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코인 주식 리딩방 초대
🏆 HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP 📈 국내 주식 & BTC 단기 전략 무료 공개 시장에는 언제나 기회가 있지만, 중요한 것은 언제 진입하고 어떻게 대응하느냐입니다. HANSUNG INVESTMENT GROUP은 국내 주식과 BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩을 기반으로 실시간 시장 분석과 단체 트레이딩을 운영하고 있습니다. 무료 공개를 통해 실제 운영 방식과 전문가의 전략을 직접 확인해 보시기 바랍니다. 🔗 무료 입장 링크 https://t.me/+YzI2zf5yamhmZDJk ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📌 무료 공개 내용 ✅ 국내 주식 실시간 전략 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 전문가 대응 전략 ✅ 단체 트레이딩 운영 방식 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 🎁 정회원 전용 혜택 ✅ 국내 주식 트레이딩 ✅ BTC 단기 전략 트레이딩 ✅ 실시간 시장 브리핑 ✅ 1:1 맞춤 투자 전략 컨설팅 ✅ 원금보장 프로그램 운영 (적용 대상 별도 안내) ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 📅 단체 트레이딩 운영 일정 🕘 09:00 ~ 11:30 │ 오전 국내 주식 트레이딩 ☕️ 11:30 ~ 13:00 │ 휴식 및 시장 모니터링 🕐 13:00 ~ 13:30 │ 오후 국내 주식 트레이딩 ₿ 14:00 ~ 14:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 1부 ₿ 15:00 ~ 15:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 2부 ₿ 16:00 ~ 16:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 3부 ₿ 17:00 ~ 17:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 4부 ₿ 18:00 ~ 18:30 │ BTC 단체 트레이딩 5부 ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 💬 운영 방식을 직접 확인하신 후 참여 여부를 결정하셔도 됩니다. 부담 없이 입장하셔서 실시간 리딩을 직접 경험해 보세요.
A fake verification step can move the attack surface into an already authenticated browser page. In this case, the decisive analytical distinction is between evidence of a malicious bookmark, evidence of token transfers, and proof of how those transfers were authorized. Those are related questions, but they are not interchangeable.Our direct explorer review identified three USDC transfers from one source owner to the recipient named in SlowMist's original technical analysis. They total exactly 45,106.851598 USDC and span 63 seconds. That matches the reported 45,106.85 USDC total when rounded to two decimal places. The match makes them strong candidate incident anchors; it does not independently establish the source wallet owner's identity or the victim's consent.Scope and evidence boundaryMeasureValue / interpretationNetworkSolanaCandidate inbound total45,106.851598 USDC; three unique successful transactionsCandidate transfer window2026-10-04 08:58:45–08:59:48 UTCReview cutoff2026-10-09 00:32 UTC; historical transaction snapshots, not a complete chain auditPublic loss reportApproximately $48,000 in assets, as relayed by SlowMist; not equated with the exact USDC subtotalIndependent victim confirmationNot obtained; attribution remains a documented candidate matchThe review deduplicates by transaction signature and counts only the single USDC transfer in each candidate transaction. SOL network fees are recorded separately and are not added to the USDC amount. Address-wide activity is kept outside the candidate incident subtotal.Three findings that matter1. The reported withdrawal total has a specific, reproducible candidate matchQuestion: can the reported three withdrawals be distinguished from the recipient's other inflows? The three transactions below share the same source owner, destination owner, USDC mint and decoded transferChecked method. Their exact sum, count and destination fit the public report. The source wallet is therefore an investigative candidate, not a newly identified person.UTC on 4 OctoberUSDC transferredEvidence08:58:4532652.960737A01: transaction detail08:59:235002.490046A02: transaction detail08:59:487451.400815A03: transaction detailThe arithmetic is 32,652.960737 + 5,002.490046 + 7,451.400815 = 45,106.851598 USDC. The 0.001598 USDC difference from the two-decimal public figure is rounding, not a separately identified transfer. What remains uncertain is independent confirmation that these exact signatures correspond to the reported victim's withdrawals.Figure 1. Directly checked candidate transfers. A dashed co-signer panel is an authorization observation, not a money-flow edge. Downstream attribution is deliberately not shown.2. A co-signer label does not resolve the compromise mechanismQuestion: does the chain tell us whether an attacker exported a key or requested remote signing? Each candidate transaction lists the source owner and a second signer that Solscan labels “Fomo Co-signer.” That is evidence about transaction signers and a provider label, not proof of who initiated the request, which authentication material was used, or whether any signing service was compromised.RolePublic address / accountSource owner / transfer authority6R6stpcbSij7scSpD7Refq1eap2gN1Qj3omFeGu3gJPcSecond signer; Solscan label “Fomo Co-signer”AgmLJBMDCqWynYnQiPCuj9ewsNNsBJXyzoUhD9LJzN51Source USDC token accountBcxGQtcyAgX1VrM8sS94aMbFridPqkJ3u8qQx4e4X3PgDestination USDC token accountEpAjLMVnttREdDiXGddym5eYgsn5hH2oPPnQcarTKajMDestination owner named by SlowMistD783JqupQ2FYhkxUfGEd1gaFEoAJDXRX1NEb4aVH2hZ6The owner-level explorer summary and the decoded instruction describe different layers: the summary resolves wallet owners, whereas the instruction names the SPL token accounts being debited and credited. A token account must not be presented as a separate attacker wallet merely because it has a different address.3. A Privacy Cash transfer is verified; its victim attribution is notQuestion: can an address-wide service exposure be treated as this victim's recovered path? A separate successful transaction sends 212.492295 SOL from the named collection owner to a pool Solscan labels Privacy Cash Pool on 5 October at 07:46:10 UTC. This directly supports an address-to-pool transfer. It does not by itself show that those SOL were purchased with the three candidate USDC transfers.ObservationEvidence / limitTransaction4YM1bkC7UjJwLX8zc6FgPbg7yFViDLQfo2hgJ8u9iGAjDDxFv9crdwJ1JkZurmE13JsD56CneJibLtvekoieT3MxAmount and UTC212.492295 SOL; 2026-10-05 07:46:10 UTCPool destination4AV2Qzp3N4c9RfzyEbNZs2wqWfW4EwKnnxFAZCndvfGhProgram9fhQBbumKEFuXtMBDw8AaQyAjCorLGJQiS3skWZdQyQDAttribution boundaryAddress-history evidence only. No independently reconciled route from candidate USDC anchors yet.SlowMist's reported 1,568.33 SOL cumulative Privacy Cash outflow concerns the address's history. It is not substituted for the incident's 45,106.85 USDC subtotal, nor independently reproduced by the single transaction checked here. The intervening swaps, balances and other inflows must be reconciled before assigning a victim-specific downstream amount.How the bookmark crosses the trust boundaryAccording to SlowMist's original technical analysis, a token-page link led to a fake human-verification page that prompted a bookmark action. The saved JavaScript then ran in the logged-in FOMO context and targeted browser storage, IndexedDB and Privy session material. We did not execute the malicious sample or connect to its collection endpoint.Figure 2. Source-based mechanism reconstruction, not an independently replayed exploit or transaction trace. The unresolved signing step is dashed.The useful security conclusion is narrower than “a wallet connection stole the funds”: the described lure sought code execution within a trusted application session. Conversely, the source's conditional MFA logic and the victim's reported absence of 2FA do not establish a demonstrated MFA bypass. Initiating an enrollment flow would also not prove successful enrollment.Timeline: observations rather than invented milestonesUTCEvent and evidence level2026-10-04 08:58:45A01: 32,652.960737 USDC, directly checked2026-10-04 08:59:23A02: 5,002.490046 USDC, directly checked2026-10-04 08:59:48A03: 7,451.400815 USDC, directly checked2026-10-05 07:46:10T01: 212.492295 SOL to provider-labeled Privacy Cash pool; separate address history2026-10-08SlowMist public alert and analysis; not the attack dateThe attack's initial browser-execution time is not established here. The collection address's reported first activity on 17 September is not assigned as the incident start time.Alternative explanations and what would resolve themThe three-transfer match could be strengthened by an original withdrawal record or source confirmation naming the signatures. A transaction's valid signatures do not reveal whether the human account owner approved it. Application-side authentication, session revocation, withdrawal and signing logs would be needed to test competing key-export and remote-signing explanations.For downstream analysis, identical asset values or nearby timestamps are insufficient to prove a bridge connection. A defensible cross-chain edge requires a source transaction, bridge order or fulfillment record, and destination transaction. Ethereum and Bitcoin candidates mentioned by the source remain external leads until that chain of evidence is available; they are not drawn as