Sha Zhu Pan)” tactic adapted to the MemeCore ecosystem context. There are indications that the attacker analyzed the community atmosphere and the victim’s activity patterns beforehand to approach with a tailored script.2.1 Manipulating the Environment to Build Trust: “The Illusion of the Fake Room” The attack seems to have begun with an approach from an account mimicking an acquaintance active on Memex. In anonymous messenger environments like Telegram, profile pictures and Display Names can be configured similarly, and Usernames (Handles) are hard to distinguish with just a one-character difference. The attacker judged to have secured trust by exploiting these characteristics. The Telegram room the victim was invited to contained multiple accounts impersonating Admins and Creators. They staged the room to look like an “Official Community” by continuing conversations or sharing profit verification screenshots even before the victim joined. In such an environment, it was easy to mistake the room for an extension of the official Memex community, which became the basis for the fraud.2.2 Technical Deception: Fake Bot and Inducing Wallet Connection Once a certain level of trust was established, the attacker guided the victim saying, “You can receive staking rewards if you connect your wallet via the Telegram bot”. The method is close to a typical Phishing or Drainer type. The wallet (0xDC54…69b) the victim newly created and connected was a “clean wallet” with almost no transaction history. The moment the victim trusted the instructions and moved assets, it is likely the attacker secured control through one (or a combination) of the following methods:Possibility that the transaction signed via the bot was actually an Unlimited Token Approval, not staking.Possibility that it was designed to execute an asset Transfer transaction during the signing or connection process.Possibility that keys or permissions were exposed to the attacker during the wallet creation/connection process. The key point is that “Wallet Connection” may have turned into an act of handing over actual asset authority, rather than simple login or authentication.3. Technical Characteristics of MemeCore Ecosystem and Asset StructureTo interpret the fund flow, it is necessary to first understand the background of the MemeCore chain where the victim’s assets existed and the asset structure. This explains why the attacker performed repetitive swaps and why the laundering path developed into a specific pattern.3.1 MemeCore and Proof of Meme (PoM) MemeCore is a Layer 1 chain aimed at connecting the cultural value of Memes with an economic reward structure. It promotes Proof of Meme (PoM) as its consensus structure, which includes elements like community contribution and viral activities in the reward system alongside simple staking. The base asset of this chain is the M token. M is used for core functions such as gas fees, governance, and validator staking, and has relatively high liquidity, which is why the attacker ultimately pooled funds into M for laundering.3.2 MRC-20 Token Standard and Cash-out Constraints Tokens such as NinjaMEX, walxop, LIFT, Bubger, and Abudium identified in the swap path of this incident follow the MemeCore-specific token standard (MRC-20). These appear to be “transit tokens” temporarily passed through during the process of the attacker exchanging stolen assets on the internal DEX, rather than assets originally held by the victim. Technically similar to ERC-20, they are structured for the creation and circulation of meme tokens within MemeCore. The issue is external compatibility. Since it is rare for external chains, centralized exchanges, or bridges to directly support MRC-20, it is difficult for the attacker to move them out externally and cash them out in the MRC-20 state. Eventually, to proceed to the actual cash-out stage, they must go through the flow of: converting back to M on the internal DEX -> moving to an external chain (BNB Chain, etc.) via a bridge -> attempting cash-out via swap/dispersed withdrawal on the external chain. The massive internal swap transactions observed in the report are interpreted as reflecting the constraint of having to convert back to M for external export, along with the possibility of transit swaps intended to confuse tracking in some sections.4. Incident Timeline and Detailed Forensic ReconstructionThis incident is clearly divided into Reconnaissance & Testing on December 7 and the Main Exploit on December 8. The attacker checked the validity of the path the day before, and then stole all available assets and proceeded with rapid laundering the next day.4.1 Phase 1: Reconnaissance and Initial Infiltration (Dec 7) — Traces Left by Destination Choice Immediately after securing access rights, the attacker showed a pattern of verifying two things with small (or relatively small) transfers first, rather than moving the full amount immediately:Whether the wallet is actually usable by the