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ChainBounty · Report analysis · CASE-10DA91A7Ethereum mainnet · Activity: September 30, 2026 · Source: SentinelTX report generated October 5, 2026SentinelTX’s MUSystem report follows four Ethereum transactions that combine supplied capital, repeated deposit-and-return cycles, and repaid flash loans. It reports a 5.335155071161390070 ETH reduction at the affected contract and a 3.190655071161390070 ETH increase at the initiating account before fees. A third address received 2.1445 ETH. The distinction between those amounts is central to the report: receipts, account changes, and an incident-wide loss answer different questions.Report status matters here. The exported PDF says its automated integrity gate downgraded six claims and flagged one finding. Its chronology and conclusion carry an “unverified (auto-downgraded)” label, and page 83 flags a time-inverted path. This article presents the report’s findings with those qualifications. The figures below adapt its bounded transaction narrative; they do not reproduce the flagged onward path or certify the report’s findings. (SentinelTX, pp. 4, 10, 17, 21, 83)The scope of the reportAll four transactions fall in Ethereum block 26,087,602, timestamped September 30, 2026, at 03:27:35 UTC. SentinelTX calls the first transaction the Run and the following three Sample 1, Sample 2, and Sample 3. The report’s accounting covers those four operations. It does not establish that they comprise the entire campaign or all activity involving the affected contract.The principal roles are the initiating and receiving externally owned account, or EOA; the contract it created and used to coordinate the operations; the affected MUSystem contract; and newly created helper contracts. The report calls the coordinating contract the attack contract. This article uses “orchestration contract” to make its execution role clear without suggesting a separately identified operator. The third recipient’s role and control remain unresolved.The report sets an observation cutoff of October 5, 2026, at 10:00 UTC. It separately identifies address-history, token, and balance observations retrieved around 10:11–10:15 UTC that day as later observations. That distinction matters when reading its statements about activity after the four transactions. (SentinelTX, pp. 4, 8, 18)The Run belongs in the calculationThe last three transactions produced receipts of approximately 5.9475 ETH, 5.0703 ETH, and 2.8368 ETH for the EOA. Together, those receipts total 13.854604425661360100 ETH. Looking only at that part of the sequence omits the EOA’s earlier contribution in the Run.In the Run, the EOA sent 10.7 ETH to the orchestration contract and received 0.036050645500029970 ETH back. Its net change for that transaction was therefore −10.663949354499970030 ETH before fees. The Run also contained the same repeated-cycle pattern seen later; it was more than a preliminary funding transfer.SentinelTX breaks the Run into a priming deposit and sixteen helper cycles. The orchestration contract first paid 44.101139073399812544 ETH to the affected contract. During that call, the affected contract sent 26.460683444039887526 ETH back to the orchestration contract and 2.1445 ETH to the unresolved third address. The report gives the affected contract’s net increase on this leg as 15.495955629359925018 ETH.The sixteen subsequent cycles reduced the affected contract’s ETH by 6.976506274859954988 ETH. Combining those two parts leaves the affected contract with a reported Run increase of 8.519449354499970030 ETH. The later sample transactions then reduce that amount. Including the Run is essential to understanding the four-transaction result. (SentinelTX, pp. 6, 10–11)Figure 1. The report’s four-transaction sequence in one Ethereum block. It records 16 helper contracts in the Run, 16 in Sample 1, 16 in Sample 2, and 11 in Sample 3, for 59 in total. These counts describe contracts, not independent people. All four transactions share the block timestamp; spacing shows sequence rather than elapsed time.Color key: Slate identifies sequence markers and the directly labeled helper counts.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 4, 8, 10, 13–15. The chronology is marked unverified by the report’s automated gate. Transaction links appear in the source register below.One deposit, two returnsThe first helper cycle in Sample 1 provides a compact example of the pattern SentinelTX describes. The proxy at 0x8b0856e9b0787d09f9abded66bccc85feb5561d4 calls the affected contract with 53.355703172210117028 ETH. It receives an initial payment of 32.253522567601017211 ETH. After a second call, it receives another 21.502348378400678141 ETH.The two payments total 53.755870946001695352 ETH. The proxy then forwards that amount to the orchestration contract. The excess over the original deposit is 0.400167773791578324 ETH for this cycle. Repeated deposits and forwarding create much larger gross movement volumes, so adding every leg would obscure the net result. The report explicitly excludes gross helper forwarding and large graph aggregates from its economic totals. (SentinelTX, pp. 12, 15)Diagram 1. The ETH legs in Sample 1’s first helper cycle, as described in the report. The same proxy sends 53.355703172210117028 ETH and receives two payments totaling 53.755870946001695352 ETH, an excess of 0.400167773791578324 ETH. Artwork values are rounded. Equal-width arrows show the direction of each leg, not its relative size.Color key: Slate outlines the same proxy P in each row; sage outlines the affected contract. Slate amount text labels the deposit and sage amount text labels the two returns.Address key: Proxy = 0x8b0856e9…561d4; affected contract = 0x9bdf81e6…d9364. The proxy appearing in each row is the same account. MUS token movements are outside this native-ETH calculation.