verified branches here.Case-specific response pointsFor the affected account, preserve the bookmark URL and browser/session chronology without executing the bookmark again. Application operators can correlate the three candidate signatures with withdrawal requests and signing-policy decisions, then evaluate session and refresh-token revocation. A password change alone should not be assumed to invalidate every previously issued session artifact.For investigators, preserve the full source/destination token-account mapping and block references before expanding a cluster. For any service request, provide the specific transaction and account history being queried, and distinguish the verified transfer from a claim about stolen-fund ownership. Provider labels are leads for corroboration, not legal identity findings.Evidence appendixID / slotFull transaction signatureA01Solana slot 45320947444uGoQH6KQRyVDCLuDTUHW3KxR61j9pGnnWWKoGtWFh9b3jUFRQ9t5MMVHoFr5ZWFLgEgWKmgxuR5Wq8tS36XkzNA02Solana slot 4532096174pgANnxQ2Q5139ToXuc7LvHWqBZKKsBXwAVKA4eSi1wLnYdpukbgL2ZheTxXAMevU84HVKJCe1TBTTZ1VN2TZrH9A03Solana slot 453209712xM1eCwjwhV4h9ECr2dTpL4TTDq3YafKiME3qyJcCAiLM3iqZosCVSW3rdQPcUr8AXWhzDrJzd4JKDZDWBJ6q4KMT01Solana slot 4535158714YM1bkC7UjJwLX8zc6FgPbg7yFViDLQfo2hgJ8u9iGAjDDxFv9crdwJ1JkZurmE13JsD56CneJibLtvekoieT3MxToken / technical propertyValueUSDC mintEPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1vCandidate instructionSPL Token Program transferCheckedPer-candidate fee0.00001507 SOL; separate from USDC principalSource basisSlowMist's original technical analysisReproducibility limitExplorer-decoded detail checked; no raw RPC replay, victim-account access or complete downstream reconciliation claimedThis report separates directly observed chain transactions, explorer-provided labels, external reporting and analytical inference. It does not identify an attacker or attribute every historical recipient transaction to this case.

Money moved out of a contract on Ethereum, reached a wallet, and then left that wallet in twenty equal transfers. The last transfer came 15 minutes and 24 seconds after the initial withdrawal.The amount was 200 ETH. ETH, short for ether, is the native asset of Ethereum. At the start of this path, it was held in a token form called WETH, or wrapped ETH. During the withdrawal, 200 WETH was converted into 200 ETH.That change of form matters: we are following the same-sized amount through several stages, not adding a new loss every time it moves.A security alert linked the event to an old auction program. We will first explain what that program did, then follow the recorded transfers, and finally separate what is known from what still needs checking.The route in brief: 200 WETH leaves a collateral contract → it becomes 200 ETH → a wallet receives it → the wallet sends twenty transfers of 10 ETH. The records examined here do not establish where the money went after mixing.Incident: October 6, 2026.Evidence cutoff: October 6, 2026, 21:55 UTC (October 7, 06:55 KST).Reading guide: Follow sections 1–6 for the story. Full transaction references and addresses are in the appendix.1. The auction was selling loan collateral, not NFTsWhy does an auction appear in this story? In MakerDAO, users can leave assets such as ETH as security for a loan. That security is called collateral. They borrow DAI, a token designed to track the value of one US dollar, against it.Think of borrowing against something you own. If its value falls too far, the lender may need to sell it to settle the debt. A liquidation auction performs that role here: it sells crypto collateral. The actual system has its own thresholds, fees, and settlement rules. Background: the official liquidation-system proposal.A keeper is software that automates tasks such as bidding in those auctions. It is not the borrower. The person borrowing against collateral and the participant buying it at auction have different roles. Background: the official Auction Keeper project.The next diagram follows the general process from borrowing to receiving the auctioned asset. Read it from top to bottom, paying particular attention to the final two steps.Figure 1. From borrowing to withdrawing collateralA simplified guide to the historical Flipper auction process, not a trace of this incident. The final two boxes separate settlement from external withdrawal. Detailed bidding rules and the wider current system are outside this diagram.Winning, settling, and withdrawing are separate steps. Winning determines the buyer. Settlement records the outcome. Withdrawal moves the asset out to an external address. Finishing one step does not mean all three have happened.In the published historical auction code, a function called deal settles the auction and credits the recorded winning bidder. The person who calls that function does not become the winner merely by calling it. This is general background, not proof of how the exact incident contract was configured. Source: the published Flipper implementation.With that distinction in mind, we can now follow the actual movement of funds.2. Meet the addresses before following the moneyYou do not need to memorize hexadecimal addresses. The names below describe what each address did in the records; they do not identify a person or prove who controlled it.The collateral adapter — 0x2F0b…042A. This contract is the first sender of WETH in the transfer records. Etherscan, the public transaction explorer, labels it “Sky: MCD Join ETH A.” Here, an adapter means a contract used to move collateral into or out of the system.Two intermediate contracts — 0xF09A…C170 and 0xEc997…1dcF. The WETH passes through these contracts. The first is created during the transaction; the second later sends ETH to the initiating wallet. A contract is a program on the blockchain, not necessarily a person's wallet.The initiating wallet — 0x01EB…A5FA. This address starts the transaction, receives the 200 ETH, and then sends the twenty later transfers. We use the same name throughout so that you can recognize it as the story continues.The WETH contract. This contract releases ETH when WETH is unwrapped. “Unwrapping” is the change from the token form to ETH; it is not a gain of another 200 ETH.One distinction will help when reading the next diagram: starting a transaction is not the same as sending every asset inside it. A wallet can instruct a contract, and that contract can trigger further calls and transfers.3. At 06:13:11, the wallet receives 200 ETHOn October 6 at 06:13:11 UTC, the initiating wallet submitted the withdrawal transaction. Within that one transaction, the collateral adapter sent 200 WETH to the newly created contract. That contract passed 200 WETH to the other intermediate contract.The intermediate contract then unwrapped the WETH. The WETH contract paid it 200 ETH, and it passed 200 ETH to the initiating wallet. These are several movements inside one transaction, not several separate withdrawal transactions. Check the withdrawal transaction.In the diagram below, start with the first blue asset-transfer box. Follow the blue WETH path until it becomes the purple ETH path. The gray strip at the top shows who initiated the call, not an additional payment.Figure 2. Separating WETH transfers from ETH paymentsFollow the numbered asset movements from top to bottom. Blue means WETH; purple means ETH. The gray call strip is not a payment. All stages belong to one transaction. Evidence: token logs 174, 176, and 177, plus internal ETH transfers.The important change is at the end: the initiating wallet now holds ETH that it can send onward. The diagram explains that route. It does not explain why the contracts allowed it or establish a system-wide compromise.You can compare the explanation with the explorer screenshot below. Look for the timestamp, the WETH transfer entries, and the internal ETH payments. “Internal” here means payments made during contract execution inside the transaction.Evidence 1. The withdrawal transaction on EtherscanOriginal explorer evidence: compare the timestamp, WETH transfers, and internal ETH payments. The displayed dollar values are not used as incident-time loss estimates. Open the withdrawal record.Several lines show the number 200 because the amount passes through multiple steps. Keep that in mind as we follow it out of the wallet.4. The same wallet sends twenty transfers of 10 ETHAfter receiving the ETH, the initiating wallet sent twenty transactions to the same Tornado Cash router. A router is an intermediate contract that forwards a request to another contract. Each transaction sent 10 ETH, making 200 ETH in total, excluding transaction fees. Check the wallet's transaction history.Tornado Cash is a mixer designed to make a