attacker.Whether the exchange deposit is processed normally (no risk of detection/blocking). At 10:18 UTC, 388.717 M was transferred to Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and at 14:08 UTC, an additional 752 M was transferred via the same path. This flow aligns with the typical pattern of a small test followed by additional transfers. The notable point is that the receiving address 0x7a5d…337 is estimated to be a User-Assigned Deposit Address of a Centralized Exchange (Bitget), not a personal wallet. Funds flowing into this address were observed being collected into the Bitget hot wallet (0x1ab4…f23) within minutes. If cooperation with the exchange is established, there is a possibility that tracking can continue on an account basis (KYC-based).4.2 Phase 2: Full-Scale Asset Theft and Laundering (Dec 8) — Forced Conversion to M and Exfiltration The full-scale theft proceeded rapidly on December 8. In this phase, it is observed that repetitive processing of the WM contract and mass liquidation (swap) of MRC-20 tokens were carried out in parallel with simple transfers.4.2.1 WM Repetitive Processing Pattern: Between 06:45 and 06:49 UTC, 8 repetitive transactions occurred against the WM contract, confirming processing (Deposit/Withdraw) of approximately 8,000 M. This repetitive wrapping/unwrapping can be interpreted as (1) a staging to confuse tracking, or (2) a preparatory step to match the asset form required for subsequent swaps/bridging.4.2.2 Organized Outflow of 5 MRC-20 Tokens and Immediate Cash-out: Around 1:24 PM, continuous M→MRC-20 swap transactions via the internal DEX occurred in the victim’s wallet, which appear to have been performed by the attacker. Subsequently, these 5 MRC-20 tokens were transferred to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…eae6), where a process of converting them back to M via the Swap Router was observed. This choice is pragmatic from the attacker’s perspective. The longer low-liquidity meme tokens are held, the greater the price fluctuation and tracking traces may become. It seems the attacker chose to quickly convert MRC-20 to M to increase mobility and cash-out potential.4.3 Phase 3: Cross-Chain Bridging and Final Concealment — Attempt to Evade Tracking via Chain Hopping The secured M tokens did not stay in the MemeCore chain for long and were observed moving to the BNB Chain via the Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3) cross-chain bridge.Meson Bridge: 6,129 M Deposited.BNB Chain Arrival: 6,122.87 M received at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) (Approx. 3 mins to arrive). Gathering Wallet 2 subsequently acts as a hub to send funds to exchanges or disperse them to other chains (Base, Arbitrum). It has a strong character of a “Operational Wallet” used repeatedly rather than a simple transit point.5. Fund Flow Structure AnalysisFunds drained from the victim’s wallet moved largely in two directions:Direct Outflow straight to the exchange (Priority: Speed).Indirect Laundering via gathering wallets and bridges (Priority: Evasion).5.1 Key Deposit (Receiving) AddressesSuspect Bitget Deposit 1: 0x7a5d...337 / Received: 2,140.72 M (~$2,867.47) / Note: Exchange Transfer.Gathering Wallet 1 (MemeCore): 0x8325...eae6 / Received: 5 MRC-20s + 10.39 M / Note: MRC-20 → M Swap.Gathering Wallet 2 (Multi-chain Same Address): 0x1c00...285f / Received: 6,122.87 M & Multi-chain activity (BNB/Arbitrum/Base).Suspect Bitget Deposit 2: 0xb408...dd5c / Received: 5,907.67 M (~$7,969) / Note: From Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Exchange. Caution: Possibility of mixing with other victims' funds..5.2 Characteristics and Implications in Fund Flow First, the laundering strategy is split into two. Part of it prioritized speed by sending it quickly to the exchange (Path 1), while the rest tried to make tracking difficult through bridging and multi-chain dispersion (Paths 2, 4). Second, Bitget appears repeatedly. Both the direct outflow path (0x7a5d…) and the path from the gathering wallet (0xb408…) converge to Bitget deposit addresses. In particular, 0xb408… is a common point receiving funds from both Gathering Wallet 1 and Gathering Wallet 2, making it a candidate for a key cash-out window. However, as other victims’ funds may be mixed in this section, definitive conclusions should be avoided. Third, Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) functions as a central node that receives bridged funds and then performs exchange transfers or dispersion to other chains.5.3 Multi-Exchange Dispersed Withdrawal (Smurfing) Statistics (BNB Only) From Gathering Wallet 2 (BNB Chain) → Exchange Withdrawal Statistics:Bybit: 23.44 BNB / 16 txsBitget: 7.15 BNB / 2 txsMEXC Global: 5.06 BNB / 22 txsRemitano: 1.30 BNB / 4 txsBinance: 0.56 BNB / 4 txsTotal Exchange Withdrawals: 37.51 BNB / 48 txs / 5 Exchanges Note: After swapping M → BNB at Gathering Wallet 2, dispersed withdrawals were made to multiple exchanges. Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern. Reference: Remitano is known as a platform widely used for P2P trading in Southeast Asia, which can serve as a reference clue for geographic profiling (Note: Do not conclude).6. Relevant Actor Intelligence AnalysisIn this investigation, by cross-examining on-chain flows and off-chain public activity traces, we secured clues to narrow down the relevant Actor (Actor A) and associated account/profile candidates. The central address of the analysis is Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), and OSINT information was organized around this address.6.1 Circumstances Connecting On-Chain Activity and Digital Identity In this case, some clues were observed where 0x1c00…5f, identified as a key gathering address, could be connected to external public activities. If the same address is repeatedly mentioned or exposed in specific social accounts or community profiles, it can serve as important evidence connecting on-chain addresses with off-chain activities. There are circumstances where a specific social account marked as (Redacted) posted the 0x1c00…5f address multiple times in posts related to past airdrops, whitelist registrations, faucet participation, etc. This raises the possibility that the address is associated with the account’s activity to a certain level.6.2 Detailed Identity Profile (Circumstantial) In the OSINT investigation, circumstances were confirmed where the social account/handle marked as (Redacted) is connected to a specific bounty/task platform (e.g., Superteam Earn) account/profile. The following additional information is derived from this:Real Name/Legal Identity: (Redacted)Country/Region of Residence: (Redacted; Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns, etc.)Professional Identity: (Redacted; Based on self-introduction)Tech Stack Claims: (Redacted)Activity Character: (Redacted)Additional Explanation: Meaning of “Partially Consistent with Remitano Usage Patterns” Here, “Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns” does not mean concluding residence in a specific country/region (e.g., Vietnam) solely because Remitano appeared. It is intended to be referred to as a supplementary clue that increases probability from the perspective of Geo-profiling. specifically:Regional Character of Remitano: Remitano is known to be relatively widely used for P2P On/Off-ramp (cash-out/settlement) purposes in Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) rather than being used equally worldwide like global major exchanges. Therefore, if Remitano is naturally included and repeatedly observed in the multi-exchange withdrawal flow, the possibility that the actor’s living sphere/settlement environment touches the Southeast Asian region (including Vietnam) relatively increases.Hints form “Exchange Combination”: In this case, regional P2P channels like Remitano appear alongside general-purpose exchanges like Bybit, Binance, and MEXC. This combination can be interpreted as a form often observed in dispersed withdrawals considering the final cash-out route, rather than simple investor propensity.Therefore, Remitano traces are worth referencing as a “Geographic Clue Candidate”. However, it is a “Supplementary Clue,” not definitive evidence. Final confirmation must be made through cooperation/investigation data such as exchange KYC, login/access logs (IP/Device), and withdrawal methods (Bank/Payment info).7. Conclusion & Our CommitmentComprehensive Conclusion This incident, occurring on December 7–8, 2025, was a social engineering-based asset theft. Funds were laundered through two parallel paths:A direct path flowing straight into the Bitget exchange (Speed).An indirect path exfiltrated to external chains via the Meson bridge after internal swaps on MemeCore (Stealth).Additionally, circumstantial evidence links “Gathering Wallet 2” (0x1c00...5f) to specific social accounts and developer profiles, providing strong identification clues for law enforcement.Response Strategy ChainBounty has advised a phased response:Phase 1: Immediate reporting to law enforcement with key TxIDs and requesting asset freezing at Bitget.Phase 2: International cooperation review for cross-border tracking.Phase 3: Continuous monitoring of suspect addresses and community education on risk factors.Need help tracking stolen funds? Recovering stolen assets starts with professional tracking. If you have been targeted by a similar exploit, do not hesitate to reach out. ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program provides the forensic evidence needed for law enforcement reporting and exchange cooperation.👉 Apply for Victim Relief Program: https://chainbounty.io/en/event/campaign-victim-support/(Disclaimer: This report is based on on-chain data and public OSINT. Identity-related content is circumstantial estimation. Final legal judgments must be confirmed through lawful procedures by law enforcement agencies.)

ChainBounty

ChainBounty

9 months ago