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 12, 17–18; Sample 1 transaction. The report marks the cycle-pattern observation unverified and treats the root-cause explanation as attributed analysis.The proposed explanation comes from external research cited in the PDF. SentinelTX attributes to SlowMist a first-deposit bonus that was credited both in an immediate ETH refund and in the user’s MUS allocation, with same-transaction redemption allowing total ETH returned to exceed the deposit. It also cites the DeFiHackLabs reproduction. SentinelTX did not execute that reproduction, and it does not present the root cause as independently verified from the affected contract’s source code.The report distinguishes that explanation from its interpretation of the calls. It says the first selector matches the common deposit() signature, while the second selector’s ABI meaning remains undecoded. It treats the use of fresh proxies as consistent with a per-address first-deposit condition, rather than as decoded proof of that condition. In the example, the first and second payments are approximately 60.45 percent and 40.30 percent of the deposit. Those proportions describe this example; they are not a constant return promised for every cycle. (SentinelTX, pp. 17–18)Borrowed WETH supplied working capitalSentinelTX reports a Balancer Vault WETH loan in each transaction, with the principal returned in the same transaction. It also says the corresponding native-ETH unwrap and rewrap amounts match. These movements explain how substantial capital passes through the execution sequence without turning the entire principal into a reported loss.WETH principal borrowed and repaidRun: 70.940455629359925017 WETHSample 1: 53.355703172210117028 WETHSample 2: 45.486053167691556828 WETHSample 3: 38.777129899239648888 WETHThe report attributes a zero FlashLoan fee to the analyst’s receipt parsing, citing log indexes 276, 345, 414, and 463. It also notes a conflict with a comment in the public reproduction about attacker-owned capital and says it prefers the receipt evidence. These are the report’s stated source choices; this article does not claim to have rerun the reproduction or independently re-established the loans. (SentinelTX, pp. 7, 17)MUS remains a separate token record. The PDF describes a 49.75309010988246 MUS transfer, at display precision, from the affected contract to the orchestration contract in the Run. It calls this a transfer or allocation because the source is the affected contract rather than the zero address. It leaves token decimals, raw values, and log-level completeness unresolved in its anchored evidence. Neither that displayed quantity nor the WETH principal is added to native ETH when calculating the four-transaction changes. (SentinelTX, pp. 7–8, 21–22)From receipts to the net changeThe EOA’s three sample receipts exceed 13.85 ETH, but the preceding Run produces a negative EOA change of more than 10.66 ETH. SentinelTX’s four-transaction total incorporates both sides.EOA native-ETH change before feesRun: −10.663949354499970030 ETHSample 1: +5.947512945688151244 ETHSample 2: +5.070290034224630664 ETHSample 3: +2.836801445748578192 ETHFour-transaction change: +3.190655071161390070 ETHThe report separately attributes 0.005781774786752720 ETH in fees to these four transactions. Deducting those fees gives its stated EOA change of +3.184873296374637350 ETH. That number excludes other costs and any value associated with residual MUS. It is not an account balance or a campaign-wide profit figure. (SentinelTX, pp. 6–7, 21–22)Figure 2. The report’s native-ETH changes for the EOA across the four transactions, before fees. The negative Run and three positive sample receipts produce a reported total increase of 3.190655071161390070 ETH. Values in the artwork are rounded; the table preserves the PDF’s precision. The scope is a change across selected transactions, not the wallet’s starting or ending balance.Color key: Slate is the Run; sage is Samples 1–3. Explicit signs and the zero axis distinguish decreases from increases.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 6–7, 21–22. The report’s conclusion marks these findings unverified (auto-downgraded). Full transaction links and hashes are listed below.At the account level, SentinelTX reports a reduction of 5.335155071161390070 ETH at the affected contract, an increase of 3.190655071161390070 ETH at the EOA before fees, and a 2.1445 ETH receipt at the third address. Its reconciliation assigns zero net ETH to the orchestration contract and the 59 helpers within each transaction. These net changes are an accounting summary; they do not identify the third recipient’s owner or purpose.The approximately $36,900 headline remains a separate, attributed claim. SentinelTX credits it to SlowMist and explicitly declines to reconcile it to the native-asset figures. The article therefore does not convert the report’s ETH changes into a new dollar-loss estimate. (SentinelTX, pp. 6, 8, 18, 21–22)The third recipient and the limits of the traceThe third address, 0xA30911099156608A32e35c11aCf2956258E0F645, receives its 2.1445 ETH during the Run’s priming-deposit call. SentinelTX does not establish whether the recipient is controlled by the attacker, unrelated to the attacker, a fee or referral recipient, or an existing participant. Its appearance in the sequence supports a reported payment, not one of those explanations.The PDF’s post-incident observations are also bounded. It says no outbound movement from the EOA was observed in the queried datasets through the later retrieval period around 10:11–10:15 UTC on October 5. It identifies no exchange deposit on the examined outbound paths of the EOA or orchestration contract. The report