deposit difficult to link directly to a later withdrawal. That is why observing money enter this route is not the same as knowing who later received it.The next diagram gives every transfer its own tile. Read left to right, then move to the next row. A block number identifies the block containing the transaction; the equal tile spacing does not mean equal time intervals.Figure 3. All twenty transfers in block orderOne tile equals one transfer of 10 ETH. Read left to right, then down. Tile spacing does not represent time. Individual transaction links are in Appendix A.The twenty tiles show repeated transfers to the router, all from the same wallet. You can check each transaction separately in Appendix A without interrupting the story here.The explorer screenshot lists the same type of entries in the opposite direction: newest first. Compare the destination and the 10 ETH amounts, rather than reading its rows as the diagram's order.Evidence 2. Repeated 10 ETH transfers from the same addressOriginal explorer evidence: the newest entries appear first. Compare the Method, To, and Amount columns. Open the wallet history.The final transfer shows one step furtherThe last transaction was recorded at 06:28:35 UTC. Its internal payment record shows the router forwarding 10 ETH to the contract labeled “Tornado.Cash: 10 ETH,” the pool in this final transfer. Check the final transaction.That extra check was made for the final transaction. The twenty outgoing transfers were reviewed, but this article does not claim a complete internal router-to-pool review of all twenty.Evidence 3. The final 10 ETH paymentOriginal explorer evidence: From is the initiating wallet; To is the router. Internal Transactions shows the final 10 ETH payment to the pool. Open the final transfer.We now have two verified endpoints: the withdrawal at 06:13:11 and the final transfer at 06:28:35. The difference is 15 minutes and 24 seconds. The next diagram places those endpoints around the transfers and shows where our evidence stops.Figure 4. The observed time window and the limit of the traceThe bracket spans 06:13:11 to 06:28:35 UTC: 15 minutes and 24 seconds. Intermediate spacing is schematic. Only the final transfer received a detailed internal router-to-pool check; the post-mixer path remains unestablished.The bracket measures withdrawal to final transfer. It is not the duration of the twenty transfers alone or of the entire incident. The separately labeled 2020 history comes from an external alert, which we examine below.The path ends at the checked pool payment because this article has not established a later destination. It does not show an exchange deposit, a cash-out, or the identity of the person controlling the wallet.5. Several movements do not mean several lossesWe have seen 200 WETH move, 200 ETH arrive, and 200 ETH then leave in smaller transfers. These are successive stages of the observed route, not separate amounts to add together.Instead, read the next diagram as a running account of the route: the asset changes form, reaches the wallet, and is sent onward. Each box describes what happens next to the same-sized amount.Figure 5. Following the same amount without counting it twiceRead top to bottom. The amounts describe successive stages, not separate losses to add together. Gas fees are excluded; this diagram makes no incident-time dollar valuation.The observed route is 200 WETH → 200 ETH → twenty transfers totaling 200 ETH. It is not an 800 ETH loss obtained by adding repeated entries inside the transaction, and the onward transfers are not another separate 200 ETH withdrawal.These totals exclude gas fees, the fees paid to execute transactions. Dollar prices displayed in explorer screenshots reflect the display at capture time; this article does not use them to calculate an incident-time dollar loss.The amount and route are now clear. The remaining question is different: what allowed the withdrawal?6. The route is visible; the reported cause still needs checkingDefimon Alerts attributed the event to a permission problem in an old MakerDAO auction keeper. According to its report, the keeper had won four auctions in 2020—numbers 1457 through 1460, each for 50 WETH—but had not settled them. The report says an external caller used an unprotected keeper function to settle and withdraw the collateral. Read the source alert.This explanation connects back to the separate steps in section 1. Settling an auction and deciding who may withdraw its assets are not the same permission question. A publicly callable settlement function is not automatically a flaw.The following comparison puts those two questions side by side. Read the left panel as general auction background and the right panel as the keeper-permission issue that needs verification.Figure 6. Settlement and withdrawal are different permission questionsThis comparison separates the general settlement mechanism from the externally reported keeper-permission issue. The dashed amber panels mark a question and an allegation, not an independently verified exploit path.The allegation concerns someone else being able to invoke a function that sends the keeper's collateral to an external address. To confirm that explanation, we would need the keeper's code and configuration at the time, together with the detailed execution record. The transfer amounts alone cannot answer it.The general Flipper source cited earlier is not assumed to match the exact deployed implementation. Likewise, the adapter's explorer label is not evidence that all of MakerDAO or Sky was compromised.What we can take awayThe records support a specific sequence: 200 WETH moved, it was converted into ETH, the initiating wallet received 200 ETH, and that wallet sent twenty transfers of 10 ETH to a router. The final transfer also has a checked 10 ETH payment from the router to the labeled pool.Use the final diagram to separate that observed route from the external explanation and the unanswered questions. The labels matter as much as the colors: blue is checked evidence, dashed amber is the reported explanation, and gray is unresolved.Figure 7. Verified records and unresolved questionsLabels and border styles distinguish the evidence levels as well as color. The dashed amber box contains the external explanation, not an independently verified cause. No speculative line connects the mixer to an unverified later address.The next investigation has four concrete tasks. Check the keeper's historical permissions and implementation. Verify the creation, bidding, and settlement records for auctions 1457–1460. Review the internal payments in the other nineteen transfers. Look for independent evidence before linking any later withdrawal to these deposits.We can follow the money to the limit of the examined records. We cannot yet turn that route into a proven cause, an identified operator, or a confirmed cash-out.This is the end of the narrative. The appendix below keeps the original records available for readers who want to verify the details.Appendix A. The twenty transaction referencesEach entry represents one outgoing transfer of 10 ETH from the initiating wallet to the router. The full transaction hash is its identifier; follow the link to inspect the original record. The list runs in block order.Order: 1Block: 26131503Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xb8ecff9c129d8d9331c85558eaeddff29a38c4c16b71a40986acbf8f6febefebOrder: 2Block: 26131507Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x01dd51eff5790bf070ae5abefc4a77f3df2b2476feebbe9aaa6ffa1fd48f8429Order: 3Block: 26131509Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x8c5fb4f50aa0f56cc701afdad377e56f53655e48e237f85aef8fe902797a4240Order: 4Block: 26131512Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x9a6ef7cce759e09f1d23115f974eb0707460a6834de0d30a55c3761a9c9dce6cOrder: 5Block: 26131514Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x725cdd6f23f7fc30d6ab43a6cf634aec791e5e2097151a09fc522408786da3ffOrder: 6Block: 26131516Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xaf1fb061f3d3db6cc6107219ea7bc5e0c6f86ba54c997e10bb062e0a3f7f7eedOrder: 7Block: 26131519Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xfd60254ab0a74ae6d51706023394190ca20646264d1da322998afa4682ae18b2Order: 8Block: 26131521Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xcc14212fc5d51d3d5ea7f0de9895264da8c0b5c779ca2947083f665f50f0bfbeOrder: 9Block: 26131523Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x31d6c9cb202306536c9f977a486bd2f5d2a16d0db9c7558ac132442fe58440f5Order: 10Block: 26131525Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x3ef864598198ff4d23f22a35d540e0437ba0ed3af7a77c3d23ae99f59f1bb96eOrder: 11Block: 