expressly says those observations do not prove unspent proceeds, recovery, a freeze, or current balances. Later blocks, other chains, and off-chain disposition fall outside those conclusions. (SentinelTX, pp. 8, 18, 22)Earlier funding history should be read in its own time. The report places the RAILGUN Relay Adapt receipt and LiFi departure before the incident, and it leaves the origin of the later Relay.link payout unresolved. It excludes that earlier history from incident proceeds and cash-out totals. The service labels do not establish who controlled the EOA or what anyone intended. These earlier routes are not drawn as an onward path in this article. (SentinelTX, pp. 10, 18)What the report concludesThe useful distinction in this case is between capital that passed through the contracts and the net changes the report assigns to the selected transactions. SentinelTX describes a repeated two-payment cycle and reports a positive EOA change after including the Run’s contribution. It keeps the repaid WETH principal, native-ETH account changes, and MUS transfer record separate.Its unresolved questions remain material: the third recipient’s role, activity outside the four transactions and outside Ethereum, the origin of the Relay.link payout, token-level details, and an additional orchestration-contract nonce increment. The PDF’s own proposed next steps include source and ABI decoding, a fuller log-level token ledger, and a dated valuation with an agreed incident scope. None of these is presented as completed work. (SentinelTX, pp. 18, 21–22)Figure 3. The conclusion and its limits, adapted from SentinelTX. The reported four-transaction amounts do not establish total campaign loss, real-world control of the third recipient, current holdings, recovery, or completed cash-out. The source PDF retains an automated integrity warning and labels the conclusion unverified.Color key: Slate labels the unresolved section; amber frames the directly stated report-integrity warning. Color does not indicate attribution or independently verified status.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-10DA91A7, pp. 21–22 and 83. The INV-5 warning concerns a time-inverted path in the report; that path is not included in these figures.Source register and report noteThis article adapts SentinelTX’s “MUSystem: Four-Transaction Ethereum Investigation — 30 September 2026,” case CASE-10DA91A7, an 85-page PDF generated on October 5, 2026, at 11:25:40 UTC. Page references above refer to that export. The source is the exported report, including its attributed claims and integrity qualifications; the article is not an independent on-chain audit or a certification of the report’s signature or custody claims.The four transaction identifiers in the PDF are:Run: 0xc6116f5ffa7935f3b06f71fc13e3ab0bf5e09a2b1091a134c79619447ce456f2Sample 1: 0xfe28118e48c64b275b587c90da472fc13b8c3dbed9d3cded1e18c1e7a7fc0392Sample 2: 0xaa172fcaa4800b14826daed1a78c9d6dcd8f26ae45ce5f31786d55768b709ec6Sample 3: 0x905af4e8cdaf32c183605358c97181e9ad57393bd4ed1d945baf6d6eebe983feExternal analysis cited by the report:SlowMist’s MUS disclosure, for the attributed mechanism and approximately $36,900 headlineDeFiHackLabs’ MUS reproduction, which the report cites but did not executeAddress key, using the roles in this article:Initiating / receiving EOA: 0x1a083ADf234a8f67ad65A9B9B616853ACf5998E5Orchestration contract, called the attack contract in the PDF: 0xD1a7A2A3c27962E80E9B6B46D54094F93267e988Affected contract: 0x9bdf81e6066d32764b7e75a1b5577237e06d9364Third recipient, role and control unresolved: 0xA30911099156608A32e35c11aCf2956258E0F645Sample 1’s first proxy: 0x8b0856e9b0787d09f9abded66bccc85feb5561d4Balancer Vault: 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8WETH contract: 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2

ChainBounty · Investigation analysisBase mainnet · Activity: October 4, 2026 · Reviewed: October 5, 2026Six transactions moved 1,783.067 aBaswstETH from a Base vault to an intermediate contract on October 4. The selected records then show receipt-token forwarding, a withdrawal of the underlying wstETH, and two Base-side bridge initiations totaling 1,001 wstETH. This reconstruction follows those movements through 20 transaction records, separating the token route from the reported exploit mechanism and the still-unverified destination-chain receipts.Key findingsSix vault outflows transferred exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH to a contract deployed by the same address that submitted the outflow transactions.Eight forwarding transfers preceded a pool withdrawal that released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH.Two Base bridge initiations burned 1 and 1,000 wstETH. The events identify an intended recipient; this review has not established receipt on Ethereum.The review covers one contract deployment and 19 token-movement transactions. All times below are UTC. Approximate figures are marked in the text. The linked receipts retain full addresses and native token precision, and all 20 records are listed below.Figure 1. The observed route from vault receipt tokens to two Base-side bridge initiations. Circular nodes identify roles; equal-width arrows show the token route without encoding quantities or elapsed time. Six vault transfers moved exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH; eight forwards moved approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH to Address A. At 09:23:13 UTC, a pool withdrawal burned aBaswstETH and released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH to that same address. Address A then made two transfers to Address B, which initiated bridge withdrawals of 1 and 1,000 wstETH. These are successive stages, not amounts to add together. This schematic groups the route by role; Figure 4 shows the interleaved downstream transaction order. ≈ marks rounding to three decimals. Ethereum receipt has not been verified.Address key: Vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc; intermediate contract 0xcdfe91…1f569d; Address A 0x0b5126…edb034; Address B 0xc73448…297f8d. Base burn denotes the token Transfer to the zero address in each bridge initiation, not a transfer to the bridge contract.