26131527Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x4c10b56e2f5c37706fdcbe2b1c7da35de68661306971b32e8ea5ed95e7a02a7aOrder: 12Block: 26131529Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xa452e803014458dba087c82bf0a7e9432bf014337b59d34483bbbf232fe39d57Order: 13Block: 26131531Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xaddc6ea108b17f39beca57487fee55f878546c8f233bdb8c0736b03658e890d4Order: 14Block: 26131533Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x61e349fe5ce11d9b3b8f4d9813c3a1f74e6dd898d43f61c0139673540137b3e6Order: 15Block: 26131537Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x7167efdb6740e1c1a38983edd33e3a7446d01abe2fcf63874b80aa8f9f3f7ee6Order: 16Block: 26131539Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xe82b2082edd720801389e75cf2a6158f494f9e8b3ad3a7671bfc18f9e7c07538Order: 17Block: 26131541Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x48303767bec9e216fa06e79dd21f3f3257524dd613c976f3fe60132bcc38af52Order: 18Block: 26131543Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x0ac6195011bfea03360778ce3a05f8ed665a6fe2ce6ac10231c2be3dcbb99210Order: 19Block: 26131546Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0x2cd7eb09abe21d07e36aedc5a93f6c6f99b5ab796b2b5632aa14c6278192396cOrder: 20Block: 26131548Amount: 10 ETHOriginal transaction: 0xf1db855a987c2fb5e0ea6184ae8f8ed3271cca98c80e627be4839e4b4ac8dcbfAppendix B. Full addresses and their rolesThese labels describe observed behavior or a role attributed by the source alert. They do not identify people or establish knowing participation in wrongdoing.Role: Transaction initiator and ETH recipientFull address: 0x01eb957e5c7dcddd60f3c875956ccc6fb9bda5faBasis: Withdrawal and subsequent transaction recordsRole: Intermediate contractFull address: 0xec997d2ad033277913d6002277353368e8321dcfBasis: Transaction target and internal paymentRole: Contract created during the transactionFull address: 0xf09a13072ed939b79bc25b66aa3a836ea6dcc170Basis: Creation record and WETH transfersRole: ETH-A collateral adapterFull address: 0x2f0b23f53734252bda2277357e97e1517d6b042aBasis: Explorer label and WETH transferRole: WETH contractFull address: 0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2Basis: Token and withdrawal eventsRole: Affected keeper identified in the alertFull address: 0x9c05a05893ada984fc20d0da0c046de5cc0e8273Basis: Role attributed by DefimonRole: Tornado Cash routerFull address: 0xd90e2f925da726b50c4ed8d0fb90ad053324f31bBasis: Explorer label and subsequent transfersRole: 10 ETH pool in the final transferFull address: 0x910cbd523d972eb0a6f4cae4618ad62622b39dbfBasis: Internal payment in the final transactionAppendix C. Source records and review scopeThe review covers the initial withdrawal, the twenty outgoing transfers, and the internal payment in the final transfer. The historical auction story and the alleged permission failure remain externally reported claims rather than independently established findings.Withdrawal transaction, timestamp, token transfers, and internal ETH transfersWithdrawal transaction event logsInitiating address and subsequent transaction historyFinal deposit transactionDefimon Alerts report of the alleged causeOfficial liquidation-system proposal, MIP45Published Flipper source for the general settlement mechanismOfficial Auction Keeper project

ChainBounty · Investigation analysis · October 6, 2026A dormant third-party ETH-A keeper was exploited on Ethereum on October 6, 2026, according to SentinelTX's CASE-ASYNCADB report. The exploit released 200 WETH, which was unwrapped into 200 ETH and delivered to the attacker's externally owned account. That account then sent twenty transfers of 10 ETH each to a Tornado.Cash router between 06:19:35 and 06:28:35 UTC.SentinelTX locates the authorization weakness in the keeper's implementation contract. It classifies the incident as an exploit of a third-party liquidation bot, rather than a breach of the MakerDAO core protocol.Key findingsThe trace follows a 200 ETH native payout through the attack contract to the attacker's account, followed by twenty 10 ETH transfers to the same routerThe keeper proxy delegated selector 0x8804d1de to an unprotected exit path in its implementationThe router is the last recorded recipient on this route. Attacker identity and any exchange-deposit leg remain unestablished1. A funded account deployed two contracts before the drainThe first recorded step was gas funding. At 05:57:23 UTC, account 0x01eb95…bda5fa received 0.09783730488175 ETH from the address labeled Tornado.Cash's 0.1 ETH pool.The account then submitted three control transactions in order. At 06:09:23 UTC, nonce 0 created 0xa5c3a6…1fc552, a staging contract whose purpose remains unconfirmed. At 06:12:11 UTC, nonce 1 created the attack contract, 0xec997d…321dcf. At 06:13:11 UTC, nonce 2 called that contract with selector 0x0e763dd6 in block 26,131,471.The two deployments and the drain occurred within 3 minutes and 48 seconds. The deployment records contain no native value transfer; the 200 ETH payout followed in the drain transaction.The payout route contains two 200 ETH native movements in the same attack transaction. The WETH contract sent 200 ETH to the attack contract, and the attack contract forwarded 200 ETH to the externally owned account. The report interprets the first movement, following selector 0x2e1a7d4d, as the WETH unwrap.Figure 1. The reported native-ETH route. Two 200 ETH movements occur in the attack transaction; twenty later 10 ETH transfers carry 200 ETH from the account to the router. These are successive movements of the same principal, not separate losses. Arrows show direction, not proportional value or elapsed time. Separate gas funding is shown approximately; the exact transfer is 0.09783730488175 ETH.Color key: Slate: native payout hops. Amber: onward router deposits. Sage: separate gas funding.Address key: WETH contract 0xc02aaa…756cc2; attack contract 0xec997d…321dcf; attacker account 0x01eb95…bda5fa; router 0xd90e2f…24f31b. Full identifiers appear below.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCADB, October 6, 2026, pp. 4–7 and 10–14. Simplified explanatory figure, not an original SentinelTX graph.2. The drain entered a third-party keeper implementationThe attack contract called keeper proxy 0x9c05a0…0e8273 with selector 0x8804d1de. The proxy then used DELEGATECALL with the same selector to implementation 0x68399e…6a5546. SentinelTX identifies the missing authorization check in this implementation path as the weakness that allowed the drain.The attack calldata includes the keeper proxy, the ETH-A collateral identifier, the WETH contract, the recipient account, and auction IDs 1457, 1458, 1459, and 1460. These identifiers align with the reported account of four legacy auctions holding 50 WETH each. SentinelTX interprets the history as a dormant keeper that had won the auctions but had not completed settlement, leaving collateral available to the unprotected exit path.Later calls pass through the auction and collateral contracts identified as Flipper, Vat, and GemJoin ETH-A, followed by the WETH operation and the 200 ETH payout. The call trace records the selector bytes and execution order. Function names such as GemJoin exit and WETH withdraw are interpretations based on matching signatures and surrounding execution, rather than decoder-confirmed names.The relevant core-contract calls executed without reverting. The report's conclusion that MakerDAO core operated as designed also depends on its interpretation of those contract roles and cited reporting; it did not cross-check the address identities against MakerDAO's public changelog. Its finding is therefore specific to the third-party keeper implementation, rather than a claim that “MakerDAO was hacked.”Diagram 2. The third-party keeper call path. The proxy delegates selector 0x8804d1de to its implementation. Function-name mappings remain interpretations, while the 200 ETH native payout is recorded directly in the call tree. This diagram simplifies the sequence.Color key: Slate: selected keeper call path. Sage: later WETH release/unwrap and native payout section.Address key: Keeper proxy 0x9c05a0…0e8273; implementation 0x68399e…6a5546. Contract roles follow the report's stated basis and qualifications.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCADB, October 6, 2026, pp. 4 and 8–9.3. Twenty equal deposits moved the proceeds to the routerThe first 10 ETH transfer to the Tornado.Cash router was recorded at 06:19:35 UTC. The twentieth was recorded at 06:28:35 UTC. The twenty listed transactions each carry 10 ETH, totaling 200 ETH over nine minutes.This sequence started about six minutes after the drain. SentinelTX interprets the equal-size transfers as a structured mixer-deposit pattern.The recipient is labeled Tornado.Cash, Mixer, and Sanctioned. No exchange-deposit leg is recorded. The route ends at the router in the available evidence; that does not establish a final beneficiary or identify a corresponding mixer withdrawal.Figure 3. Cumulative deposits derived from the twenty 10 ETH transfers listed in the PDF. The steps reach 200 ETH at 06:28:35 UTC. Horizontal spacing represents actual time; the chart describes this deposit sequence, not the router's balance or downstream withdrawals.Color key: Slate: cumulative total derived from the twenty listed deposits. Sage: the final 200 ETH total.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCADB, October 6, 2026, pp. 6–7 and 11–13. Cumulative totals are an editorial calculation from the listed same-unit transfers.4. Transfer activity is different from the incident amountThe activity summary totals 23 traced value movements involving five addresses and gross movement of 600.097837 ETH. This figure repeats funds at successive hops and is not a loss total. The 200 ETH payout is recorded from the WETH contract to the attack contract, again from the attack contract to the externally owned account, and then across the twenty router transfers. The small gas-funding transfer is separate.The incident quantity is 200 WETH, followed by 200 ETH after unwrapping. The approximately US$538,000 valuation comes from reporting and was not independently priced in the investigation. Native quantities therefore provide the clearest basis for following the funds.The timed movements discussed here run from 05:57:23 to 06:28:35 UTC on October 6. Later paths remain outside this documented route.ConclusionSentinelTX's conclusion is a third-party keeper authorization exploit followed by a 200 ETH payout and twenty mixer-router deposits. The useful boundary is specific: the keeper implementation is the identified weakness, the reported route reaches the router, and the attacker has not been attributed.Useful follow-ups include tracing the keeper and implementation deployers or owners, examining possible correspondence between the timed deposits and later withdrawals, and checking related proxies for similar exposure. These remain investigation leads, rather than established downstream matches.Any proposed downstream match or real-world identity would need its own supporting evidence.Figure 4. The report's conclusion and limits. The route accounts for a 200 ETH payout and twenty 10 ETH router deposits. Attacker identity and corresponding downstream withdrawals are not established; no exchange-deposit leg is recorded.Color key: Slate: keeper weakness. Sage: asset outcome. Amber: stated limits.Source: SentinelTX, CASE-ASYNCADB, October 6, 2026, pp. 4 and 8–10.Continue from the twenty deposit transactionsThe twenty timed deposits provide a concrete starting point for further tracing. The prompt below asks SentinelTX to assess possible later withdrawal correspondence, clearly separating supported links from candidates.Request SentinelTX access · Sign inCopy this starting prompt:Investigate the October 6, 2026 Ethereum route from 0x01eb957e5c7dcddd60f3c875956ccc6fb9bda5fa to Tornado.Cash router 0xd90e2f925da726b50c4ed8d0fb90ad053324f31b. Start with attack transaction 0xbb6940f7c2a1e68cafbae7bb9b94d09af9af06ec3a114f6996f2cab993f3a88c and the twenty 10 ETH deposits recorded from 06:19:35 to 06:28:35 UTC. The first deposit is 0xb8ecff9c129d8d9331c85558eaeddff29a38c4c16b71a40986acbf8f6febefeb; the last is 0xf1db855a987c2fb5e0ea6184ae8f8ed3271cca98c80e627be4839e4b4ac8dcbf. Assess whether available evidence supports any later withdrawal correspondence. Separate directly supported links from timing or amount-based candidates, do not infer common control from correlation alone, and include transaction links, the queried window, and query time. Keep the third-party keeper separate from MakerDAO core, and state when a path cannot be established.Source and address notesThis article adapts SentinelTX's CASE-ASYNCADB — 0x01EB957e…bDa5FA, dated October 6, 2026. The WETH mechanism rests on call-tree evidence; a separate token-event-log check was incomplete. Page references above identify the source of the article and explanatory figures.Attacker account: 0x01eb957e5c7dcddd60f3c875956ccc6fb9bda5faAttack contract: 0xec997d2ad033277913d6002277353368e8321dcfKeeper proxy: 0x9c05a05893ada984fc20d0da0c046de5cc0e8273Keeper implementation: 0x68399ed8aa33c5b43f863ee6782de492006a5546WETH contract: 0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2Gas-funding pool: 0x12d66f87a04a9e220743712ce6d9bb1b5616b8fcRouter recipient: 0xd90e2f925da726b50c4ed8d0fb90ad053324f31bThe pool and router descriptions reproduce the report's labels. Account identifiers identify on-chain addresses, not the real-world identity of the attacker.


Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated…
Gravity Bridge Exploit: Full Attacker Fund Flow Traced — 113 Transactions Reveal Sophisticated Laundering OperationThe laundering infrastructure behind the recent Gravity Bridge exploit has now been largely uncovered.After tracing 87 confirmed attacker transactions and an additional 26 downstream movements, the overall flow of stolen funds is becoming clear. What initially appeared to be a straightforward bridge exploit has evolved into a highly structured laundering operation involving decentralized exchanges, relay wallets, non-custodial swap services, and centralized exchanges.This report summarizes the complete fund flow observed so far and highlights the remaining recovery opportunities.Executive SummaryTotal tracked transactions: 113Initial stolen assets converted into ETH almost immediatelyApproximately $4.7M converted through KyberSwap and 1inch2,600 ETH consolidated into a secondary aggregation walletFunds dispersed through dozens of one-time relay walletsConfirmed deposits identified at ChangeNOW and KuCoinMultiple staging wallets still hold potentially recoverable fundsSeveral laundering paths remain active and require real-time monitoringPhase 1 — Asset ConversionThe attacker-controlled wallet:0x7B582033061b96cC3F9421e73a749ED7C62da1F9immediately began converting stolen stablecoins into ETH.The swaps were executed primarily through KyberSwap and 1inch, suggesting the attacker wanted to reduce exposure to token freezes while maximizing liquidity.Observed transactions include:$100K USDC → ETH$200K USDC → ETH$500K USDC → ETH$400K USDT → ETHMultiple additional swapsIn total:Approximately $4.3M USDCApproximately $434K USDTwere converted into ETH within a short time window.The rapid conversion indicates pre-planning and suggests the operator anticipated potential blacklisting or asset recovery attempts.Phase 2 — ETH ConsolidationAfter conversion, the attacker consolidated funds into a second wallet:0x4d3ca32e687e871a58b78AcAc73bE59AC37C7A47A total of 2,600 ETH was transferred through multiple transactions:600 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETH500 ETHThis wallet appears to have functioned as the primary distribution hub for the laundering operation.Rather than cashing out directly, the operator implemented a layered relay strategy designed to fragment attribution and complicate tracing efforts.Phase 3 — Distributed Relay LaunderingThe most notable discovery is the laundering architecture itself.Instead of sending large transfers directly to exchanges, the attacker repeatedly split funds into dozens of temporary wallets.The observed pattern resembles:Primary Wallets → One-Time Relay Wallets → Swap Service / Exchange → Cross-Chain ExitIndividual transfers were commonly observed in the 6–10 ETH range.This methodology significantly reduces the visibility of exchange deposits and makes automated clustering more difficult.The pattern appears intentional and operationally mature.Confirmed ChangeNOW ActivityThe largest identified laundering route currently leads to ChangeNOW.Observed destination:0xeba88149813bec1cccccfdb0dacefaaa5de94cb1Estimated deposits:Approximately 114 ETHRoughly $230,000 equivalentBecause ChangeNOW is non-custodial, recovery options are more limited.However, transaction records still exist.The highest priority investigative question is determining what assets these ETH deposits were converted into.Particular attention should be given to:Monero (XMR)Privacy-focused assetsCross-chain bridge destinationsIf conversion into privacy-preserving assets occurred, tracing may become significantly more difficult.Confirmed KuCoin DepositsA second laundering path has been identified through KuCoin.Known deposit address:0x45300136662dd4e58fc0df61e6290dffd992b785Estimated deposits:Approximately 6 ETHAdditional suspected deposit address:0x58edf78281334335effa23101bbe3371b6a36a51Status:Further