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The reported incident and the two assetsBlockaid’s October 4 public alert described an exploit of an unnamed vault involving a newly whitelisted contract and estimated about US$2.02 million across approximately four transactions. PeckShield’s alert separately suggested that about 1,783 wstETH, valued at roughly US$6 million, had been drained. These are attributed alert estimates. This review does not assign a revised dollar loss.The distinction between the two assets is central to the trace. aBaswstETH is an Aave receipt token representing supplied assets and accrued yield. wstETH is the underlying asset released in the later pool withdrawal. Aave’s tokenization documentation explains that a withdrawal burns aTokens and releases the underlying asset. Adding the receipt-token transfers, the withdrawal, and the bridge burns would count successive stages of the same position repeatedly.Contract deployment and vault outflowsAddress 0x0b5126…edb034 deployed the intermediate contract, 0xcdfe91…1f569d, at 07:28:57. It later submitted the six transactions that moved aBaswstETH from vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc to that contract.The first outflow, for 1 aBaswstETH, occurred at 08:55:01, 86 minutes and four seconds after deployment. Five more transfers followed: 100, 500, 500, 500, and 182.067 aBaswstETH. The last outflow occurred at 09:12:37. Together, the six transfers moved exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds.Figure 2. Six vault-to-contract outflows of aBaswstETH on October 4, 2026, in UTC transaction order. The exact amounts are 1, 100, 500, 500, 500, and 182.067, totaling 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds. Bar length starts at zero and encodes token quantity. Rows are equally spaced for comparison, not elapsed time; the 1-token outflow is less than one pixel long at the 720-pixel image width, so its exact value is labeled.Source: the six vault-outflow receipts linked under Sources and method.The route in Figure 1 follows the token Transfer events; Figure 2 compares the six vault outflow amounts. The transaction sender is a separate field: 0x0b5126…edb034 submitted calls to the intermediate contract, while the token Transfer events name the vault as the source of aBaswstETH. That distinction connects the calls to the observed movements without claiming that the vault itself signed a transaction.Receipt-token forwardingEight transactions moved aBaswstETH from the intermediate contract to 0x0b5126…edb034. The first forward, for 1 aBaswstETH, occurred at 08:56:25, 84 seconds after the first vault outflow. The forwarding sequence ended at 09:15:09.Figure 3. Six vault outflows and eight receipt-token forwards through an intermediate contract. The outflows total exactly 1,783.067 aBaswstETH over 17 minutes and 36 seconds. Forwarding overlaps the outflows; ≈ marks its rounded total. Rows are evenly spaced, not an elapsed-time scale. The receiving address deployed the contract at 07:28:57 UTC.Address key: Vault 0xd1895f…cfcabc; Intermediate contract 0xcdfe91…1f569d; Receiving address 0x0b5126…edb034.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The repeated calls have two distinct selectors: 0x9a39f8dd in the transactions containing vault outflows and 0xcb984317 in the forwarding transactions. Their timing supports a description of staged transfer-and-forward execution. A small first movement followed by larger transfers does not, by itself, establish whether the first movement was a deliberate test.The observed forwarding total is approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH. At full precision it differs slightly from the vault-outflow total, and the receipts also include small zero-address mint transfers. These are separate recorded totals; their small difference should not be treated as an additional loss.Withdrawal of the underlying wstETHAt 09:23:13, 0x0b5126…edb034 called a contract labeled “Aave: Pool Proxy Base” by Basescan. Its decoded Withdraw event identifies wstETH as the reserve asset and the same address as the recipient.The transaction burned approximately 1,783.067 aBaswstETH and released approximately 1,783.067 wstETH. Those are related sides of one pool withdrawal. The underlying asset moves out of the pool to the recipient, supporting the description of a withdrawal or redemption rather than a debt repayment.Diagram 1. Two accounting legs of one Aave pool withdrawal on Base at 09:23:13 UTC on October 4, 2026. The selected receipt records a Transfer of exactly 1,783.067000109162566728 aBaswstETH to the zero address (a receipt-token burn) and the release of exactly 1,783.067000294435092335 wstETH to the same holder, Address A. The displayed amounts are rounded to three decimals. The upper arrow represents the receipt-token burn within the pool operation; it is not an additional transfer to a new address. The diagram describes the recorded withdrawal and does not establish an exploit mechanism.Address key: Holder / same holder is Address A, 0x0b5126…edb034. Pool operation is a process label; reserve denotes the underlying-wstETH reserve in the selected receipt.Source: Pool-withdrawal receipt and logs.This is the point where the reviewed route changes from receipt-token transfers to movement of the underlying asset. The pool interaction provides no evidence of a vulnerability in Aave’s contracts. The separate question is how the vault’s receipt tokens became available to the transaction-sending address.Two Base bridge initiationsAt 09:24:15, the withdrawing address sent 1 wstETH to 0xc73448…297f8d. At 09:27:29, that second address initiated a withdrawal through 0xac9d11…4287ab. Lido’s official contract list identifies the call target as its Base L2 ERC20 Token Bridge.The bridge receipt records a 1-wstETH Transfer to the zero address and a WithdrawalInitiated event. The call went to the bridge contract; the token movement was a burn on Base.The larger transfer to the second address came at 10:47:23, for approximately 1,782.067 wstETH. Using their full precision, the two selected transfers sum exactly to the wstETH received in the pool withdrawal.At 12:10:59, the second address initiated a further withdrawal of 1,000 wstETH through the same bridge. Both WithdrawalInitiated events specify 0xc73448…297f8d as the intended destination-side recipient.Figure 4. Five downstream transactions in order: pool withdrawal; transfer; bridge-withdrawal burn; transfer; bridge-withdrawal burn. The 1-wstETH bridge initiation precedes the larger transfer between addresses. Both bridge branches end at Base-side burns; Ethereum receipt has not been verified. Rows are evenly spaced, not an elapsed-time scale.Address key: Token contract 0x99cbc4…42ef0d; First address 0x0b5126…edb034 (the upstream receiving address); Second address 0xc73448…297f8d; Base-side burn is the zero address.Source: Basescan transaction receipts linked under Sources and method.The two initiations total exactly 1,001 wstETH. Their order matters: the first bridge initiation happened before the second address received the larger transfer. Grouping both transfers ahead of both burns would misrepresent that sequence.Where the trace stopsThe vault’s permission path remains unresolved. Blockaid reported a newly whitelisted contract, but the reviewed transfers do not independently establish that change or show how it was authorized. The relevant vault implementation, administrative history, and execution traces are needed to test that explanation. The transaction records also do not identify a person or establish common beneficial control of both addresses.The two Base events specify an intended recipient, but this review has not matched either initiation to an Ethereum finalization transaction. A destination-chain continuation needs the corresponding withdrawal message, token amount, receiving address, and confirmed receipt before it can follow any onward movement.Finally, subtracting the two bridge burns from the two selected inflows to 0xc73448…297f8d leaves approximately 782.067 wstETH. This is an arithmetic difference, not a verified current balance. A balance finding needs a query at a specified block or a complete reconciliation through a stated cutoff, including any other transfers.Figure 5. Where the verified trace stops. The selected Base receipts show two bridge-withdrawal initiations of 1 and 1,000 wstETH, totaling exactly 1,001 wstETH. Ethereum receipt has not been verified. Vault permission, destination finalization, and current balance remain to be established from the evidence listed here. A difference between selected transfer amounts is not a verified balance.Source: 1 wstETH initiation; 1,000 wstETH initiation.Sources and methodThis reconstruction uses 20 successful Base transaction records inspected on Basescan on October 5, 2026, including relevant decoded events. It is a selected-record review, not a complete account-history reconciliation or a self-hosted chain replay. The public alert estimates are separately attributed above.Chart 1. Composition of the 20 distinct successful Base transaction records reviewed for this article. Receipt-token movements: 14 (70%), comprising six vault outflows and eight forwards. Underlying-asset records: five (25%), comprising one pool withdrawal, two transfers between addresses, and two Base bridge initiations. Contract deployment: one (5%). Each transaction is assigned once by its role; the withdrawal is counted once with the underlying-asset records despite including both a receipt-token burn and underlying release. The percentages describe the selected evidence, not token quantities, losses, account balances, or coverage of all chain activity.Source: the 20 distinct transaction receipts in the source list below; reviewed October 5, 2026.Contract deployment: 07:28:57Vault outflows: 08:55:01, 09:08:13, 09:09:21, 09:10:19, 09:11:11, 09:12:37Receipt-token forwards: 08:56:25, 09:08:53, 09:09:43, 09:10:45, 09:11:49, 09:13:27, 09:14:15, 09:15:09Pool withdrawal: 09:23:13Transfers between addresses: 09:24:15, 10:47:23Base bridge initiations: 09:27:29, 12:10:59

Investigation FindingsExecutive SummaryOn 1 October 2026, a third-party FlashLoopAdapter enabled execution from two Safe accounts. The exploit transaction delivered 114.096151469674448809 ETH to the initiating EOA. The evidence points to delegated module authority, not an exploit of Aave V3 core. SlowMist primary analysis and clarification.The strongest downstream finding is an exact fee split: 114.030726169100264326 ETH was wrapped, 113.745649353677513666 WETH entered the RAILGUN privacy-system proxy, and 0.285076815422750660 WETH went to the protocol treasury. The visible route ends at that privacy boundary; it does not identify a hidden recipient or prove an exchange cash-out.Measure / scopeVerified resultExploit proceeds received114.096151469674448809 ETH; counted oncePrivate-pool transfer113.745649353677513666 WETHTreasury fee0.285076815422750660 WETHScopeEthereum; focused funding and outbound routeInvestigation cutoff4 October 2026, 23:32:47 UTC; block 26122303Evidence basisSentinelTX call traces and receipts, independently checked Etherscan