confirmation requiredUnlike ChangeNOW, KuCoin operates as a custodial exchange and maintains KYC records.This creates a potential recovery and attribution opportunity if law enforcement or affected parties act quickly.Remaining On-Chain FundsSeveral wallets remain active and continue to warrant monitoring.Primary Staging Wallet0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562Current observations:Received 59 ETHOnly 15 ETH moved onwardApproximately 44 ETH potentially remains under attacker controlThis wallet may represent an operational staging point rather than a final cash-out destination.Additional Unresolved Destinations0xf1ed839d08309e2a52e58d69b06d286d35fc18bc — 15 ETH0xe1e471614305656114c39294637b65adccf665a3 — ~13 ETH0x58432e011aa493c404f80409d997b1eabdfd8e24 — 9 ETH0x79f376453537878eeb79fb7d2cdb2c10bc58f454 — 9 ETH0x98d9022fa2789c0d8e9cd49707599c6848619ed8 — 10 ETHThese wallets currently represent unresolved portions of the laundering network.Immediate Investigative Priorities1. KuCoin Cooperation RequestThis remains the strongest recovery opportunity.Required actions:Identify account owner(s)Preserve account recordsFreeze assets if still presentObtain associated KYC informationTiming is critical.2. ChangeNOW Exit TracingInvestigators should determine:Destination chainDestination assetConversion timingPotential privacy-coin exposureThis path likely contains the most important unanswered questions in the investigation.3. Real-Time Monitoring of Staging WalletsThe wallet:0xc8c71ae4261e55a66d9967f2ac252be4e669f562should be monitored continuously.A significant portion of attacker-controlled funds may still be sitting on-chain.Any future movement could reveal:Additional exchange depositsAdditional swap servicesNew laundering infrastructureFinal cash-out attemptsConclusionThe Gravity Bridge attacker did not rely on a simple exchange cash-out strategy.Instead, the operator employed a structured relay-wallet laundering network designed to fragment attribution, obscure exchange deposits, and delay investigation.While a meaningful portion of the funds has already entered laundering channels, several opportunities remain.The most actionable leads currently include:KuCoin deposit attributionChangeNOW conversion tracingMonitoring of the 59 ETH staging walletThe next movements from these wallets will likely determine whether investigators can continue following the money — or whether the trail disappears into privacy infrastructure permanently.
ChainBounty
4 months ago
Unmasking a Sophisticated Solana Scam Network: A $SUBY Forensic Investigation
How automated bots and shared infrastructure revealed a 10-month-old organized crime syndicate.The blockchain never forgets, but it can be incredibly complex to navigate. Recently, ChainBounty conducted a deep-dive forensic investigation into a significant asset theft involving $SUBY and other Solana-based tokens. What began as a single incident report evolved into the discovery of a professional, long-standing scam infrastructure that has now led to an active criminal investigation by the Cyber Crime Investigation Division in Seoul, South Korea.1. The Incident: Precision and AutomationOn May 30, 2025, a victim’s wallet was drained of approximately 8.2 million $SUBY tokens, along with $SSE and $DAW. The speed of the transfer was alarming.Our forensic analysis revealed that this wasn’t a manual operation. The assets were moved to an intermediary wallet (46S5bgHq...) and immediately processed through automated scripts. These bots executed swaps into stablecoins and distributed funds across multiple "hop" wallets with 0-second latency, ensuring the trail became as fragmented as possible within minutes.2. Identifying the “Cash Out” InfrastructureBy tracing the flow of stolen assets, we identified two primary exit points: Bitget Exchange and FixedFloat (a mixing service). While some deposits to these platforms occurred shortly before or after the specific $SUBY theft, our “Infrastructure Analysis” proved a definitive link. We discovered a massive, interconnected network:27 Common Fee Payers: A cluster of wallets consistently funded the gas fees for the attack wallets.63 Shared Addresses: These wallets acted as a central hub for multiple thefts over a 10-month period.The Forensic Anomaly: Why tracking the criminal organization is more effective than tracking the tokens aloneThis confirms that the attackers are not “lone wolves” but an organized syndicate operating a “Scam-as-a-Service” model on the Solana network.3. The Evidence: The Smoking GunThe most compelling evidence of organized crime was the Machine-like Transfer Patterns. Our timeline analysis showed batch processing intervals of exactly 15 to 28 seconds. This level of synchronization is only possible through a dedicated command-and-control (C2) botnet designed for money laundering.Through our investigation, we identified over $142,430 USDT funneled through the Bitget deposit addresses associated with this specific group.Inhuman execution: Batch processing and mechanical intervals confirm the use of laundering bots.4. Active Investigation and Next StepsChainBounty has officially submitted this forensic package to the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. The investigation is currently focused on:KYC De-anonymization: Working with Bitget to identify the account holders behind the identified deposit addresses.Cross-Chain Tracking: Tracing funds that exited via FixedFloat into Ethereum and Bitcoin.Asset Freezing: Coordinating with exchanges to blacklist and freeze the identified criminal infrastructure.Conclusion: Vigilance in the Web3 EraThis case is a stark reminder that in the world of DeFi, your digital footprint — and that of the hackers — is permanent. At ChainBounty, we are committed to turning the tide against these scam networks.We urge the community to stay vigilant. Do not click on suspicious partnership links or authorize “blind signings” in your wallet. The scammers are professional, but so is our pursuit of justice.Join the Fight. Follow our investigation and report suspicious activities at our community: 🔗 https://community.chainbounty.io 📧 For inquiries: [email protected]#ChainBounty #Solana #Forensics #CyberCrime #Web3Security #OSINT #CryptoInvestigation
ChainBounty
8 months ago
MemeCore (M) Digital Asset Theft Incident: On-Chain Forensics & OSINT Analysis Report
IntroductionThis report details a real-world case submitted by an applicant to ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program. The victim approached us after suffering a significant loss due to a targeted social engineering attack. ChainBounty is actively assisting the victim by providing comprehensive on-chain forensics and intelligence analysis to trace the stolen assets and identify the perpetrators for law enforcement purposes.1. Executive SummaryThis report synthesizes the results of on-chain forensic analysis and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) investigation regarding the digital asset theft incident that occurred between December 7 and 8, 2025.The incident appears to have originated from a social engineering attack targeting an active user of Memex, a major dApp in the MemeCore (M) ecosystem. The attacker impersonated community administrators and creators to lure the victim into a fake Telegram group, then induced them to connect their wallet to a fraudulent bot service using “high-yield staking rewards” as bait.The victim created a new wallet and transferred assets as instructed, but the flow was designed to funnel funds into the attacker’s scam network.On-chain analysis reveals that the stolen funds did not end with a simple transfer. A multi-stage laundering flow was observed, involving MRC-20 token swaps within the MemeCore network, repetitive transactions based on the WM contract, cross-chain bridging via Meson Finance, inflows into Centralized Exchanges (CEX), and dispersed withdrawals across multiple exchanges.Notably, a “direct-to-exchange” flow is clearly visible in the early stages. M tokens were directly transferred from the victim’s wallet to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and this fund was collected into the exchange’s hot wallet (0x1ab4…) within a short period. This suggests the attacker operated a direct route to the exchange alongside other methods to accelerate cash-out early on.The damage is calculated based on two criteria:Total M Token Outflow (Direct): 2,151.11 M, approx. $2,881.39 (Combined sum of direct transfers to exchange + EOA/Gathering Wallet).Total M Token Outflow (Including Bridge): 8,280.11 M, approx. $11,150.17 (Direct outflow + Meson bridge outflow included).Furthermore, clues suggesting a connection to specific social accounts and developer community profiles were identified in Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), which was confirmed as a key hub for money laundering. Based on this, grounds to narrow down suspect candidates have been partially secured. However, this is a circumstantial judgment based on the correlation between public information (OSINT) and on-chain data, and is not a legally confirmed conclusion.1.1 Summary StatisticsThe key flows are summarized as follows:1.2 Summary of Key Flows (4 Core Paths)Path 1: Victim → Direct Outflow to Bitget (Attempt at Immediate Cash-out)A total of 2,140.72 M (approx. $2,867) was directly transferred from the Victim Wallet (0xdc54…) to Suspect Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…).The deposit was collected into the Bitget exchange hot wallet (Bitget 6, 0x1ab4…) within minutes (approx. 