anchors, SlowMist primary analysisCore findingWhat establishes itDelegated authorityVictim-emitted module success logs 1023 and 1030Exact extraction accountingReceipt logs separate collateral, repaid debt, returned loan and ETH proceedsPrivacy boundaryShield receipt separates private-pool transfer and protocol feeFinding 1 — How Did the Safe Accounts Execute Without Owner Signatures?The question is not whether a wallet signed the initiating transaction—it did—but whether the victims’ owners signed the Safe executions that removed assets. The traced exploit used module executions. No owner-signed Safe execution was observed in the inspected call tree.Observed call relationshipEvidence / interpretationAdapter → victim Safe 1Module execution targeting weETH transferAdapter → victim Safe 2Module execution targeting lending-pool withdrawalAdapter → execution helperAdditional module execution frames naming the helper as the SafeCoverage boundary259 frames reported; 134 returned by the trace tool—not a complete replaySlowMist reports that open()/close() checked ISafe(msg.sender).isModuleEnabled(address(this)), allowing a fake caller to answer its own authentication check. It then describes attacker-controlled router.call data targeting genuine victim Safes through execTransactionFromModule. This source-level explanation is attributed research; our call-trace evidence supports the module-execution route, but we did not independently compile or replay the adapter. SlowMist primary analysis and clarification. 0x75328f916b1a0878724d364da5eb12b255160b894cb36c63ed5d718efc616fc4.Receipt corroboration — two victim-emitted success eventsBoth victim Safe contracts emitted ExecutionFromModuleSuccess naming the same adapter. Log 1023 follows the first victim’s weETH Transfer; log 1030 follows the second victim’s Aave withdrawal. These events independently corroborate the module route beyond the partial call trace. They establish successful execution by the named module, but do not by themselves reconstruct the caller’s authorization check or the owners’ earlier decision to enable it. Exploit receipt: decoded event logs.The implication is a separate authorization boundary: enabling a module grants executable authority beyond the ordinary owner-signature path. SlowMist explicitly clarified that Aave V3 core was unaffected. The current enabled-module lists and the complete set of exposed Safes were not enumerated; two observed victims are not a total exposure count.Finding 2 — Which Amount Is the Loss, and Which Is Reused Liquidity?The exploit receipt and internal movements show WETH unwrapped into the execution helper and then paid to the attack EOA. Those two legs describe the same 114.096151469674448809 ETH and must be counted once. 0x75328f916b1a0878724d364da5eb12b255160b894cb36c63ed5d718efc616fc4.QuantityClassificationEvidence boundary114.096151469674448809 ETHExploit proceeds receivedExact internal transfer11,537.239738536922710940 WETHMorpho loan and matching returnExact logs 1014–1015 and 1059; returned liquidity1,335.255802777509633370 WETHDebt repaymentExact Repay event for victim Safe 2, log 10211,449.351954247184082179 WETHSwap outputExact WETH transfer to helper, log 1058The large flash loan provides temporary liquidity for repayment and collateral release. It was returned, so counting it as stolen funds would inflate the incident by two orders of magnitude. Proceeds received are also not necessarily each victim’s gross collateral loss: debt repayment changes the net economic calculation. The receipt now establishes each victim’s exact token movements. A single ETH-denominated loss for each victim still requires an explicit weETH valuation basis and account-state reconciliation.Subtracting only exploit-transaction gas gives 114.092231045147641069 ETH. That is an arithmetic subtotal, not an all-in profit claim: deployment costs, forwarding costs and other activity are not completely reconciled.Victim Safe 1 — direct token removalThe first victim transferred 6.426087021311600894 weETH directly to the execution helper in log 1022. Its own module-success event follows in log 1023. This is an exact token outflow; it must not be relabeled as 6.426087 ETH or added to a WETH figure without a conversion basis. Exploit receipt: decoded event logs.Receipt itemExact resultVictimSafe 1; full account address in evidence appendixweETH outflow6.426087021311600894 weETHTransfer evidenceLog 1022; victim → execution helperModule executionLog 1023; adapter named by victimVictim Safe 2 — collateral removal after debt repaymentThe helper paid 1,335.255802777509633370 WETH against Safe 2’s debt. The Pool Repay event identifies both that victim and the helper as repayer. The Pool then records withdrawal of 1,306.482324969756972729 weETH for Safe 2 to the same helper; the token Transfer corroborates it. Gross collateral removed and debt extinguished are economically different legs. Exploit receipt: decoded event logs.Receipt itemExact resultDebt repaid for Safe 21,335.255802777509633370 WETH; logs 1020–1021Collateral delivered to helper1,306.482324969756972729 weETH; logs 1027 and 1029aToken burn value1,306.482262583889567736; log 1026Accrued balance increase0.000062385867404993; log 1026Module executionLog 1030; adapter named by victimThe aToken burn value plus its logged balanceIncrease equals the underlying weETH withdrawal exactly. Counting the burn, Transfer and Withdraw as three losses would triple-count the same collateral leg. The debt-token Burn likewise separates 1,329.536830578102452349 from 5.718972199407181021 of balance increase; together they equal the 1,335.255802777509633370 WETH repayment. These are receipt reconciliations, not independent cash movements.Helper accounting — why the flash loan cancels outHelper WETH legExact amount / receiptMorpho