3–5 mins).This flow represents the attacker sending “M tokens that are easy to cash out immediately” straight to the exchange.Path 2: Victim → Gathering Wallet 1 → Meson Bridge → Gathering Wallet 2 (Mainstream of Indirect Laundering)After WM contract processing, 5 types of MRC-20 tokens were received by the Victim Wallet and then drained to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…e6).In Gathering Wallet 1, MRC-20s were swapped back to M, and 6,129 M was bridged via Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3).6,122.87 M arrived at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) on the BNB Chain.Path 3: Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Reconsolidation at Bitget Deposit 2 (Possible Mixing with Other Victims’ Funds)900.65 M from Gathering Wallet 1 and 5,007.02 M from Gathering Wallet 2 flowed into Suspect Bitget Deposit 2 (0xb408…).The combined total is 5,907.67 M. As there is a “possibility of other victims’ funds being mixed,” this needs to be interpreted separately from the victim’s sole damage amount.Subsequent collection into Bitget 6 (0x1ab4…) was confirmed.Path 4: Multi-chain Dispersed Withdrawal from Gathering Wallet 2 (Evasion/Smurfing)From Gathering Wallet 2, after swapping M → BNB, there is a record of 37.51 BNB being dispersed and withdrawn in 48 transactions to 5 exchanges: Bybit, Bitget, MEXC, Binance, and Remitano.Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base as well as BNB, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern.2. Incident Mechanism and Psychological AnalysisThis incident appears to have started from a social engineering scenario targeting human trust rather than technical flaws such as system vulnerabilities. It seems to be a variation of the typical “Pig Butchering (Sha Zhu Pan)” tactic adapted to the MemeCore ecosystem context. There are indications that the attacker analyzed the community atmosphere and the victim’s activity patterns beforehand to approach with a tailored script.2.1 Manipulating the Environment to Build Trust: “The Illusion of the Fake Room” The attack seems to have begun with an approach from an account mimicking an acquaintance active on Memex. In anonymous messenger environments like Telegram, profile pictures and Display Names can be configured similarly, and Usernames (Handles) are hard to distinguish with just a one-character difference. The attacker judged to have secured trust by exploiting these characteristics. The Telegram room the victim was invited to contained multiple accounts impersonating Admins and Creators. They staged the room to look like an “Official Community” by continuing conversations or sharing profit verification screenshots even before the victim joined. In such an environment, it was easy to mistake the room for an extension of the official Memex community, which became the basis for the fraud.2.2 Technical Deception: Fake Bot and Inducing Wallet Connection Once a certain level of trust was established, the attacker guided the victim saying, “You can receive staking rewards if you connect your wallet via the Telegram bot”. The method is close to a typical Phishing or Drainer type. The wallet (0xDC54…69b) the victim newly created and connected was a “clean wallet” with almost no transaction history. The moment the victim trusted the instructions and moved assets, it is likely the attacker secured control through one (or a combination) of the following methods:Possibility that the transaction signed via the bot was actually an Unlimited Token Approval, not staking.Possibility that it was designed to execute an asset Transfer transaction during the signing or connection process.Possibility that keys or permissions were exposed to the attacker during the wallet creation/connection process. The key point is that “Wallet Connection” may have turned into an act of handing over actual asset authority, rather than simple login or authentication.3. Technical Characteristics of MemeCore Ecosystem and Asset StructureTo interpret the fund flow, it is necessary to first understand the background of the MemeCore chain where the victim’s assets existed and the asset structure. This explains why the attacker performed repetitive swaps and why the laundering path developed into a specific pattern.3.1 MemeCore and Proof of Meme (PoM) MemeCore is a Layer 1 chain aimed at connecting the cultural value of Memes with an economic reward structure. It promotes Proof of Meme (PoM) as its consensus structure, which includes elements like community contribution and viral activities in the reward system alongside simple staking. The base asset of this chain is the M token. M is used for core functions such as gas fees, governance, and validator staking, and has relatively high liquidity, which is why the attacker ultimately pooled funds into M for laundering.3.2 MRC-20 Token Standard and Cash-out Constraints Tokens such as NinjaMEX, walxop, LIFT, Bubger, and Abudium identified in the swap path of this incident follow the MemeCore-specific token standard (MRC-20). These appear to be “transit tokens” temporarily passed through during the process of the attacker exchanging stolen assets on the internal DEX, rather than assets originally held by the victim. Technically similar to ERC-20, they are structured for the creation and circulation of meme tokens within MemeCore. The issue is external compatibility. Since it is rare for external chains, centralized exchanges, or bridges to directly support MRC-20, it is difficult for the attacker to move them out externally and cash them out in the MRC-20 state. Eventually, to proceed to the actual cash-out stage, they must go through the flow of: converting back to M on the internal DEX -> moving to an external chain (BNB Chain, etc.) via a bridge -> attempting cash-out via swap/dispersed withdrawal on the external chain. The massive internal swap transactions observed in the report are interpreted as reflecting the constraint of having to convert back to M for external export, along with the possibility of transit swaps intended to confuse tracking in some sections.4. Incident Timeline and Detailed Forensic ReconstructionThis incident is clearly divided into Reconnaissance & Testing on December 7 and the Main Exploit on December 8. The attacker checked the validity of the path the day before, and then stole all available assets and proceeded with rapid laundering the next day.4.1 Phase 1: Reconnaissance and Initial Infiltration (Dec 7) — Traces Left by Destination Choice Immediately after securing access rights, the attacker showed a pattern of verifying two things with small (or relatively small) transfers first, rather than moving the full amount immediately:Whether the wallet is actually usable by the attacker.Whether the exchange deposit is processed normally (no risk of detection/blocking). At 10:18 UTC, 388.717 M was transferred to Bitget Deposit 1 (0x7a5d…), and at 14:08 UTC, an additional 752 M was transferred via the same path. This flow aligns with the typical pattern of a small test followed by additional transfers. The notable point is that the receiving address 0x7a5d…337 is estimated to be a User-Assigned Deposit Address of a Centralized Exchange (Bitget), not a personal wallet. Funds flowing into this address were observed being collected into the Bitget hot wallet (0x1ab4…f23) within minutes. If cooperation with the exchange is established, there is a possibility that tracking can continue on an account basis (KYC-based).4.2 Phase 2: Full-Scale Asset Theft and Laundering (Dec 8) — Forced Conversion to M and Exfiltration The full-scale theft proceeded rapidly on December 8. In this phase, it is observed that repetitive processing of the WM contract and mass liquidation (swap) of MRC-20 tokens were carried out in parallel with simple transfers.4.2.1 WM Repetitive Processing Pattern: Between 06:45 and 06:49 UTC, 8 repetitive transactions occurred against the WM contract, confirming processing (Deposit/Withdraw) of approximately 8,000 M. This repetitive wrapping/unwrapping can be interpreted as (1) a staging to confuse tracking, or (2) a preparatory step to match the asset form required for subsequent swaps/bridging.4.2.2 Organized Outflow of 5 MRC-20 Tokens and Immediate Cash-out: Around 1:24 PM, continuous M→MRC-20 swap transactions via the internal DEX occurred in the victim’s wallet, which appear to have been performed by the attacker. Subsequently, these 5 MRC-20 tokens were transferred to Gathering Wallet 1 (0x8325…eae6), where a process of converting them back to M via the Swap Router was observed. This choice is pragmatic from the attacker’s perspective. The longer low-liquidity meme tokens are held, the greater the price fluctuation and tracking traces may become. It seems the attacker chose to quickly convert MRC-20 to M to increase mobility and cash-out potential.4.3 Phase 3: Cross-Chain Bridging and Final Concealment — Attempt to Evade Tracking via Chain Hopping The secured M tokens did not stay in the MemeCore chain for long and were observed moving to the BNB Chain via the Meson Finance (0x25ab…48d3) cross-chain bridge.Meson Bridge: 6,129 M Deposited.BNB Chain Arrival: 6,122.87 M received at Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) (Approx. 3 mins to arrive). Gathering Wallet 2 subsequently acts as a hub to send funds to exchanges or disperse them to other chains (Base, Arbitrum). It has a strong character of a “Operational Wallet” used repeatedly rather than a simple transit point.5. Fund Flow Structure AnalysisFunds drained from the victim’s wallet moved largely in two directions:Direct Outflow straight to the exchange (Priority: Speed).Indirect Laundering via gathering wallets and bridges (Priority: Evasion).5.1 Key Deposit (Receiving) AddressesSuspect Bitget Deposit 1: 0x7a5d...337 / Received: 2,140.72 M (~$2,867.47) / Note: Exchange Transfer.Gathering Wallet 1 (MemeCore): 0x8325...eae6 / Received: 5 MRC-20s + 10.39 M / Note: MRC-20 → M Swap.Gathering Wallet 2 (Multi-chain Same Address): 0x1c00...285f / Received: 6,122.87 M & Multi-chain activity (BNB/Arbitrum/Base).Suspect Bitget Deposit 2: 0xb408...dd5c / Received: 5,907.67 M (~$7,969) / Note: From Gathering Wallets 1, 2 → Exchange. Caution: Possibility of mixing with other victims' funds..5.2 Characteristics and Implications in Fund Flow First, the laundering strategy is split into two. Part of it prioritized speed by sending it quickly to the exchange (Path 1), while the rest tried to make tracking difficult through bridging and multi-chain dispersion (Paths 2, 4). Second, Bitget appears repeatedly. Both the direct outflow path (0x7a5d…) and the path from the gathering wallet (0xb408…) converge to Bitget deposit addresses. In particular, 0xb408… is a common point receiving funds from both Gathering Wallet 1 and Gathering Wallet 2, making it a candidate for a key cash-out window. However, as other victims’ funds may be mixed in this section, definitive conclusions should be avoided. Third, Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f) functions as a central node that receives bridged funds and then performs exchange transfers or dispersion to other chains.5.3 Multi-Exchange Dispersed Withdrawal (Smurfing) Statistics (BNB Only) From Gathering Wallet 2 (BNB Chain) → Exchange Withdrawal Statistics:Bybit: 23.44 BNB / 16 txsBitget: 7.15 BNB / 2 txsMEXC Global: 5.06 BNB / 22 txsRemitano: 1.30 BNB / 4 txsBinance: 0.56 BNB / 4 txsTotal Exchange Withdrawals: 37.51 BNB / 48 txs / 5 Exchanges Note: After swapping M → BNB at Gathering Wallet 2, dispersed withdrawals were made to multiple exchanges. Activity of the same address was confirmed on Arbitrum and Base, reinforcing the cross-chain laundering pattern. Reference: Remitano is known as a platform widely used for P2P trading in Southeast Asia, which can serve as a reference clue for geographic profiling (Note: Do not conclude).6. Relevant Actor Intelligence AnalysisIn this investigation, by cross-examining on-chain flows and off-chain public activity traces, we secured clues to narrow down the relevant Actor (Actor A) and associated account/profile candidates. The central address of the analysis is Gathering Wallet 2 (0x1c00…5f), and OSINT information was organized around this address.6.1 Circumstances Connecting On-Chain Activity and Digital Identity In this case, some clues were observed where 0x1c00…5f, identified as a key gathering address, could be connected to external public activities. If the same address is repeatedly mentioned or exposed in specific social accounts or community profiles, it can serve as important evidence connecting on-chain addresses with off-chain activities. There are circumstances where a specific social account marked as (Redacted) posted the 0x1c00…5f address multiple times in posts related to past airdrops, whitelist registrations, faucet participation, etc. This raises the possibility that the address is associated with the account’s activity to a certain level.6.2 Detailed Identity Profile (Circumstantial) In the OSINT investigation, circumstances were confirmed where the social account/handle marked as (Redacted) is connected to a specific bounty/task platform (e.g., Superteam Earn) account/profile. The following additional information is derived from this:Real Name/Legal Identity: (Redacted)Country/Region of Residence: (Redacted; Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns, etc.)Professional Identity: (Redacted; Based on self-introduction)Tech Stack Claims: (Redacted)Activity Character: (Redacted)Additional Explanation: Meaning of “Partially Consistent with Remitano Usage Patterns” Here, “Partially consistent with Remitano usage patterns” does not mean concluding residence in a specific country/region (e.g., Vietnam) solely because Remitano appeared. It is intended to be referred to as a supplementary clue that increases probability from the perspective of Geo-profiling. specifically:Regional Character of Remitano: Remitano is known to be relatively widely used for P2P On/Off-ramp (cash-out/settlement) purposes in Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) rather than being used equally worldwide like global major exchanges. Therefore, if Remitano is naturally included and repeatedly observed in the multi-exchange withdrawal flow, the possibility that the actor’s living sphere/settlement environment touches the Southeast Asian region (including Vietnam) relatively increases.Hints form “Exchange Combination”: In this case, regional P2P channels like Remitano appear alongside general-purpose exchanges like Bybit, Binance, and MEXC. This combination can be interpreted as a form often observed in dispersed withdrawals considering the final cash-out route, rather than simple investor propensity.Therefore, Remitano traces are worth referencing as a “Geographic Clue Candidate”. However, it is a “Supplementary Clue,” not definitive evidence. Final confirmation must be made through cooperation/investigation data such as exchange KYC, login/access logs (IP/Device), and withdrawal methods (Bank/Payment info).7. Conclusion & Our CommitmentComprehensive Conclusion This incident, occurring on December 7–8, 2025, was a social engineering-based asset theft. Funds were laundered through two parallel paths:A direct path flowing straight into the Bitget exchange (Speed).An indirect path exfiltrated to external chains via the Meson bridge after internal swaps on MemeCore (Stealth).Additionally, circumstantial evidence links “Gathering Wallet 2” (0x1c00...5f) to specific social accounts and developer profiles, providing strong identification clues for law enforcement.Response Strategy ChainBounty has advised a phased response:Phase 1: Immediate reporting to law enforcement with key TxIDs and requesting asset freezing at Bitget.Phase 2: International cooperation review for cross-border tracking.Phase 3: Continuous monitoring of suspect addresses and community education on risk factors.Need help tracking stolen funds? Recovering stolen assets starts with professional tracking. If you have been targeted by a similar exploit, do not hesitate to reach out. ChainBounty’s Victim Relief Program provides the forensic evidence needed for law enforcement reporting and exchange cooperation.👉 Apply for Victim Relief Program: https://chainbounty.io/en/event/campaign-victim-support/(Disclaimer: This report is based on on-chain data and public OSINT. Identity-related content is circumstantial estimation. Final legal judgments must be confirmed through lawful procedures by law enforcement agencies.)
ChainBounty
9 months ago