loan in11,537.239738536922710940 WETH; logs 1014–1015WETH debt repayment out1,335.255802777509633370 WETH; logs 1020–1021WETH swap output in1,449.351954247184082179 WETH; log 1058Morpho loan returned11,537.239738536922710940 WETH; log 1059WETH unwrapped114.096151469674448809 WETH; log 1060The matching loan-in and loan-return cancel. Swap output minus debt repayment equals 114.096151469674448809 WETH exactly, matching the withdrawal event and subsequent ETH receipt. This explains the observed extraction without treating temporary liquidity as incident loss. The helper also retained approximately 0.008411991 weETH in the explorer’s rounded token overview; it is excluded from the exact ETH subtotal because that overview is not an exact balance proof. Exploit receipt: decoded event logs.Combined execution and settlement mapThis supplementary overview connects the module-execution boundary with both collateral outflows and helper settlement. The dashed paths represent authority calls; the dotted path is a repayment prerequisite, not a token transfer. Solid paths show selected asset movements. The flash-loan return is shown separately from extracted proceeds.The diagram rounds amounts to six decimals. The native receipt tables preserve exact quantities; it does not convert weETH into ETH one-for-one or claim a complete execution trace.Finding 3 — What Actually Entered the Private Pool?The forwarding transfer is larger than the exploit receipt because the EOA had pre-existing funding. It cannot be treated as an exclusively stolen-funds figure. The next transaction converts the gross ETH input to WETH and divides it between the privacy-system proxy and treasury. 0x3a5663d9a3d32bdea3c3012fd9dbaf490195ed413204c4db8f1097e1e7f753f9. 0xa20636bf3792f705ae51a48afdec336fb0518cd43365a8fc3e596dea23266dc9.Shield receipt legExact WETHLogWrapped input114.030726169100264326262Transfer to privacy-system proxy113.745649353677513666266Transfer to treasury0.285076815422750660267Shield eventSupports the amount / fee split268The allocation chart below uses a shared linear WETH scale. The fee bar is intentionally tiny: enlarging it without a separate scale would misrepresent the 0.25% allocation. Chart labels are rounded to six decimals; the native table above preserves the full values and receipt indices.The two transfers sum exactly to the wrapped input. The treasury fee is 0.25% rounded down at token precision; transaction gas of 0.001793902352363730 ETH is separate. The treasury leg is a protocol fee—not evidence of cash-out, common ownership, or a recovery target. We independently checked these visible Etherscan logs against the SentinelTX follow-up result.Timeline — Funding, Execution and DispositionAll times below are UTC on 1 October 2026. These are selected transaction anchors, not a claim that every intervening transaction has been accounted for.UTC / blockEventAmount14:15:23 / 26098000RAILGUN withdrawal funds attack EOA0.049875 ETH net received15:08:47 / 26098264Exploit helper pays attack EOA114.096151469674448809 ETH16:45:59 / 26098748Attack EOA forwards to intermediate EOA114.130726169100264326 ETH16:46:59 / 26098753Intermediate EOA sends Relay Adapt input114.030726169100264326 ETHFunding to exploitation took 53 minutes 24 seconds. The creation transaction preceded exploitation by six minutes; forwarding followed exploitation by 1 hour 37 minutes 12 seconds, and shielding followed forwarding by 60 seconds. These measured intervals are consistent with a prepared execution sequence, but do not identify a person or prove coordination with any service operator.Helper creation — a direct infrastructure anchorThe creation transaction at block 26098235, 1 October 2026 15:02:47 UTC, was signed by the same initiating EOA and sent to a separate contract; the explorer identifies the helper as created within that transaction. This establishes a transaction-level infrastructure link. It does not justify calling the EOA the direct CREATE caller without inspecting the creation call frame. 0x0c2bbaf2b5ebf1102e0df4acb1bcc2c7bc920896c45da6f85b4e9442506a3884.Creation anchorObserved resultTransaction signer0x42c2633438609881c8fBAb82414eb9A0c45F9353Transaction target0x4a418c7132d452705a2123e95B5b9bFdF3b1f84aCreated helper0xf09168963ac7b31917a02aa82fa9cd667f4b67ffUTC / block2026-10-01 15:02:47 / 26098235Creation transaction0x0c2bbaf2b5ebf1102e0df4acb1bcc2c7bc920896c45da6f85b4e9442506a3884Wallet network — how the public route connectsThe account-level overview below joins the victim collateral legs with the directly observed outbound route. V2 collateral is delivered by the Aave token contract, not by a direct Safe token transfer. The funding origin is a separate earlier privacy-service withdrawal; using the same public infrastructure does not prove a shared hidden owner. Exact transaction anchors remain in the evidence appendix.Diagram nodeFull Ethereum account / contractV1 · Victim Safe 10xe3b23e47df7cd85876ac6cb05bdb9d7cd5b28520V2 · Victim Safe 20xcfedf95a3653a128dfc2e4288758a1a1850d169fH · Execution helper0xf09168963ac7b31917a02aa82fa9cd667f4b67ffA · Attack EOA0x42c2633438609881c8fBAb82414eb9A0c45F9353R · Forwarding EOA0x951ad21b85c1ce165f15d548a7c7d42520a32f1aS · Relay Adapt0xac9f360ae85469b27aeddeafc579ef2d052ad405P · Privacy-system proxy0xfa7093cdd9ee6932b4eb2c9e1cde7ce00b1fa4b9T · Protocol treasury0xe8a8b458bcd1ececc6b6b58f80929b29ccecff40Aave Pool0x87870bca3f3fd6335c3f4ce8392d69350b4fa4e2Morpho flash lender0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcbThe role-labelled nodes are verified account or contract anchors, not a common-owner cluster. The 114.130726 ETH forwarding transfer exceeds the exploit receipt because it includes pre-existing balance. Relay Adapt wraps 114.030726 ETH, then the receipt splits WETH between the privacy-system proxy and treasury. The treasury payment is a protocol fee, not attacker cash-out. No verified edge continues from the private pool to a hidden withdrawal or exchange.Connection Evidence — Direct Transfers Are Not Identity EvidenceA same-transaction call chain directly connects the initiating EOA, helper, adapter and victim executions. Two later transaction hashes directly connect the initiating EOA to the forwarding EOA and Relay Adapt. These are transaction relationships, not human attribution.Proposed connectionEvidence levelConclusionAttack EOA → helper → adapter → victimsDirect inspected call traceExecution relationship establishedAttack EOA → forwarding EOA → RAILGUNDirect value transfersVisible disposition route establishedFunding withdrawal and shield use same public serviceShared service patternDoes not establish hidden owner continuitySimilar-looking addressesPotential poisoningDo not merge into attacker clusterPost-shield withdrawal of similar sizeHeuristic onlyAmount / timing alone cannot attribute fundsLimits and Alternative InterpretationsThe traced scope is Ethereum. Two reported Optimism activities were not inspected. The exact exploit receipt and helper creation transaction were checked in this revision. Adapter source code, a complete replay, incident-block module lists, the precise CREATE caller and each victim’s pre/post account valuation remain unestablished. Historical owner/setup claims from the first automated result were withdrawn in the follow-up and are not used here.The RAILGUN funding-transaction signer may be an independent relayer. Shared public infrastructure does not identify an operator. No exchange endpoint was identified in the inspected routes; that is narrower than proving no exchange cash-out occurred. The private-pool transfer cannot be followed to a particular hidden withdrawal using these public records alone.Visible noncustodial EOA balances are not automatically freezeable. We also do not describe the helper’s deployment as the only remaining lead: unexamined histories, module exposure and alternate infrastructure remain separate questions.Incident-Specific Response PointsQuestionPractical investigation actionWhich Safes retain this authority?Enumerate adapter-enabled Safes and incident-block module lists; validate current exposure before remediationHow much did each victim lose net of debt?Use the exact receipt legs established here; reconcile pre/post positions and a documented weETH valuation basisWas infrastructure reused?Inspect the creation call frame and transaction target history; the signing EOA is now directly linked to helper creationCan downstream funds be attributed?Treat pool exit matches as leads; require independent evidence before attribution or exchange requestsFor affected account operators, the relevant control is the specific module’s execution authority. A verified vulnerable-module exposure warrants targeted module revocation and preservation of account state and receipts. This is distinct from a blanket assertion that Safe or Aave core is compromised.Evidence Appendix — Ethereum Account AnchorsRoleFull addressAttack EOA0x42c2633438609881c8fBAb82414eb9A0c45F9353Execution helper0xf09168963ac7b31917a02aa82fa9cd667f4b67ffThird-party adapter0x16bb8b912da187870c23ec6756bb3fad061283d8Victim Safe 10xe3b23e47df7cd85876ac6cb05bdb9d7cd5b28520Victim Safe 20xcfedf95a3653a128dfc2e4288758a1a1850d169fForwarding EOA0x951ad21b85c1ce165f15d548a7c7d42520a32f1aRAILGUN Relay Adapt0xac9f360ae85469b27aeddeafc579ef2d052ad405RAILGUN privacy-system proxy0xfa7093cdd9ee6932b4eb2c9e1cde7ce00b1fa4b9RAILGUN Treasury0xe8a8b458bcd1ececc6b6b58f80929b29ccecff40Evidence Appendix — Contract and Asset AnchorsRoleEthereum addressweETH token0xcd5fe23c85820f7b72d0926fc9b05b43e359b7eeWETH token0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2Aave Pool V30x87870bca3f3fd6335c3f4ce8392d69350b4fa4e2aEthweETH token0xbdfa7b7893081b35fb54027489e2bc7a38275129Variable debt WETH token0xea51d7853eefb32b6ee06b1c12e6dcca88be0ffeMorpho flash lender0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcbHelper creation transaction target0x4a418c7132d452705a2123e95B5b9bFdF3b1f84aEvidence Appendix — Transaction AnchorsRoleFull transaction hashHelper creation0x0c2bbaf2b5ebf1102e0df4acb1bcc2c7bc920896c45da6f85b4e9442506a3884Funding withdrawal0xc5dc2606e42ebfad29fce601056248b9b3f3571318c9a0de2910ac7c0363852bExploit0x75328f916b1a0878724d364da5eb12b255160b894cb36c63ed5d718efc616fc4Forwarding0x3a5663d9a3d32bdea3c3012fd9dbaf490195ed413204c4db8f1097e1e7f753f9Shield / fee split0xa20636bf3792f705ae51a48afdec336fb0518cd43365a8fc3e596dea23266dc9Source and Method NotesPrimary mechanism and scope clarification: SlowMist primary analysis and clarification. Incident index: SlowMist Hacked. Transaction references above are Etherscan records. SentinelTX was used for the original call-trace and downstream receipt analysis. This revision directly checked the exploit receipt’s decoded events and the helper creation transaction in Etherscan; the shield accounting and exploit anchor were cross-checked against visible explorer records. The report separates directly observed transfers, attributed source-code findings and analytical inference.The central result is a module-authority route yielding a precisely observed ETH receipt, followed by a fee-reconciled privacy-pool entry. A large flash loan is not the loss figure, a protocol fee is not cash-out, and a privacy endpoint is not an identified attacker.Revision note — 5 October 2026: added exact victim-level receipt accounting, helper creation evidence, a measured UTC timeline, a proportional shield-allocation chart and clearer directional diagrams. The original investigation window ends at block 26122303 (4 October 2026 23:32:47 UTC); this revision does not claim a complete scan of later activity.